The Buddhist Association of China (BAC), a supposedly non-political organization, is becoming a key instrument in the Chinese Communist Party’s strategy to assimilate and transform Tibetan Buddhism, particularly in relation to the search for and recognition of reincarnate lamas. This process, which is intended to break down Tibetan Buddhism’s unique characteristics and to change it into a tool of the Chinese state, is known as Sinification.^[1]

Since President Xi Jinping’s announcement of his intent to Sinify the religions of the PRC in 2012, the BAC has been mandated as the tool to implement campaigns that will contribute to its fruition, particularly in connection with Tibetan Buddhism. Accordingly, the BAC has been strengthening its institutional foundation in recent years, which includes five-year plans and shaping monastic training to meet political goals.

When the BAC was founded in 1953, its political agenda was not highlighted. The draft charter of the association discussed in its first meeting in May-June 1953 outlined its purpose:

To unite Buddhists throughout the country and, under the leadership of the people’s government, to participate in the movement for the protection of the motherland and the defense of world peace; to assist the people’s government in carrying out the policy of freedom of religion and belief, and to contact Buddhists in all parts of the country to carry forward the fine traditions of Buddhism.^[2]

However, the charter was amended in subsequent years with the political agenda becoming more prominent. In 2020 it was amended to include “Sinification of Buddhism in China” as one of its objectives, to read, “support the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the socialist system, study and implement Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, adhere to the direction of the Sinification of Buddhism in China.”^[3]

Today, the BAC has adopted an overwhelming political tone and language and exhibits no qualms in pushing forward the CCP’s political agenda.

The Chinese leadership’s objective of Sinification of Tibetan Buddhism was most recently reiterated during the Two Sessions held in March 2024, when Wang Huning, head of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), said that they “carried out 10 research and inspections in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Tibet-related counties in Sichuan Province on promoting the Sinification of Tibetan Buddhism.”

The CCP strategy of Sinification is more than its literal meaning of transforming something into Chinese. This is evident from the fact that even the traditional home-grown Chinese religion Daoism is having to go through Sinification, with the China Daoist Association being assigned to take the lead.^[4]

At a “Buddhist Educational Affairs and Teaching Style Work Training Course of the China Buddhist Association” on Mount Wutai, Shanxi province on Sept. 5, 2023, participants were told that “Sinicizing” Buddhism means to “comprehensively and thoroughly study and implement the spirit of the 20th National Congress of CCP and Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, and thoroughly study and implement General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important expositions on religious work.”^[5]

The Chinese authorities have realized that Tibetan Buddhism is the core of Tibetan identity, and the attempt is to alter this identity to comply with their CCP goals. Thus, to the CCP, Sinification serves to make Tibetan Buddhism conform to the CCP ideology and be an active agent of its promotion and implementation.

Sinification is thus linked to the future of Tibetan Buddhism. During his visit to the Tibetan town of Chamdo (Chinese: Changdu) in June 2023, the China-selected Panchen Lama Gyaltsen Norbu was quoted by state media as saying, “Today, whether or not Tibetan Buddhism can adapt to the socialist society with Chinese characteristics and whether or not we can sinicize Tibetan Buddhism will determine the future and development of Tibetan Buddhism.”^[6]

As far back as 2014, at a seminar on “Implementation of Sinification of Tibetan Buddhism” held at the Sichuan Tibetan Buddhist College in Chengdu, the Chinese authorities laid out four reasons for Sinification:

The Sinification of Tibetan Buddhism is an inevitable requirement for the healthy inheritance of Tibetan Buddhism, inevitable requirement for Tibetan Buddhism to be compatible with socialist society. the inevitable requirement for the integration of Tibetan Buddhism and Chinese culture, and the inevitable requirement for synchronization with the rule of law.^[7]

To lay a foundation for Sinification of Tibetan Buddhism, China is attempting to create a false narrative in terms of its history, as with China’s political claim over Tibet, which it says goes back in history. The most recent indication of this is in an article on Tibet in the authoritative CCP theoretical bimonthly journal “Qiushi” (“Seeking Truth”) on March 16, 2024, which categorically asserts, “Tibetan Buddhism is a product of the Sinification of Buddhism and has played a positive role in the formation of China’s unified multi-ethnic state.”^[8] To make this article even more authoritative, “CPC Tibet Autonomous Region Committee” has been listed as the author.^[9] Similarly, state media outlet China Daily carried an “interview” on Tibetan Buddhism with a researcher with the Minzu University of China (formerly the Institute for Nationalities). When asked as to the origin of Tibetan Buddhism, the researcher is reported as saying, “Tibetan Buddhism not only originates from ancient Indian Buddhism, but also from Chinese Buddhism.”^[10] The China-selected Panchen Lama told a meeting of the China Buddhist Association that “Tibetan Buddhism is an important part of the excellent traditional Chinese culture.”^[11]

To put the role of the BAC in context, it is vital to understand the changes to the Chinese government’s approach to Tibetan Buddhism. For the first several years leading to and after the Chinese invasion and occupation of Tibet, there was a policy of complete annihilation of Tibetan religion, including its institutions. In 1960, one year after the Dalai Lama was able to escape from Tibet to India, with around 80,000 Tibetans able to follow him, the Legal Inquiry Committee of the International Commission of Jurists issued a report following extensive interviews with Tibetan refugees, concluding, “The evidence available from Chinese sources themselves reveals an intention to put an end to the ancient religious practices and institutions of Tibet and to allow only that degree of freedom of religious belief which would be compatible with complete acceptance of communism, in short, none at all.”^[12]

After the Cultural Revolution, there was a brief period of liberalization in the 1980s, leading to a resurgence of Tibetan religious fervor. In an apparent realization of the failure of its policy of elimination of Tibetan Buddhism, the Chinese leadership slowly began to change its policy to one of control.

The CCP’s notorious United Front Work Department (UFWD) is in overall charge of Sinification with the State Administration of Religious Affairs (SARA)—which until 2018 was under the State Council and since then has been put directly under the control of the UFWD—projected as the functional department of the government to implement the policy. In fact, all meetings of the BAC at different levels are not only participated by UFWD officials but are addressed by them with their remarks becoming the guiding principles. The BAC is thus being used as the front to give religious legitimacy to the implementation of the CCP policy.

Accordingly, both SARA and the BAC have been issuing directives over the past several years all aimed at making Tibetan Buddhism conform with CCP ideology.

In 2009, the BAC adopted Measures for Qualification Certification of Tibetan Buddhist Clergy outlining the fundamental requirement of allegiance to the CCP to teach in the monasteries. These measures were revised by the BAC in 2019 with the following being the first of the basic conditions to be met by a teacher: “Love the country and religion, support the leadership of the Communist Party of China, support the socialist system, adhere to the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, abide by the constitution, laws, regulations, rules and policies, and unequivocally safeguard the unity of the motherland, oppose ethnic divisions, and maintain religious harmony; be harmonious with society, adhere to the direction of Sinicizing Buddhism, and practice the core socialist values.”

In 2011, the BAC announced “Measures for the appointment of main teaching positions in Tibetan Buddhist monasteries” in which a fundamental requirement for being in monastic leadership positions like Khenpo (abbot), Gekoe (disciplinarian), Umze (chant master) is to “Support the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the socialist system.”^[13]

The traditional system of awarding religious degrees by the ecclesiastical community was replaced with the CCP-controlled State Administration of Religious Affairs and the religious affairs departments of the people’s governments of provinces and autonomous regions being appointed to supervise and guide the awarding of Tibetan Buddhist degrees.

One concrete indication of the entrenched ideological role for the BAC is the institution of a Party Committee within it even though it is a religion-focused entity, supposedly run by religious leaders. Given that CCP members are not permitted to join any religion, the BAC party committee’s leadership seems to be from the United Front Work Department. For example, the Tibet Autonomous Region BAC party committee’s general secretary is Sonam Rinzin (Chinese: Suolang Renzeng), who was a deputy head of the TAR United Front Work Department before becoming a vice chair of the TAR CPPCC.

The Party Secretary of the Dechen (Diqing) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Buddhist Association is Yang Jinhua, also a lay Tibetan and a CCP cadre. He has been working in Dechen since 1995, including in the CCP’s foreign affairs and propaganda divisions in the prefecture.

Naturally, the party committee in the BAC is the decision-making authority, above the abbots and lamas, and has total control of the monastic community.

As part of its efforts to have the BAC be an effective tool in fulfilling its political agenda, the CCP had the BAC organize major Buddhist conferences to seek international legitimacy. Thus, in April 2006, the first of what is called the World Buddhist Forum was held in China (the occasion was also used to launch the China-selected Panchen Lama on international stage^[14]), with the second in 2009 and the third in 2012. Since “harmonious society” was the guiding CCP ideology under then-President Hu Jintao, the theme of each conference was also shaped accordingly as being “A harmonious world begins in the mind.” But after Xi Jinping took over in 2012, the fourth forum in 2015 and the fifth in 2018 replaced the “harmonious society” theme. The sixth WBF is scheduled this year in Ningbo.

One of the ways adopted to control Tibetan Buddhism was the establishment of specialized training institutes for Tibetan Buddhist clergy outside of the framework of traditional monasteries.

After shifting to a policy of control of Tibetan Buddhism in the 1980s, a series of Tibetan Buddhist institutes was established by the CCP, all overseen by the BAC, wherein patriotic education was an integral part of its curriculum. In 1982, the first such institute, the High-level Tibetan Buddhist College, was opened near the Tibetan capital Lhasa. Interestingly, the authorities closed this institute in 1996, citing “the influence of the Dalai Lama clique’s separatist activities,” and reestablished it only in 2009. In 1984, the Qinghai Tibetan Buddhist College and the Sichuan Tibetan Buddhist College were established. In 1986 the Gansu Buddhist College was established to train Tibetan monks and nuns from Kanlho (Gannan) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture. Thereafter, a High-level Tibetan Buddhism College of China was set up in 1987 in Beijing to serve as the national body. The Yunnan Tibetan Buddhist College was established in 1997. The college in Beijing has subsequently been charged with overseeing the giving of monastic degrees, traditionally the role of the monastic organization.

An example of how the indoctrination of the students in these institutes is taking place can be seen from a seminar on “History Customization and Policies and Regulations of the Reincarnation of Tibetan Buddhist Living Buddhas” at the High-level Tibetan Buddhism College of China on March 8, 2024. Participants were told by a CCP official to “deepen their study of the religious rituals and historical customization of the reincarnation of the Living Buddha, and fully understand that the domestic search for the reincarnation of the Great Living Buddha, the drawing of lots from the golden urn, and the government approval of historical customs are necessary for the reincarnation of the Living Buddha. important principles to uphold.”^[15]

The BAC has come out with regulations and other bureaucratic control initiatives to meet its political objectives. On Sinification, in 2018 it announced the five-year work plan outline for adhering to the Sinification of Buddhism (2019-2023). This plan laid out the political direction of the BAC, calling for the study and implementation of Xi Jinping Thought, with the fundamental basis of supporting the CCP and core socialist values.^[16]

Given that the first five-year plan has not been completely successful, in 2022, the BAC came out with another Five-Year Work Plan for Deepening the Sinification of Buddhism in China (2023-2027) for the next five years. The text of this latest plan is not publicly available yet, but the 2019-2023 plan had two direct references to Tibetan Buddhism. It mandated the Tibetan Buddhist community to work on explaining Buddhist teachings to strengthen its ideological construction in the “new era,” and providing expositions of the teachings and rules of Tibetan Buddhism that are in line with the requirements of the development and progress of contemporary China and in line with the excellent traditional Chinese culture.

The BAC has a special Tibetan Buddhism Working Committee, whose mandate is to “assist the party committee and government in strengthening the management of temples in accordance with the law and unite monks around the party and the government to the greatest extent.”^[17] It is this committee that oversees the implementation of the CCP directives to the Tibetan monasteries.

The committee has 27 members, including four who are not Tibetan. The director is an elderly lama from Kardze (Ganzi), Gyalten Lobsang Jampa (Jiadeng Luorong Xiangba), who is known to be a “patriotic” lama.

In a statement on Sinification of Tibetan Buddhism issued in May 2023, the working committee said

We must take the lead in publicizing laws and regulations such as the “Measures for the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas of Tibetan Buddhism”, and in accordance with General Secretary Xi Jinping’s requirements of “being politically reliable, religiously accomplished, morally able to convince the public, and effective at critical moments”, and dare to take responsibility at critical moments, Always stand with the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people.^[18]

The five-year plan also called for carrying out patriotic education, thus bringing a direct connection between the agenda of BAC and the Patriotic Education Law that was passed in October 2023. This law also promotes the objective of Sinification through the innocuous sounding clause, “The state encourages and supports religious groups, religious institutions, and religious activity sites’ carrying out of patriotic education, enhancing religious professionals’ and believers’ sense of nation, citizenship, and rule of law, and their patriotic feelings, guiding religion to adapt to socialist society.”^[19]

Soon after the coming into effect of the Patriotic Education Law on Jan. 1, 2024, the National Joint Conference of Religious Groups met on Jan. 4 and issued guidelines on its implementation, including to “promote the deepening and solidification of the Sinification of religion in our country.”^[20]

The BAC president Yanjue expanded on this in an article in February 2024 in which he outlined how the association has carried out work around strengthening patriotism education. One of the activities was to “Deepen the practical cultivation of patriotism. We will closely integrate the development of patriotism education with the promotion of the Sinification of Buddhism, conscientiously implement the contents of the ‘Five-Year Work Plan for Deeply Promoting the Sinification of Buddhism (2023-2027).’”^[21]

For Tibetan Buddhists, their understanding of patriotic education was made clear when in 2022, the Tibet Autonomous Region branch of the BAC issued the “Initiative of the Tibetan Branch of the China Buddhist Association on Maintaining Harmony and Stability in the Field of Tibetan Buddhism to Welcome the Victory of the Party’s 20th National Congress” to educate “the monks and nuns of the monasteries and temples to consciously draw a clear line of demarcation between the Fourteenth Dalai and the Dalai clique.”^[22]

Karma Tseten, head of the TAR United Front Work Department, told a meeting of the TAR branch of the BAC in July 2023 that they should be “listening to the Party, feeling the Party’s benevolence, and following the Party’s lead, resolutely oppose secession, adhere to the Party Central Committee’s unswerving characterization of the 14th Dalai Lama and the Dalai clique, adhere to the unswerving approach to the struggle against the Dalai Clique, educate and guide religious figures and monks and nuns in temples and monasteries to consciously draw a clear line between themselves and the 14th Dalai Lama and the Dalai Lama clique.”^[23]

The most critical area where the BAC will contribute to the CCP agenda would be in the search and recognition of Tibetan reincarnations. In the initial decades after 1959 the recognition of Tibetan reincarnated lamas was not allowed at all. In her seminal book, “The Search for the Panchen Lama,” Isabel Hilton, who had special access to the Dalai Lama and spent months researching in Tibet and India, mentions the following concerning development in Chinese policy toward the reincarnation system and reincarnated lamas who are known as Trulkus or Tulkus: “For decades after the occupation the recognition of Trulkus was forbidden. The monasteries were disbanded and the teachers who would have transmitted the tradition to the young incarnates were dead, scattered or in exile. But in 1979 Chinese policy changed. Limited recognition of trulkus is now permitted, as long as it remains under official control.”^[24]

The BAC has been assigned a role in the CCP-determined recognition process of reincarnations and their training. The revised Religious Affairs Regulations announced by the State Council, which came into effect Feb. 1, 2018, mandates (Article 36) that “The succession of living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism is to be conducted under the guidance of Buddhist groups,”^[25] “Buddhist groups” being a reference to the BAC and its chapters.

The BAC plays a primarily political role. Arjia Rinpoche, the abbot of Kumbum Monastery in northeastern Tibet, who had the highest status among Tibetan Buddhists in the Chinese political system until his flight into exile in 1998, had mentioned his apprehension of being appointed to head the BAC^[26] and to oversee the China-selected Panchen Lama’s upbringing as the main reason for his coming out of Tibet.^[27]

This CCP process is certainly in preparation for the Chinese government’s long-term strategy on the future reincarnation of the Dalai Lama. An indication of how they might be planning to apply it can be seen from the way the CCP handled the Panchen Lama reincarnation issue.

On Jan. 30, 1989, three days after the death of the Panchen Lama, the Chinese government announced a ” Decision on the Funeral and Reincarnation of the Tenth Panchen Lama.” The decision stated:

According to the request of the Tashilhunpo Monastery Democratic Management Committee and the monks, and with reference to historical practices, the State Council has made the following decisions on mourning and reincarnation issues: (1) Build the tenth shrine at Tashilhunpo Monastery in Shigatse City. The Tibet Autonomous Region People’s Government and Tashilhunpo were instructed to construct the stupa and shrine for Panchen Erdeni Choekyi Gyaltsen for future generations to pay homage to and commemorate his achievements in patriotism and religion. The Tashilhunpo Temple Democratic Management Committee shall jointly handle matters such as the preservation of remains in accordance with the rituals of Tibetan Buddhism. (3) The Democratic Management Committee of Tashilhunpo Monastery will be responsible, and if necessary, the Buddhist Association of China and the Tibet Branch of the Buddhist Association will assist in handling matters such as the search and identification of the reincarnation of the 10th Panchen Erdeni Choeky Gyaltsen, and report to the State Council for approval.^[28]

Accordingly, the Chinese government formed a search committee for his reincarnation to be chaired by Gyayak Rinpoche, the tutor of the Panchen Lama. Its members included Chadrel Rinpoche (abbot and head of the Tashi Lhunpo Democratic Management Committee), Bomi Jampa Lodoe (head of the TAR Buddhist Association and acting Gaden Tripa), Arjia Rinpoche, Gungthang Rinpoche, Ngagchen Rinpoche, etc. Following Gyayak Rinpoche’s passing in 1990, Chadrel Rinpoche was made the head of the committee. The then-President of the BAC Zhao Puchu and Vice President Phakpala Gelek Namgyal were made “consultants.” More importantly, a CCP “leading group for the search for the reincarnated Panchen Lama” was formed, headed by Li Ruihuan a member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). The Leading Group was the one that was overseeing the religious search committee and giving directives.

In November 1995, Li Ruihuan outlined a six-stage process that they had adopted for the Panchen Lama search. He said:

The main ones are as follows: First, the establishment of Tashilhunpo Monastery is mainly based on living Buddhas and eminent monks. The second is to search for the reincarnated boy in accordance with religious rituals and procedures. The third is to submit the candidate children to participate in the drawing of lots to the central government for approval. The fourth is to send personnel from the central government to preside over the drawing of lots from the golden urn. The fifth is to draw lots. The recognized soul boy reports to the central government for formal approval of the succession. Sixth, the central government sends personnel to preside over the enthronement ceremony of the reincarnated soul boy. Among these items, the drawing of lots from the golden urn is particularly important.^[29]

The BAC was also used by the Chinese government as the vehicle in 1989 to invite the Dalai Lama to the memorial service for the Panchen Lama. “President Zhao Puchu of the association handed a letter of invitation to a personal representative of the Dalai Lama,” a Chinese White Paper on Tibet of 1992, “Tibet – Its Ownership And Human Rights Situation,” said. The Dalai Lama ended up not going. Similarly, in 1994, the Dalai Lama had sent an invitation to Chadrel Rinpoche through Gyalo Thondup to come to Dharamsala to continue discussions on the Panchen Lama. He also ended up not coming to India.^[30]

The CCP has introduced the following measures, regulations and initiatives to exercise control over the recognition of reincarnations. In 2019, the Chinese spokesperson responded to the Dalai Lama’s assertion about his authority to decide on his reincarnation by saying that the process would have to be as per Chinese law.

1. The “Management Measures for the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism” (Order No. 5) passed by the State Administration of Religious Affairs—also known as National Religious Affairs Administration in English—on July 18, 2007, that came into force on Sept. 1, 2007.^[31] It articulates in detail the selection, installation and education of reincarnate lamas. The regulations are aimed at ensuring that layers of control are the same both in the Tibet Autonomous Region and all other Tibetan areas now incorporated into the People’s Republic of China.
2. The 2010 “Tibetan Buddhism Living Buddha Certificates” provided by the BAC to reincarnations who have been approved by the Chinese government. The certificate, which is the size of an ID card, includes the lay name, religious name, sect and name of monastery to which the individual belongs. Each certificate has a unique 14-digit number, the China selected Panchen Lama’s certificate number being 54230111100000.
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   PHOTO: A Chinese state media sample of “Tibetan Buddhism Living Buddha Certificate”
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3. The 2016 “Tibetan Buddhism Living Buddha Inquiry System” launched by the BAC to verify legitimacy of reincarnations. In January 2016, the database started with 870 names, while in April the same year, it increased to 1,300. Notably, the Dalai Lama is not listed in this database.
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   PHOTO: A screenshot of the “Tibetan Buddhism Living Buddha Inquiry System” website
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4. The “Revised Religious Affairs Regulations” (Order No. 686) passed by the State Council on June 14, 2017 that came into force on Feb. 1, 2018. It mandates that the religious community shall “practice the core socialist values; and preserve the unification of the country, ethnic unity, religious harmony and social stability.”
5. The “Measures for the Administration of Religious Clergy” (Order No. 15) passed by SARA on Jan. 8, 2021, regulating the administration of religious clergy.^[32] The measures, which came into force on May 1, 2021, standardize state management of clergy to serve the ideological and political interests of the state and legally underpins the “Sinification” of religion policy in China. Article 15 in the regulation explicitly reaffirms the state’s role in management and approval of Tibetan reincarnate lamas.
6. “Administrative Measures for Religious Activity Venues” (Order No. 19) that came into force on Sept. 1, 2023 that also repealed Order No. 2 of the 2005 “Measures for Approval and Registration of the Establishment of Places of Religious Activities.”^[33] The measures not only place all religions as subservient to the CCP but also mandates that they implement Xi Jinping thought. Article 3 says:
   

   Places of religious activity shall uphold the leadership of the CCP and the socialist system, thoroughly implement Xi Jinping’s ideology of socialism with Chinese characteristics for the new era, abide by the Constitution, laws, rules and regulations and relevant provisions on the management of religious affairs, practice core socialist values, adhere to the direction of Sinification of China’s religions, adhere to the principle of independence, autonomy and self-sufficiency, and safeguard the unity of the country, national unity, religious harmony and social stability.

Below is a partial list of Tibetan lamas who hold leadership positions at both the national and provincial levels of the BAC. It can be assumed that these Tibetan lamas are among those who are being involved either directly or indirectly by the Chinese government on matters relating to Tibetan Buddhism, including in the search process for reincarnations at all levels.

The majority of them are from the Gelug lineage (at the national level, the honorary president and seven of the eight vice presidents) and belong to monasteries located in eastern and northeastern Tibet, areas that are outside the Tibet Autonomous Region. Four of the nine lamas are 70-plus years of age. Some of them have the title of “Huthoktu,” which is the second-highest level among reincarnations under the Tibetan government of the past. According to lama-scholar Dhungkar Lobsang Thinley, this title was bestowed by emperors of China, the Dalai Lama or the Panchen Lama in the past.

While Phakpalha Gelek Namgyal might be seniormost in terms of the Chinese official hierarchy, he is past 80 and sources in Tibet say he is not in good health. The Jamyang Shepa is likely the seniormost in the religious hierarchy, while Tsemonling Tenzin Thinley is the one with historical importance, given that he comes from one of the four traditional monasteries around Lhasa (called the four “lings” after their name: Tsemonling, Tengyeling, Shideling, and Kundeling) that have had their lamas become regents at different times during the absence of the Dalai Lamas. In terms of current politics, one of them, Drupkhang Thubten Khedrup, is among those most vocal in voicing CCP positions and has been sent abroad several times as part of official Chinese delegations. The China-selected Panchen Lama is the one with the most political value in the coming years, in terms of his age and the title he has been given. Interestingly, two of them have direct connections with prominent lamas living in exile. One of them (Sharnor Zhongba) was recognized by the 17th Karmapa, while the enthronement of another (Sertri Choekyi Lodoe Gyatso) was presided over by Arjia Rinpoche.

Quite a few of them are also heads of the Tibetan Buddhist institutes in their region (mentioned earlier in this report) or have leadership positions in their monastery’s democratic management committee, the CCP-imposed entity that ensures that the monasteries comply with party ideology. In the CCP reincarnation selection process, the democratic management committee has been used as a primary “applicant” on behalf of the monastery for search and recognition of reincarnations.

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