A senior Chinese judicial official said China has the “legitimate” right to apply its new “Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress Law” (EUPL) to individuals and organizations outside its borders.

At a news briefing on June 24, 2026, Vice Justice Minister Hu Weilie stated that the extraterritorial clause stipulated in Article 63 aligns with China’s legal principles, realities, and international practice. He said the provision “…constitutes a legitimate, lawful, necessary, and feasible legal measure” and targets “illegal acts” that “undermine ethnic unity and progress or incite ethnic separatism.”

This, in practice, could mean targeting rights activists, individuals, and organizations abroad, including Tibetans, Uyghurs, Hong Kongers, and other non-Chinese nationalities living and advocating for their rights in various parts of the world. This is perhaps the first official confirmation of the extraterritorial reach of EUPL, which was promulgated by China’s National People’s Congress in March 2026 and forcibly enacted on July 1.

Senior Chinese officials and scholars commemorated the 40th anniversary of the founding of China Tibetology Research Center on June 3, framing academic research as a primary tool to “construct an independent knowledge system of Tibetan studies with Chinese characteristics” and serve broader China’s national strategies.

During the event, speakers, including United Front officials and academics, emphasized that adherence to “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” and the “forging of Chinese national community consciousness” represents the core mission of the field.

The significant emphasis placed on “countering hostile forces” and expanding China’s international discourse power suggests that state-directed research in this area prioritizes propaganda over independent scholarship. While these initiatives are presented as academic advancements, the anniversary highlights how Tibetology in China functions primarily as an ideological instrument for exercising narrative control over Tibet.

More than 300 cadres from Lhasa’s municipal departments and A-level scenic spot tour guides attended a major “Red Stories” event on June 10, which was organized by the Tibet Autonomous Region Culture and Tourism Department and co-hosted by Lhasa authorities at the city’s government service hall.

The activity, framed as implementing Xi Jinping Thought on Culture and the development of “red resources,” focused on three main themes: history and achievements of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), including in bringing the communist revolution to the Tibetan plateau; early struggles in establishing what China termed the frontier regions, and; collaboration of civilians with the military in border defense. Presenters highlighted stories of China’s war against Japan, early work by the People’s Liberation Army and Han cadres in the “peaceful liberation of Tibet”, and construction of the Sichuan-Tibet Highway and the Qinghai-Tibet Highway in the early 1950s.

Contemporary story of Tibetan sisters Dolkar and Yangzom in Yumed (Yumei) township in Lhoka (Shannan), was also highlighted for their loyalty to China as defending the border. Dolkar, who is a star propagandist for the CCP, was awarded the “July 1 medal” in 2021 at the commemoration of the founding day of the CCP. She also attended the 20th Party Congress in October 2022 as a delegate.

Using immersive storytelling formats, which included the use of historical images and photographs, the event sought to make “red” history” emotionally resonant for the cadres. Organizers described it as a “profound spiritual baptism” designed to strengthen ideological foundations and integrate red culture with ethnic unity education.

Authorities plan to organize more such activities, leveraging local “red tourism” resources to enhance the “long-term effectiveness of revolutionary storytelling activities”. According to the Chinese state media report, “the Municipal Bureau of Culture and Tourism will continue to collaborate with the Department of Culture and Tourism of the Autonomous Region to promote the in-depth and practical implementation of revolutionary education and ethnic unity education.”

Ped Go (Ban Guo), Qinghai Provincial Party Standing Committee member and United Front Work Department head, visited Nangchen (Nangqian) County to supervise the “correct performance” of political education campaigns.

During his visit, he praised local officials’ efforts to integrate the study campaign with practical implementation, and instructed officials to align county work with China’s national priorities and uphold strict political discipline.

Emphasizing the importance of the implementation of the newly enacted EUPL, Ped Go also called for intensified promotion of ethnic unity initiatives, patriotic education of religious figures, and “problem rectification.” The visit reflects Beijing’s ongoing drive to reinforce ideological control in Tibetan areas through cadre education and local governance.

On June 8, officials from Ngaba (Aba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture in Sichuan and Golog (Guluo) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Qinghai signed a border stability maintenance collaboration agreement in Barkam (Maerkang), intensifying coordinated control across provincial boundaries in Tibetan regions.

The agreement, framed around the implementation of Xi Jinping’s directives on Tibet-related work, establishes joint mechanisms for information sharing, dispute mediation, risk prevention and control, joint policing, and “peaceful creation” initiatives. Senior leaders from both sides emphasized deeper collaboration in grassroots governance and cracking down on issues in cross-border areas.

This is further evidence of Beijing’s expansive security apparatus extending deep into Tibetan-inhabited areas. Such inter-provincial pacts effectively create a unified security grid that limits cross-border movement and information flow, reinforcing central control while presenting it as cooperative governance.

A high-level delegation from Tibet, led by Sun Xianzhong, Vice Chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Region People’s Congress and Party Secretary of Tibet University, visited Hong Kong and Macau from June 14–18. The group met with central liaison offices, legislative bodies, education officials, and universities, while engaging with pro-Beijing elites.

Officially framed as an effort to deepen exchanges in education, law, culture, youth, and tourism, the visit included the first official education-sector contact between Tibet and Hong Kong. Discussions focused on “telling the story of the new Tibet” and promoting “Chinese-style modernization” in border regions.

While presented as cooperation, this delegation appears to be a classic example of United Front work, with an emphasis on “improving” Tibet’s external image, building elite networks, and leveraging Hong Kong and Macau’s international platforms for narrative management.

Underscoring Beijing’s tightening grip on information control in Tibet, the Tibet Autonomous Region’s Cyberspace Affairs Office launched a five-day political education training program for 50 young cadres at the Chinese Communist Party’s Jinggangshan revolutionary base.

Officially framed as building a “loyal, clean, and responsible cyber information iron army,” the program prioritizes ideological purity over technical or professional skills. Trainees are immersed in Xi Jinping Thought, required to internalize the “Two Establishments” and “Two Safeguards,” and participate in “immersive” visits to revolutionary sites and martyr memorials to absorb the Jinggangshan spirit. Sessions on “correct performance views” reinforce alignment with central directives.

In a region already subject to heavy internet controls and surveillance, the strong emphasis on combating “splittism,” maintaining stability, and fostering unwavering loyalty raises concerns about stifling independent thought and open discourse. Rather than equipping young cadres with tools for transparent governance or digital innovation, the training appears designed to produce compliant enforcers of the Party line in cyberspace.

As 2026 marks the 75th anniversary of the 1951 “Seventeen Point Agreement,” Chinese state media on June 10 featured an article by professor Wang Xiaobin of the Central Party School, in which he claimed that Tibet’s “peaceful liberation” offers the world “Chinese wisdom and solutions” for ethnic governance.

Wang portrayed the annexation of Tibet as a successful model of adapting Marxism and traditional Chinese governance to local conditions. He praised the new ethnic unity law as central to promoting the state’s goal of “forging a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation.”

In the article, Wang rejected criticism from the European Parliament regarding China’s Tibet policies, labeling it “malicious smears” and “gross interference,” while dismissing Western ethnic theories as incompatible with China’s “pomegranate” model of unity.

This exemplifies Beijing’s relentless historical revisionism and propaganda. By celebrating what many Tibetans and international observers view as coercive annexation rather than “liberation”, the Party continues to suppress alternative historical accounts and aspirations for genuine autonomy. The heavy emphasis on ideological conformity and the rejection of external scrutiny highlight ongoing efforts to legitimize tight political control over Tibet under the guise of “national unity” and development.

At the 2026 graduation ceremony of the Qinghai Tibetan Language Buddhist College on June 5, Ped Go (Ban Guo), Member of the Standing Committee of the Qinghai Provincial Party Committee and Director of the United Front Work Department, said Tibetan Buddhist religious figures must adhere to the “correct political direction” and promote the Sinicization of religion.

He emphasized that the central leadership’s places great importance to “Tibetan Buddhism work”, viewing it as essential for safeguarding national unity, ethnic solidarity, and social stability. He highlighted President Xi Jinping’s multiple visits to Qinghai and Tibet, which have provided direction for religious work, while calling Qinghai a strategic location for “stabilizing Xinjiang and securing Tibet.”

The province has substantially strengthened the college as a key base for cultivating monastic leaders through increased policy support, funding, and infrastructure improvements, he added. Underlining Qinghai’s strategic role in “stabilizing and consolidating” Tibet, he instructed the monastics to diligently study Xi Jinping Thought on religious work and thoroughly implement the Party’s strategy for Tibet.

He called on the graduates to actively advance the Sinicization of Tibetan Buddhism, oppose “separatism”, and strive to become qualified monks who meet the CCP’s “four standards.”

In early June 2026, Sonam Nyima, a member of the Standing Committee of the TAR party committee and Director of the United Front Work Department, toured nine monasteries in Lhoka (Shannan) Prefecture including historic sites like Samye, Mindroling, and Yumbulhakhang under the banner of “law-based management” of Tibetan monasteries.

The official narrative stresses “ideological guidance,” “three consciousness” education (loyalty to the Party, the motherland, and socialism), promotion of Xi Jinping’s policies, and tighter control through monastery management committees. This inspection highlights the CCP’s systematic Sinicization of Tibetan Buddhism and its subordination under Party authority. Rather than emphasizing genuine religious freedom or preservation of cultural heritage, the emphasis is on ensuring political loyalty, state-appointed management bodies, and “long-term mechanisms” to achieve the complete Sinicization of Tibetan Buddhist monasteries.

The Tibet Autonomous Region People’s Congress Standing Committee revised the Cultural Relics Protection Regulations on May 27, 2026. This revised ordinance is set to take effect on September 1 2026. Key provisions of the update cover protection zones, construction controls, relic repair standards, digital documentation, and public participation. While these are presented as preservation measures, the ordinance explicitly requires all work to follow Communist Party’s leadership and advance the goal of “forging a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation.”

This mandate includes promoting “patriotic education” tied to narratives of “Tibet’s peaceful liberation” and national unity. Chinese authorities state that the revisions are aimed at safeguarding Tibet’s rich historical and cultural heritage while simultaneously promoting the state’s goals of patriotic education and national unity. Although officials insist the updates will strengthen protection of cultural relics and improve public access, the ordinance reflects Beijing’s broader strategy to assimilate Tibet’s cultural history and assets to fit China’s narrative and advance its “shared national identity” goals.