Underscoring China’s expanding geopolitical footprint in South Asia, a 14-member delegation from Qinghai Province’s Yulshul (Yushu) Prefecture Federation of Industry and Commerce, led by Vice Chairman Qi Yonghong, Vice Chairman of the federation and Vice Chairman of Yushu United Front Department, visited Nepal from November 24–28, 2025. This visit aligns with President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road strategy, positioning Qinghai—a Tibetan Plateau gateway—as a critical node in trans-Himalayan connectivity, challenging India’s historical dominance in the region and fostering alternative trade corridors.

The delegation’s engagements amplified China’s soft power diplomacy. In-depth talks with the Nepal Handicrafts Association yielded agreements on trade facilitation, cultural-tourism, and agricultural tech transfers, potentially reducing Nepal’s economic reliance on India while bolstering Beijing’s influence over Himalayan infrastructure. The inauguration of the Nepal–Qinghai Chamber of Commerce institutionalizes these ties that could reshape regional supply chains.

The delegation also made a 50,000-yuan donation to Srijana school in Nepal, which appears to be a standard tactic to deepen ties.

The delegation met with Chen Song, Chinese Ambassador to Nepal, and reported in detail on the development and results of the economic and trade exchange activities.

Throughout 2025, the Chinese government conducted an extensive year-long official commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) on 1 September 1965. Activities ranged from the issuance of commemorative coins and nationwide exhibitions in early 2025 to the high-profile visit by President Xi Jinping to Lhasa and the large-scale celebratory events held in August near the Potala Palace.

As part of this orchestrated narrative, China’s Tibet Daily published a three-part signed commentary series in late November 2025. The articles systematically denounced the 14th Dalai Lama as a “reactionary separatist” and an instrument of “hostile foreign forces,” while portraying six decades of Communist Party leadership as the sole path to prosperity and stability. The commentary served to reinforce Chinese official historiography, delegitimize Tibetan political aspirations, and consolidate ideological conformity across Tibet as the commemorative year drew to a close.

On November 7, Chinese state media Tibet Daily disseminated a bilingual (Chinese-Tibetan) post featuring 17 official propaganda slogans to promote the decisions of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee (July 2025). The slogans emphasize “high-quality development,” “new quality productive forces,” “building a Chinese national community,” a “high-level socialist market economy system,” “high-level opening up to the outside world,” rural revitalization, and common prosperity, alongside establishing a national ecological civilization highland.

Directly applicable to Tibet, the official slogans highlight “building a strong sense of the Chinese national community,” “writing a new chapter for a beautiful Tibet,” and turning the region into national model zones for ethnic unity, highland economic development, ecological civilization, and border consolidation (“four pioneering/model districts”).

The four major tasks for Tibet—stability, development, ecology, and border strengthening—are repeatedly stressed. These slogans are expected to serve as the ideological framework for China’s 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) in Tibet.

In a state media commentary about the Tibetan exile community—labeled as “overseas Tibetans”—China estimates around 180,000 Tibetans in exile across 40 countries. Masking China’s ongoing repression, surveillance, and brutality that drives Tibetans into exile, Chinese commentary accuses the Dalai Lama and the exile government of coercive control and extracting “independence donations”—which in reality are voluntary contributions to the Tibetan freedom movement made by Tibetans in exile. The commentary cites a datapoint according to which 30,000 Tibetans have visited Tibet since 1978, and 2,000 of them have stayed in Tibet. The commentary states that “the work of overseas Tibetan compatriots is an important part of the struggle against the Dalai Group and a long-term strategic task in the anti-separatist struggle,” which likely means continuation of China’s strategy to engage in transnational repression and meddling in the internal affairs of the exile community to stifle unity and the political struggle.

On October 31, 2025, Lhasa authorities launched the eighth “Winter Tour Tibet” campaign (November 1, 2025 – March 15, 2026) according to Chinese state media. The Potala Palace, Jokhang Temple, Norbulingka, Namtso lake, and other iconic sites have extended winter hours to attract off-season visitors.

While the “Winter Tour Tibet” campaign may boost local revenue, it shows that sacred Tibetan pilgrimage destinations such as the Potala and Namtso lake are officially managed primarily as commercial tourism products rather than living religious centers. Tibet’s most revered sites exist primarily to serve national tourism targets, with their spiritual significance seen as secondary to their economic utility.

At the 9th Session of the 13th Gar County People’s Congress, Tibetan cadre Lobsang Tenzin was “elected” County Magistrate of Gar County, Tibet Autonomous Region, Chinese state media reported October 28, 2025. Concurrently, Han Chinese judge Chang Wei was appointed as President of the Gar County People’s Court. Although not explicitly stated and the county government website has not been updated, former Party deputy secretary and county magistrate Zhang Haichun is most likely the Party secretary of Gar County.

Gar County at an altitude of 4,500 m is a strategic border county adjacent to India and Nepal.

According to a now-deleted state media post from November 24, Xiao Youcai, Deputy Secretary of the Lhasa Municipal Party Committee, emphasized during a meeting that the work of Monastery Management Committees constitutes the most important component of “stability-maintenance” (jargon for suppressing any perceived threats to the CCP’s rule and the social order under its rule) efforts. He stated that monastery management and oversight in the new era and under new conditions has entered a phase requiring even greater intensity and effort.

During Bhutan’s Global Peace Prayer Festival (November 4–19, 2025), China conducted quiet but visible Buddhist diplomacy. A 12-member delegation from the Buddhist Association of China, led by Vice President Ven. Zheng Ci, participated from November 8–13.

State media amplified Tibetan participation: singer Namtso performed, while Khampa TV anchor Chemi Lhamo’s interview with Bhutanese musician Dawa Paljor gained attention on the Chinese social media platform, Douyin. Dawa Paljor’s line — “Tibet and Bhutan share the same language and culture”—was widely circulated inside China to underline civilizational affinity.

The visit allowed Beijing to project cultural-religious commonality with Bhutan, advancing China’s broader “Buddhist diplomacy” narrative in the Himalayas.

On November 11, 2025, Wang Junzheng, Party Secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region, presided over the Religious Legislative Symposium at the People’s Hall in Lhasa. The meeting focused on advancing religious legislation and managing religious affairs according to China’s law, in alignment with Xi Jinping’s Thought on the Rule of Law and the Party’s policy of “governing Tibet according to law.” Representatives of the religious community were invited to contribute opinions and suggestions to give a false impression of open and inclusive lawmaking. Wang Junzheng emphasized the importance of fostering national consciousness and integrating Tibetan Buddhism into socialist society through “education, guidance, and dialogue”. The symposium reflected the party’s ongoing campaign to sinicize Tibetan Buddhism and maintain long-term stability under the Party’s leadership and the principles of socialism with Chinese characteristics.

Wang stressed that since May 2022, the TAR Party Committee has implemented the “Three Consciousness” (national consciousness, civic consciousness, and rule-of-law consciousness) policy to boost recognition of the Chinese motherland, Chinese nation, culture, CCP, and socialism, advancing the sinicization of religion. He emphasized that the campaign is a top-level directive: during his August 2025 Tibet inspection, Xi Jinping reiterated systematic sinicization of religion, rule-of-law governance, and adaptation to socialist society.

On November 10, 2025, the 14th Seminar on the Interpretation of Tibetan Buddhist Doctrines was held at Xihuang Temple in Beijing. The event coordinated by the Advanced Buddhist College of the Chinese Tibetan Language Department and the China Tibetan Studies Research Center focused on implementing General Secretary Xi Jinping’s directives on religious work and advancing the Party’s Tibet governance strategy. Participants were instructed to discuss exploring elements within Tibetan Buddhist doctrine to enhance cultural assimilation, upholding socialist core values, and strengthening the rule of law in religious affairs. Over 100 scholars, monks, and experts from across Tibet and other provinces attended, to explore “religious interpretation and modernization”.

On November 3, the Tibet Branch of the Buddhist Association of China convened a mobilization meeting to launch the campaign “Study Regulations, Observe Disciplines, Cultivate Conduct, and Uphold Image.” This campaign seeks to bolster legal awareness, religious discipline, and standards among Tibetan Buddhists to advance Chinese-style “modernization of religion”.

The meeting relayed directives from the United Front Work Department and the Buddhist Association of China, stressing that the sinicization of Tibetan Buddhism is vital for compatibility with socialist principles. Attendees were instructed to study Xi Jinping’s key addresses and the spirit of the 20th Party Central Committee’s Fourth Plenary Session.

Commemorating the 80th anniversary of the “Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the Anti-Fascist War,” Chinese authorities conveniently cast Tibetan monks as a bastion of wartime patriotism aligning with Han-centric nationalism.

Under the slogan of “defending the country through compassion,” state media shows a group of Tibetan monks holding a large banner at the historic Guangren Temple in Shaanxi reading, “Xi’an Guangren Temple’s Qingming Festival in 2024 will remember the revolutionary martyrs and carry forward the spirit of patriotism.” The display serves contemporary CCP agendas more than historical nuance. Quoting a Tibetan monk saying, “Without the nation, Buddhism cannot survive,” China leverages Tibetan Buddhist monks in its anti-Japan stance while masking its religious repression of Tibetans and sinicization of Tibetan Buddhism.

The United Front Work Department of the Tibet Autonomous Region organized a compulsory 15-day training program at the Hangzhou Socialist Academy and the Tibet Socialist Academy for 47 senior Tibetan Buddhist monks to “strengthen the consciousness of the Chinese national community,” according to a United Front report on November 3. Held from October 19 to November 2, the program aimed to implement Xi Jinping’s directives on religious affairs, reinforce the “five identities” (identification with the motherland, the nation, Chinese culture, the CCP, and socialism), and deepen the “three consciousnesses” (awareness of nationality, citizenship, and the rule of law).

The monks attended lectures on the “Chinese national community,” studied “advanced monastery management,” and explored the sinicization of Buddhism. Sessions at the Hangzhou Buddhist Academy emphasized doctrinal reinterpretation and alignment with socialist values. During the graduation ceremony on November 2 at the Tibet Socialist Academy, the academy leaders outlined four expectations for the monks: to uphold patriotism and religious devotion, to embrace traditional Chinese culture, to model strict self-discipline and leadership in Buddhist governance, and to embody the “three consciousnesses” in daily life to promote China’s national unity and social stability.