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their human rights, and undertake more frequent human rights-focused visits to the XUAR.

Æ Call on the Chinese government to increase transparency when reporting instances of violence and terrorism or the criminal prosecution of defendants in cases involving violence, separatism, and terrorism, including by providing data on the exact number of “endangering state security” trials concluded every year, as it did between 2008 and 2012.

Æ Call on the Chinese government to allow domestic and international journalists and observers greater freedom to independently verify official media accounts of violent and terrorist incidents.

Æ Call for the release of Ilham Tohti, Mutellip Imin, Perhat Halmurat, Shohret Tursun, Abduqeyum Ablimit, and other Uyghurs who were detained or imprisoned for exercising their right to freedom of expression.

Æ Object to the detention, arrest, and conviction of Uyghur educators and language rights advocates like Abduweli Ayup, Dilyar Obul, and Muhemmet Sidik.

Æ Call on the Chinese government to consult with non-Han Chinese parents, teachers, and students regarding what language or languages of instruction should be used in XUAR schools, from the preschool to the university level. Call on Chinese officials to provide parents and students a choice of instruction in the Uyghur language and other non-Chinese languages prevalent in the XUAR, as mandated in Article 4 of the Chinese Constitution and Article 10 of the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law. Urge Chinese officials to support the development of educational materials in the Uyghur language and in other non-Chinese languages.

Æ Call on the Chinese government to adhere to domestic laws and regulations guaranteeing freedom of religious belief, as well as international regulations guaranteeing religious practice free from state restrictions.

Æ Encourage U.S. companies conducting business or investing in development initiatives in the XUAR to promote equal opportunity employment for ethnic minorities and to support development projects that incorporate consultation with ethnic minorities regarding the economic, political, and social impact of such projects. Encourage U.S. companies investing in XUAR business opportunities to actively recruit ethnic minority candidates for employment positions and implement mechanisms to eliminate hiring and workplace discrimination, and urge Chinese counterparts to provide equal opportunity employment to ethnic minorities.

TIBET

Findings

- Formal dialogue between the Dalai Lama’s representatives and Chinese Communist Party and government officials has been stalled since the January 2010 ninth round, the longest interval since such contacts resumed in 2002. The Commission observed no indication during the 2014 reporting year of offi-

cial Chinese interest in resuming a dialogue that takes into account Tibetan concerns regarding the Tibetan autonomous areas of China.

- The frequency of Tibetan self-immolation reportedly focusing on political and religious issues declined steeply during the Commission's 2014 reporting year, and followed an increase in Party and government security and punitive measures. The Commission has not observed any sign that Party and government leaders intend to respond to Tibetan grievances in a constructive manner or accept any accountability for Tibetan rejection of Chinese policies. One Sichuan province county issued provisions in April 2013 (unreported until February 2014) imposing collective punishment intended to deter Tibetans from self-immolating.

- Pressure on Tibetan Buddhists to accept Communist Party and government control of the religion remained high. Party leadership continued to characterize the Dalai Lama as a threat to Tibetan Buddhism's "normal order" instead of as a principal teacher, and urged that he be "separated" from the religion and the title "Dalai Lama." State-run media reported that a deployment of Party cadres to every Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) village, monastery, and nunnery, completed in March 2012, involved 60,000 cadres—nearly triple the 21,000 initially reported. Officials detained, imprisoned, or beat to death a number of monastic leaders, interfered with identifying a reincarnation, and imposed a ban on travel for religious purposes to Mount Kailash.

- The Commission observed no indication this past year that Party and government leaders intend to develop a "harmonious society" inclusive of Tibetan preferences toward their culture and language. The government asserted that learning and using Tibetan language is "protected by law" but officials closed non-government-run programs and detained Tibetans who promoted use of the language. The Party accepted no accountability for Tibetan grievances contributing to protests and blamed them on external factors, especially the Dalai Lama. In September–November 2013, a prominent example of crackdown developed in one Tibetan county: as of September 1, 2014, the Commission's Political Prisoner Database contained records of 58 detentions related to the crackdown including 15 resulting in prison sentences of up to 18 years.

- The Party and government continued to prioritize economic development as a prerequisite for "social stability." Authorities reportedly detained or imprisoned Tibetans who protested against mining activity, seizure or forced sale of land related to mining, or development projects that allegedly damaged the environment. The westward railway segment from Lhasa city to Rikaze (Shigatse) city reportedly was "put into use" in August 2014 and provided the first extension since the Xining-Lhasa segment of the Qinghai-Tibet railway opened in 2006. After 2009, TAR yearbooks ceased to report county-level population data, hindering demographic analysis.

- As of September 1, 2014, the Commission's Political Prisoner Database contained records of 639 Tibetan political prisoners

believed or presumed currently detained or imprisoned. Of those, 621 are records of Tibetans detained on or after March 10, 2008; 44 percent of them are Tibetan Buddhist monks, nuns, teachers, or trulkus. This past year, officials detained, imprisoned, or beat to death monastic leaders including Abbot Gyurme Tsultrim, Abbot Karma Tsewang, chant master Thardoe Gyaltsen, Geshe Ngawang Jamyang, and Abbot Khedrub. Officials detained or imprisoned cultural advocates, including writer Tsultrim Gyaltsen, singer Gebe, and environmental activists Choekyab and Tselha. Officials released filmmaker Dondrub Wangchen upon completion of his sentence in June 2014; as of September 1, authorities had not permitted him to travel to the United States for reunification with his family.

Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

Æ Urge the Chinese government to resume contact with the Dalai Lama or his representatives and engage in dialogue without preconditions. Such a dialogue should aim to protect the Tibetan culture, language, religion, and heritage within the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and the Tibetan autonomous prefectures and counties in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces. A Chinese government decision to engage in dialogue can result in a durable and mutually beneficial outcome for the government and Tibetans that will benefit local and regional security in coming decades.

Æ Urge the Chinese government to recognize the role of government regulatory measures and Party policies in the wave of Tibetan self-immolations and other protests. Stress to Chinese officials that strengthening the measures and policies that Tibetans resent is unlikely to promote “social stability” or a “harmonious society.” Urge the government to refrain from using security and judicial institutions to intimidate Tibetan communities by prosecuting and imprisoning Tibetans with alleged links to a self-immolator or for sharing self-immolation information.

Æ Urge the Chinese government to refrain from using intrusive management and legal measures to infringe upon and repress Tibetan Buddhists’ right to the freedom of religion. Urge the government to cease treating the Dalai Lama as a security threat instead of as Tibetan Buddhism’s principal teacher. Urge the government to respect the right of Tibetan Buddhists to identify and educate religious teachers in a manner consistent with Tibetan Buddhist preferences and traditions. Stress to Chinese officials that increasing pressure on Tibetan Buddhists by aggressive use of regulatory measures, “patriotic” and “legal” education, and anti-Dalai Lama campaigns is likely to harm social stability, not protect it.

Æ Request that the Chinese government follow up on a 2010 statement by the Chairman of the TAR government that Gedun Choekyi Nyima, the Panchen Lama whom the Dalai

Lama recognized in 1995, is living in the TAR as an "ordinary citizen" along with his family. Urge the government to invite a representative of an international organization to meet with Gedun Choekyi Nyima so that he can express to the representative his wishes with respect to privacy.

Æ Stress to the Chinese government the importance of respecting and protecting the Tibetan culture and language. Urge Chinese officials to promote a vibrant Tibetan culture by honoring the Chinese Constitution's reference to the freedoms of speech, association, assembly, and religion, and refraining from using the security establishment, courts, and law to infringe upon and repress Tibetans' exercise of such rights. Stress the importance of respecting Tibetan wishes to maintain the role of both the Tibetan and Chinese languages in teaching modern subjects, and to refrain from criminalizing Tibetans' passion for their language and culture.

Æ Encourage the Chinese government to take fully into account the views and preferences of Tibetans when the government plans infrastructure, natural resource development, and settlement or resettlement projects in the Tibetan areas of China. Encourage the government to engage with appropriate experts in assessing the impact of such projects and in advising the government on the implementation and progress of such projects. Encourage the government to report accurately and comprehensively data on population in Tibetan areas of China.

Æ Continue to stress to the Chinese government the importance of distinguishing between peaceful Tibetan protesters and rioters; condemn the use of security campaigns to suppress human rights; and request the government to provide complete details about Tibetans detained, charged, or sentenced for protest-related and self-immolation-related "crimes." Continue to raise in meetings and correspondence with Chinese officials the cases of Tibetans who remain imprisoned as punishment for the peaceful exercise of human rights.

Æ Encourage the Chinese government to respect the right to freedom of movement of Tibetans who travel domestically, including for the purpose of visiting Tibetan economic, cultural, and religious centers, including Lhasa; to provide Tibetans with reasonable means to apply for and receive documents necessary for lawful international travel; to respect the right of Tibetan citizens of China to reenter China after traveling abroad; and to allow access to the Tibetan autonomous areas of China to international journalists, representatives of non-governmental organizations, representatives of the United Nations, and U.S. Government officials.

DEVELOPMENTS IN HONG KONG AND MACAU

Findings

- The Basic Laws of Hong Kong and Macau confirm the applicability of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to both territories. The Basic Law of Hong


V. Tibet

Status of Negotiations Between the Chinese Government and the Dalai Lama or His Representatives


Formal dialogue between the Dalai Lama's representatives and Chinese Communist Party and government officials has been stalled since the January 2010 ninth round,¹ the longest interval since such contacts resumed in 2002.² The Commission observed no indication during the 2014 reporting year of official Chinese interest in resuming a dialogue that takes into account Tibetan concerns in the Tibetan autonomous areas of China.³

Tibetan Self-Immolation: Steep Decline

The frequency of Tibetan self-immolation reportedly focusing on political and religious issues declined steeply during the Commission's 2014 reporting year, and followed an increase in Party and government security and punitive measures. During the 12-month period September 2012–August 2013, the Commission recorded 66 self-immolations focused on political and religious issues;⁴ during the 12-month period September 2013–August 2014, the Commission recorded 10 such self-immolations.⁵ The Commission has not observed any sign that Party and government leaders intend to respond to Tibetan grievances in a constructive manner or accept any accountability for Tibetan rejection of Chinese policies.



The general character of self-immolations—acts committed publicly and featuring calls for Tibetan freedom and the Dalai Lama's return⁶—remained consistent with previous years and concurrent with government use of regulatory measures to control and repress principal elements of Tibetan culture and religion, including Tibetan Buddhist monastic institutions,⁷ and with the apparent collapse of the China-Dalai Lama dialogue.⁸ Since 2009, Tibetans have self-immolated in 10 of 17 Tibetan autonomous prefectures and 1 ordinary prefecture;⁹ during the 12-month period September



and 4 were in Qinghai or Gansu provinces.¹⁷ Overall, the proportions of monastic and lay self-immolators, and of Sichuan and non-Sichuan residents, were similar as of April 15, 2014, when 126 Tibetan self-immolations reportedly focused on political and religious issues had occurred.¹⁸

TIBETAN SELF-IMMOLATIONS REPORTED OR BELIEVED TO FOCUS ON
POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS ISSUES (SEPTEMBER 2013–AUGUST 2014)

See CECC 2012 and 2013 Annual Reports for Self-Immolations 1–116¹⁹

No.	Date of Self-Immolation	Name Sex / Approx. Age	Occupation Affiliation	Self-Immolation Location (Prov. / Pref. / County)	Status
	2013				
117	September 28	Shichung M/41	Farmer, tailor, husband, father	Sichuan / Aba T&QAP / Aba county	Deceased ²⁰
118	November 11	Tsering Gyal M/20	Monk Akyong Monastery	Qinghai / Guoluo TAP / Banma county	Deceased ²¹
119	December 3	Konchog Tseten M/30	Nomad, husband, father	Sichuan / Aba / Aba	Deceased ²²
120	December 19	Tsultrim Gyatso M/43	Monk Achog Monastery	Gansu / Gannan TAP / Xiahe county	Deceased ²³
	2014				
121	February 5	Phagmo Samdrub M/late 20s	Tantric Buddhist practitioner, husband, father	Qinghai / Huangnan TAP / Zeku county	Deceased ²⁴
122	February 13	Lobsang Dorje M/25	Former monk Kirti Monastery	Sichuan / Aba / Aba	Deceased ²⁵
123	March 16	Lobsang Palden M/early 20s	Monk Kirti Monastery	Sichuan / Aba / Aba	Deceased ²⁶
124	March 16	Jigme Tenzin M/29	Monk Sonag (Shador) Monastery	Qinghai / Huangnan / Zeku	Deceased ²⁷
125	March 29	Drolma F/31	Nun	Sichuan / Ganzi TAP / Batang county	Hospitalized ²⁸
126	April 15	Trinle Namgyal M/32	Layperson	Sichuan / Ganzi / Daofu county	Deceased ²⁹

Collective Punishment

This past year, the Commission observed for the first time reports of county-level governments turning to collective punishment in apparent attempts to deter individuals from engaging in prohibited behavior.

RUO'ERGAI COUNTY

In the initial and best-documented of two reports, on April 8, 2013, the Ruo'ergai (Dzoege) County People's Government, in Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province, issued provisions imposing collective punishment intended to deter Tibetans from self-immolating.³⁰ The Interim Anti-Self-Immolation Provisions (the Provisions), first reported on in February 2014,³¹ could place at risk access to housing, livelihood, or financial security of a family, community, village, or monastic institution if a member of that group committed self-immolation or was deemed to be associated with an act of self-immolation.

The Provisions target groups classified as "immediate family";³² a "household" or "residence";³³ a "village" or "community";³⁴ a monastery or nunnery ("temple");³⁵ and the monks and nuns who reside within a monastic institution.³⁶ The following summary provides examples of how the Provisions would punish such groups collectively by targeting their ability to remain functional and establishing an intimidating political environment.

- **Housing.** Obstructing the ability to maintain housing for persons officials deem to have been "actively involved" in a self-immolation by canceling household benefits for three years and social benefits for one year.³⁷
- **Livelihood.** Preventing or obstructing the ability of a self-immolator's family members to secure a livelihood by revoking the right to use land for farming or grazing;³⁸ and preventing or obstructing the ability of residents of a village where a self-immolator lived to secure a livelihood by freezing the right of villagers to use land for farming or grazing.³⁹
- **Employment.** Restricting career, employment, and housing opportunities for a self-immolator's family members by canceling their eligibility to apply for national-level government, worker or service positions, or military employment.⁴⁰
- **Business.** Preventing or obstructing the ability of a self-immolator's family members and the households of persons deemed to have been "active participants"⁴¹ in a self-immolation to secure a livelihood by withholding approval to conduct business activity for three years;⁴² and by imposing financial hardships and imperiling function in monastic institutions associated with a self-immolator by ordering them to "halt all business activities."⁴³
- **Property.** Preventing the ability of a self-immolator's family members and the households of persons deemed to have been "active participants" in a self-immolation from accessing full use of real estate by only "confirming" (household) land and building rights (*que quan*), but not issuing "certification" (*zheng*).⁴⁴

- **Finance.** Imposing financial and other hardships on a community, village, or monastic institution associated with a self-immolator by designating them as “untrustworthy” and withholding the granting of new loans for three years, and by only receiving payments on existing loans but not disbursing funds from the loans;⁴⁵ and by imperiling financial status by requiring a community, village, or monastic institution where a self-immolation takes place to pay a “security deposit” of 10,000 to 500,000 yuan (US\$1,600 to 80,000) that would be returned only if another self-immolation does not occur within two years.⁴⁶
- **Development.** Imposing financial and other hardships on a village, community, or monastic institution associated with a self-immolator by canceling or postponing national-level investment in that village, community, or monastic institution;⁴⁷ and by imposing financial and other hardships on a village or community associated with a self-immolator by halting “all investment and civil society capital projects.”⁴⁸
- **Religion.** Imposing a reduction in religious function in monastic institutions associated with a self-immolator through temporary “strict limitations” on monks’ and nuns’ activities, and on large-scale Tibetan Buddhist activities across an undefined broader “area.”⁴⁹
- **“Education.”** Requiring family members and others linked to a self-immolation by “minor evidence” or “actions [that] do not constitute a crime” to attend a minimum of 15 days’ “legal education classes” located at a “separate locality”;⁵⁰ and requiring residents of villages, communities, and monastic institutions where a self-immolation takes place to attend “legal study sessions.”⁵¹
- **Intimidation.** Implementing “the strictest comprehensive administrative enforcement possible” anywhere that a self-immolation takes place, and imposing the “strictest” comprehensive administrative law enforcement and corrective punishment.⁵²

BIRU COUNTY

In the more recent instance involving apparent collective punishment, a Tibetan advocacy organization obtained a partial copy of a Tibetan-language manual titled to indicate that it explained “a temporary regulation” issued in June 2014 by the Biru (Driru) County People’s Government in Naqu (Nagchu) prefecture, Tibet Autonomous Region.⁵³ [See Biru Crackdown in this section.] A copy of the actual regulations was unavailable as of August 2014. The regulations in certain cases could impose significant financial hardship collectively on an entire family if a single family member engaged in prohibited behavior.⁵⁴ Examples of types of behavior and punishment follow.

- **Behavior.** Attending a specific religious teaching by the Dalai Lama in India in July 2014;⁵⁵ traveling beyond one’s residential area for “illegal acts of religious education;⁵⁶ “having strong nationalistic fervor;”⁵⁷ “propagating harmful information” over the Internet;⁵⁸ “propagating videos or songs”

praising the Dalai Lama;⁵⁹ and failure to “hoist the Chinese flag” when required.⁶⁰

- **Punishment.** An individual⁶¹ or family (collective)⁶² ban for one to five years on harvesting *cordyceps sinensis* (“caterpillar fungus”)—a principal source of cash income for many Tibetan families;⁶³ loss of welfare benefits;⁶⁴ cancelation of household registration;⁶⁵ periods of legal education of up to six months;⁶⁶ and, in the case of monks and nuns, expulsion from a monastic institution.⁶⁷

COLLECTIVE PUNISHMENT UNDER CHINESE LAW

Available information about the Ruo’ergai and Biru measures raises questions regarding their application and consistency with China’s Constitution and laws.

- **Has either measure resulted in actual application of collective punishment?** As of August 2014, the Commission had not observed a report of specific collective punishment of a family, household, community, village, or monastic institution.
- **Does China’s Constitution provide support for collective punishment?** Commission research failed to locate any article within the Constitution that appears either to explicitly permit the collective punishment of families, households, communities, villages, or monastic institutions irrespective of individual activity; or that explicitly protects citizens from collective punishment.
- **Are collective punishments in line with relevant Chinese laws?** Based on Commission research, the PRC Criminal Law and PRC Criminal Procedure Law do not contain language explicitly addressing collective punishment of families, households, communities, villages, or institutions based solely on proximity to an action the government treats as illegal, or based solely on a family relationship with a person who committed such an act. The Ruo’ergai measures contain no reference to any means by which a punished entity could appeal against a punishment; information is incomplete on the Biru measures.

Religious Freedom for Tibetan Buddhists

Pressure on Tibetan Buddhists to accept Communist Party and government control of the religion remained high.⁶⁸ Party leadership continued to characterize the Dalai Lama as a threat to Tibetan Buddhism’s “normal order”⁶⁹ instead of as a principal teacher,⁷⁰ and urged that he be “separated” from the religion and the title “Dalai Lama.”⁷¹ Representative developments this past year included the following examples.

- **“Healthy” Buddhism.** Yu Zhengsheng, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee, stated that strengthening “the motherland” and boosting social and economic development are preconditions for the “healthy development” of Tibetan Buddhism.⁷²

- **Cadre deployment.** State-run media reported that a deployment of Party cadres to every Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) village, monastery, and nunnery, completed in March 2012,⁷³ involved 60,000 cadres, according to a September 2013 report⁷⁴—nearly triple the 21,000 initially reported in March 2012.⁷⁵ An official described the cadres' deployment as the most extensive since the 1951 "peaceful liberation of Tibet."⁷⁶
- **Heightened control.** Qinghai province officials reportedly pressured monks and monasteries in Yushu (Yulshul) and Guoluo (Golog) Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures to accept greater Party and government control.⁷⁷ In Yushu, where Tibetan Buddhist affairs regulations took effect in September 2013,⁷⁸ authorities ordered some monasteries to replace monastic members of management committees with "government and Party appointees" by June 2014.⁷⁹ In Guoluo,⁸⁰ officials launched a campaign in May 2014 requiring monks and residents to "demonstrate their support" for the Party, obey laws and regulations, and not engage in protest activity.⁸¹
- **Targeting leaders.** Officials detained, imprisoned, or beat to death monastic leaders, including: Abbot Gyurme Tsultrim (detained November 2013; under home confinement after urging promotion of Tibetan religion, language, and ethics);⁸² Abbot Karma Tsewang (detained December 2013; a Tibetan culture advocate accused of harboring "fugitive" monks);⁸³ chant master Thardoe Gyaltsen (detained December 2013; sentenced to 18 years' imprisonment for "inciting splittism" by possessing copies of the Dalai Lama's teachings);⁸⁴ Geshe Ngawang Jamyang (detained November 2013; beaten to death in custody in December; attained Geshe status⁸⁵ in India; previously imprisoned for "leaking state secrets");⁸⁶ and Abbot Khedrub (detained April 2014; suspected of "links" to prayers for Tibetans who self-immolated).⁸⁷
- **Reincarnation identification.**⁸⁸ A report emerged of the July 2013 closure of Shag Rongpo Monastery in Naqu (Nagchu) prefecture, TAR, over resentment of government attempts to "enthronize its own choice" of a teacher Tibetan Buddhists regard as a reincarnation.⁸⁹ A mother of two children reportedly attempted suicide in protest and authorities allegedly beat and detained up to 50 Tibetans.⁹⁰ In 2010, a court reportedly sentenced the monastery's senior monastic, Dawa Khyenrab Wangchug, to imprisonment for contacting the Dalai Lama during the search for the reincarnation.⁹¹ In August 2014, officials apparently allowed him to leave the site where he served medical parole and resume teaching at Shag Rongpo.⁹²
- **Preventing pilgrimage.** In late May 2014, People's Armed Police reportedly imposed a ban on travel for religious purposes to Mount Kailash (*Gang Rinpoche*), one of Tibetan Buddhism's principal pilgrimage sites.⁹³ The ban coincided with Tibetan Buddhism's most sacred month and day,⁹⁴ and in 2014 (the Wood Horse year) coincided with the most propitious year for such pilgrimage in the 60-year Tibetan astrological cycle.⁹⁵ The ban immediately preceded the period when the Dalai Lama provided a public Kalachakra teaching in a Himalayan

area of northern India.⁹⁶ [See Biru County in this section for information on punishment linked to attending the teaching.]

Status of Tibetan Culture

The Commission observed no indication this past year that Party and government leaders intend to develop a “harmonious society” inclusive of Tibetan preferences toward their culture and language. The Party accepted no accountability for Tibetan grievances contributing to protests and blamed them on external factors, especially the Dalai Lama—“the ultimate cause of social unrest” in Tibetan areas of China, according to Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) Communist Party Secretary Chen Quanguo.⁹⁷ Examples of Party intentions to increase political pressure on Tibetans to accept and adhere to Party policies on culture, education, and the notion of unity follow.

- **Political culture.** Chen called for establishing Party “propaganda, ideology, and culture teams,” and placing a full-time cadre responsible for propaganda in every town or township.⁹⁸
- **Political education.** Chen called for extensive implementation of “thematic educational activities” and a “patriotic revolutionary history and culture exploration project” prioritizing younger Tibetans.⁹⁹
- **Political unity.** Chen instructed cadres to “deeply conduct the national unity propaganda and education . . . to firmly establish the ‘three inseparables’ mindset.”¹⁰⁰ At the same time, security officials detained Tibetans who called for unity among themselves.¹⁰¹

BIRU CRACKDOWN

Consistent with such policies, authorities compelled Tibetans to engage in displays of patriotism toward China and imposed crackdowns if Tibetans were noncompliant. In September–November 2013, a prominent example developed in Biru (Driru) county, Naqu (Nagchu) prefecture, TAR, in the run-up to China’s October 1 National Day.¹⁰² As of September 1, 2014, the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database contained records of 58 Biru detentions related to the crackdown¹⁰³ including 15 resulting in prison sentences of up to 18 years.¹⁰⁴ Authorities reportedly disabled communication systems locally, ensuring that information is incomplete.¹⁰⁵ [See Collective Punishment—Biru County in this section.] The sequence of events in the Biru crackdown follows.

- **September 3, 2013: Elderly villager detained.** Sixty-eight-year-old Dayang staged a political protest after a “political propaganda team and dance troupe” arrived. Security officials detained, beat, and hospitalized him.¹⁰⁶
- **September 24: Sentencing.** The Biru County People’s Court sentenced Dayang to two years and six months’ imprisonment.¹⁰⁷
- **September 27: Compulsory flag display.** Preceding National Day, “thousands” of government officials and workers arrived in Naqu and forced residents to raise the Chinese national flag above their residences.¹⁰⁸

- **September 28: Disposing of flags.** In one Biru village, Tibetans threw Chinese flags into a river rather than display them. People's Armed Police (PAP) may have fired at villagers (possibly with anti-riot projectiles¹⁰⁹), leading to "open confrontation."¹¹⁰
- **September 29: Police beat protesters.** In another village, security officials beat and detained about 40 villagers who appealed against forceful suppression of protests. Police beat and hospitalized "main splittist" Tsering Gyaltzen.¹¹¹
- **October 3: Another protest leader detained.** Police detained Dorje Dragtsal for participating in the protests against compulsory flag display. He reportedly had been "especially vocal" in disapproving political education campaigns.¹¹²
- **October 6: Weapons fire, injuries.** PAP reportedly used tear gas, batons, and weapons fire (possibly anti-riot projectiles¹¹³) against Tibetans who gathered to "confront" police searching Dorje Dragtsal's residence.¹¹⁴ "At least 60" Tibetans were "wounded."¹¹⁵
- **October 8: Weapons fire, fatalities.** PAP ("security forces") reportedly opened fire on Tibetan protesters in Biru. Weapons fire allegedly killed 4 Tibetans and wounded about 50 (none identified).¹¹⁶ The Commission has not observed published corroboration of the report.
- **October 11: Social media user detained.** Police detained Biru resident Kalsang, a mother of three young children, for expressing "anti-China" views on social media and having "Tibetan patriotic" songs and the Dalai Lama's image on her mobile phone.¹¹⁷
- **October 11: Writer detained.** Public security officials detained writer Tsultrim Gyaltzen, seized his mobile phone, computer, and documents, and accused him of "separatist activities."¹¹⁸ School students staged a hunger strike in protest.¹¹⁹
- **October 12: Former policeman detained.** Police detained Tsultrim Gyaltzen's friend, Yulgyal, and accused him of "separatist activities." From 2005–2012 he worked as a Biru policeman and reportedly was "frustrated by the political nature" of the work.¹²⁰
- **October 15: Nun, villager detained.** Police detained nun Jampa and layperson Dawa Lhundrub for allegedly "revealing state secrets through mobile phones and other means."¹²¹
- **October 17: Biru monks detained in Lhasa.** Police in Lhasa city detained Shugding Monastery monks Jampa Legshe and Kalnam on suspicion of "leaking state secrets." They arrived in Lhasa a month prior to detention.¹²²
- **October 18: Father detained.** Police detained and "disappeared" Tenzin Rangdrol after he walked his children to a village school. The report implied that locals regarded the detention as politically motivated.¹²³
- **October 19: Tibetans protest father's detention.** At least 40 Tibetans gathered on October 19 outside a township government office to protest Tenzin Rangdrol's detention.¹²⁴ Overnight, their number increased by at least 100.¹²⁵
- **October 20: Police detain protesters.** PAP surrounded Tibetans protesting outside the government office against Tenzin

Rangdrol's detention, detained 10,¹²⁶ and later released them.¹²⁷ An official told protesters they were like "eggs hitting a rock."¹²⁸

- **October 28: Lengthy sentences.** An unidentified court sentenced writer Tsultrim Gyaltzen and ex-policeman Yulgyal to 13 and 10 years' imprisonment respectively following their October 11 and 12 detentions.¹²⁹

- **November 3: Tibetans detained after "education."** Tibetans attending a compulsory "political education" session pressed officials to release Tsultrim Gyaltzen and Yulgyal. That evening, officials detained 15 persons.¹³⁰ All were released by December.¹³¹

- **November 20: Activists detained.** Police detained environmental activists Choekyab and Tselha in late November and activist-singer Trinle Tsekar on November 20,¹³² and reportedly charged them with leading a large-scale May 2013 anti-mining protest.¹³³

- **December 19: Activists sentenced.** The Biru County People's Court reportedly sentenced Choekyab and Tselha to 13 and 3 years' imprisonment respectively, and Trinle Tsekar to 9 years.¹³⁴

- **January 14, 2014: Village leaders sentenced.** A court sentenced Ngangdrag and Rigsal, village leaders detained in November when Tibetans protested against mandatory display of the Chinese flag, to 10 years' imprisonment.¹³⁵

TIBETAN LANGUAGE

The government asserted that learning and using Tibetan language is "protected by law"¹³⁶ but officials closed non-government-run programs and detained Tibetans who promoted use of the language. Representative examples follow.

- **Observance canceled.** Authorities reportedly forced the cancellation of a February 21, 2014, Tibetan language "competition" coinciding with International Mother Language Day,¹³⁷ claiming the event had "political implications."¹³⁸

- **Programs pressured.** Officials reportedly ordered local Tibetan "leaders" to "monitor and discourage" community programs underway in May 2014 at which Tibetans studied language and religion.¹³⁹ Authorities planned "to impose restrictions."¹⁴⁰

- **School shut.** Authorities reportedly shut down in April 2013 a school for poor Tibetan students that had operated since 2003.¹⁴¹ Officials provided no explanation for the shut-down; "security" reportedly delayed emergence of the report.¹⁴²

- **Singer detained.** Security officials detained singer Gebe on May 24, 2014,¹⁴³ as he left a concert where he performed a song before cheering Tibetans warning, among other things, "we will be perished if we ignore our mother tongue."¹⁴⁴

Economic Development

The Communist Party and government continued to prioritize economic development as a prerequisite for "social stability"¹⁴⁵ even though some official initiatives have resulted in Tibetan pro-

tests¹⁴⁶ and alleged harm to the environment.¹⁴⁷ Representative developments included the following examples.

- **Mining, environment.** Authorities reportedly detained or imprisoned Tibetans who protested against mining activity,¹⁴⁸ seizure or forced sale of land related to mining,¹⁴⁹ or development projects that allegedly damaged the environment.¹⁵⁰ The Commission observed such reports on the Tibet Autonomous Region (November–December 2013),¹⁵¹ and on Qinghai (September, December 2013),¹⁵² Gansu (March–April 2014),¹⁵³ Sichuan (April 2014),¹⁵⁴ and Yunnan (June 2014)¹⁵⁵ provinces.
- **Railroad construction.** The westward railway segment from Lhasa city to Rikaze (Shigatse) city, initially slated for completion in 2010,¹⁵⁶ reportedly was “put into use” in August 2014¹⁵⁷ and provided the first extension since the Xining–Lhasa segment of the Qinghai–Tibet railway opened in 2006.¹⁵⁸
- **Population data withheld.** Tibetans reportedly expressed anxiety about increasing non-Tibetan population in Lhasa following the 2006 Qinghai–Tibet railway startup,¹⁵⁹ a concern that could develop in Rikaze. The Commission published a 2009 analysis¹⁶⁰ noting that official statistics indicated substantial increase in the TAR Tibetan population after 2006, but little increase in non-Tibetan population.¹⁶¹ TAR statistics¹⁶² indicated fewer Han Chinese in 2007 than the national census¹⁶³ recorded in 2000.¹⁶⁴ After 2009, TAR yearbooks ceased to report county-level population data, hindering demographic analysis.¹⁶⁵

Summary: Tibetan Political Detention and Imprisonment

As of September 1, 2014, the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database (PPD) contained 1,733 records—a figure certain to be far from complete—of Tibetan political prisoners detained on or after March 10, 2008, the beginning of a period of mostly peaceful political protests that swept across the Tibetan plateau.

Among the 1,733 PPD records of Tibetan political detentions reported since March 2008 are 28 Tibetans ordered to serve reeducation through labor (26 are believed released) and 385 Tibetans whom courts sentenced to imprisonment ranging from six months to life (198 are believed released upon sentence completion).¹⁶⁶ Of the 385 Tibetan political prisoners sentenced to imprisonment since March 2008, sentencing information is available for 370 prisoners, including 363 with fixed-term sentences averaging 4 years and 11 months, based on PPD data as of September 1, 2014.

CURRENT TIBETAN POLITICAL DETENTION AND IMPRISONMENT


As of September 1, 2014, the PPD contained records of 639 Tibetan political prisoners believed or presumed currently detained or imprisoned. Of those, 621 are records of Tibetans detained on or after March 10, 2008;¹⁶⁷ 18 are records of Tibetans detained prior to March 10, 2008. PPD information for the period since March 10, 2008, is certain to be far from complete.

Of the 621 Tibetan political prisoners who were detained on or after March 10, 2008, and who were believed or presumed to re-

main detained or imprisoned as of September 1, 2014, PPD data indicated that:

- 273 (44 percent) are Tibetan Buddhist monks, nuns, teachers, or *trulkus*.¹⁶⁸
- 540 (87 percent) are male, 52 (8 percent) are female, and 29 are of unknown gender.
- 251 (40 percent) are believed or presumed detained or imprisoned in Sichuan province and 202 (32 percent) in the Tibet Autonomous Region. The rest are believed or presumed detained or imprisoned in Qinghai province (103), Gansu province (64), and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (1).
- Sentencing information is available for 174 prisoners: 167 reportedly were sentenced to fixed terms ranging from 1 year and 6 months to 20 years,¹⁶⁹ and 7 were sentenced to life imprisonment or death with a 2-year reprieve.¹⁷⁰ The average fixed-term sentence is 7 years and 6 months. Seventy-three (43 percent) of the prisoners with known sentences are Tibetan Buddhist monks, nuns, teachers, or *trulkus*.

Sentencing information is available for 15 of the 18 Tibetan political prisoners detained prior to March 10, 2008, and believed imprisoned as of September 1, 2014. Their sentences range from 8 years to life imprisonment; the average fixed-term sentence is 12 years and 4 months.



Notes to Section V—Tibet

¹Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, "Press Statement," 25 January 10. According to the January 25 press statement, the Dalai Lama's envoys would arrive in China "tomorrow" (i.e., January 26, 2010).

²"Press Conference on Central Govt's Contacts With Dalai Lama (Text)," China Daily, 11 February 10. After the ninth round of dialogue, Zhu Weiqun referred to the gap between the eighth and ninth rounds as "the longest interval after we resumed contact and talks in 2002."

³For more information on the Tibetan autonomous areas of China, see "Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008–2009," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 October 09, 22–24. In China there are 1 provincial-level area of Tibetan autonomy, 10 prefectural-level areas of Tibetan autonomy, and 2 county-level areas of Tibetan autonomy. The area of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) (approximately 1.2 million square kilometers), the 10 Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures (TAPs) (approximately 1.02 million square kilometers), and the 2 Tibetan autonomous counties (TACs) (approximately 0.019 million square kilometers) totals approximately 2.24 million square kilometers. The 10 TAPs make up approximately 46 percent of the TAR/TAP/TAC total area. Steven Marshall and Susette Cooke, *Tibet Outside the TAR: Control, Exploitation and Assimilation: Development With Chinese Characteristics* (Washington, DC: Self-published CD-ROM, 1997), Table 7, citing multiple Chinese sources. Table 7 provides the following information. Tibet Autonomous Region (1.2 million square kilometers, or 463,320 square miles). Qinghai province: Haibei (Tsojang) TAP (52,000 square kilometers, or 20,077 square miles), Hainan (Tsolho) TAP (41,634 square kilometers, or 16,075 square miles), Haixi (Tsonub) Mongol and Tibetan AP (325,787 square kilometers, or 125,786 square miles), Huangnan (Malho) TAP (17,901 square kilometers, or 6,912 square miles), Guoluo (Golog) TAP (78,444 square kilometers, or 30,287 square miles), and Yushu (Yushu) TAP (197,791 square kilometers, or 76,367 square miles). Gansu province: Gannan (Kanlho) TAP (45,000 square kilometers, or 17,374 square miles) and Tianzhu (Pari) TAC (7,150 square kilometers, or 2,761 square miles). Sichuan province: Ganzi (Kardze) TAP (153,870 square kilometers, or 59,409 square miles), Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang AP (86,639 square kilometers, or 33,451 square miles), and Muli (Mili) TAC (11,413 square kilometers, or 4,407 square miles). Yunnan province: Diqing (Dechen) TAP (23,870 square kilometers, or 9,216 square miles). The table provides areas in square kilometers; conversion to square miles uses the formula provided on the Web site of the U.S. Geological Survey: 1 square kilometer = 0.3861 square mile. For population data, see *Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China*, Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, September 2003), Tables 10–1, 10–4. According to China's 2000 census data, the Tibetan population of the TAR (approximately 2.43 million persons), the 10 TAPs (approximately 2.47 million persons), and the 2 TACs (approximately 0.11 million persons) totaled approximately 5.01 million Tibetans. The Tibetan population of the 10 TAPs made up approximately 49 percent of the TAR/TAP/TAC total Tibetan population as of 2000. See also *Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census of the People's Republic of China*, National Bureau of Statistics, Department of Population and Employment Statistics, Population Census Office Under the State Council, 23 April 13, Table 2–1. The table titled "Population by Age, Sex, and Nationality" listed the national Tibetan population as 6,282,187. As of June 2014, the Commission has not observed detailed data based on the 2010 census for ethnic population in provincial-, prefectural-, and county-level administrative areas.

⁴The Commission has posted under the Special Topics section of the Resources tab of its Web site (www.cecc.gov) a series of lists of Tibetan self-immolations. See "CECC Update: Tibetan Self-Immolations," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 April 14. The summary contains a list showing that self-immolations numbered 51–116 took place from September 2012–August 2013.

⁵The Commission has posted under the Special Topics section of the Resources tab of its Web site (www.cecc.gov) a series of lists of Tibetan self-immolations. See "CECC Update: Tibetan Self-Immolations," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 April 14. The summary contains a list showing that self-immolations numbered 117–126 took place from September 2013–August 2014. The summary shows that self-immolation number 126 took place on April 15, 2014.

⁶For reports providing specific detail on self-immolators' protests during the period beginning on September 28, 2013 (in chronological order), see, e.g., International Campaign for Tibet, "Tibetan Father of Two Sets Fire to Himself and Dies in Ngaba," 29 September 13 (Shichung "set himself . . . and ran along the road shouting in protest against the Chinese authorities"); Free Tibet, "Tibetan Farmer Self-Immolates and Dies at Prayer Festival," 29 September 13 (prior to self-immolation, Shichung "lit butter lamps in front of a photo of [the Dalai Lama]"); "Tibetan Protester Dies of His Burns," Radio Free Asia, 12 November 13 (prior to death, Tsering Gyal "stated that he was sacrificing his body for the sake of the unity of Tibetans"); International Campaign for Tibet, "Tibetans Gather at Monastery in Golok After Self-Immolation of Young Monk," 11 November 13 (Tsering Gyal "was heard calling the name of the Dalai Lama"); International Campaign for Tibet, "Tibetan Father of Two Sets Fire to Himself in Ngaba," 4 December 13 (Konchog Tseten "was heard . . . calling for the long life of the Dalai Lama, [and his] return to Tibet"); Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, "Tibetan Monk Dies of Self-Immolation, Calls for Unity Among Tibetans in Last Note," 19 December 13 (Tsultrim Gyatso died "calling for unity among Tibetans and the return of the [Dalai Lama]"); International Campaign for Tibet, "Security Intensified in Ngaba After Former Kirti Monk Self-Immolates," 14 February 14 (as police drove Lobsang Dorje away, "he sat up and joined his palms"); Phuntsok Yangchen, "Tibetan Self-Immolation Lobsang Palden Dies," Phayul, 23 March 14 (prior to self-immolating Lobsang Palden left a text message calling for, among other things, "unity among Tibetans"); "Tibetan Self-Immolation Protesters Die of Their Burns," Radio Free Asia, 25 March

14 (Jigme Tenzin “died shortly after self-immolating on a path circling the local Sonag monastery”).

⁷ For Commission analysis of Chinese government regulatory intrusion upon Tibetan Buddhist affairs, see, e.g., “Special Report: Tibetan Monastic Self-Immolations Appear To Correlate With Increasing Repression of Freedom of Religion,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 24 January 12, 1; “Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations Taking Effect in Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 March 11; “New Legal Measures Assert Unprecedented Control Over Tibetan Buddhist Reincarnation,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 August 07. For measures issued by China’s central government, see, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs, Measures for Evaluating the Credentials of and Appointing Monastic Teachers in Tibetan Buddhism [Zangchuan fojiao simiao jingshi zige pingding he pinren banfa], issued and effective 3 December 12; State Administration for Religious Affairs, Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao simiao guanli banfa], issued 30 September 10, effective 1 November 10; State Administration for Religious Affairs, Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism [Zangchuan fojiao huofu zhuanshi guanli banfa], issued 18 July 07, effective 1 September 07.

⁸ During the 2014 reporting year, the Commission did not observe indications that dialogue between the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama’s representatives might soon resume.

⁹ The Commission has posted under the Special Topics section of the Resources tab of its Web site (www.cecc.gov) a series of lists of Tibetan self-immolations. See “CECC Update: Tibetan Self-Immolations,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 April 14. As of April 15, 2014, 126 Tibetan self-immolations reported or believed to focus on political and religious issues took place in the following 10 prefectural-level areas of Tibetan autonomy (arranged in descending order by number of self-immolations): Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province, 55 self-immolations; Gannan (Kaniho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Gansu province, 27 self-immolations; Huangnan (Malho) TAP, Qinghai province, 18 self-immolations; Ganzi (Kardze) TAP, Sichuan, 7 self-immolations; Yushu (Yulshu) TAP, Qinghai, 5 self-immolations; Naqu (Nagchu) prefecture, Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), 4 self-immolations; Lhasa municipality, TAR, 3 self-immolations; Guoluo (Golog) TAP, Qinghai, 3 self-immolations; Changdu (Chamdo) prefecture, TAR, 1 self-immolation; and Haixi (Tsonub) Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai, 1 self-immolation. In addition, 2 Tibetans self-immolated in Haidong prefecture, Qinghai, which is not an area of Tibetan autonomy. (The preceding information does not include Yushu TAP self-immolation property protests by females Dekyi Choezom and Pasang Lhamo on June 27 and September 13, 2012, respectively, and an unidentified woman in March 2013; and the April 6, 2012, deaths of a Tibetan Buddhist abbot, Athub, and a nun, Atse, in a Ganzi TAP house fire initially reported as accidental and later as self-immolation. The Commission continues to monitor reports on their deaths.)

¹⁰ The Commission has posted under the Special Topics section of the Resources tab of its Web site (www.cecc.gov) a series of lists of Tibetan self-immolations. See “CECC Update: Tibetan Self-Immolations,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 April 14. A total of 10 self-immolations numbered 117–126 took place from September 2013–August 2014: Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province (117, 119, 122–123); Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Sichuan (125–126); Huangnan TAP, Qinghai province (121, 124); Gannan TAP, Gansu province (120); and Guoluo TAP, Qinghai (118).

¹¹ For information on the February 27, 2009, self-immolation of Kirti Monastery monk Tashi (or Tabe), see, e.g., “Xinhua Insight: Who Can Put an End to Self-Immolation Tragedy?” Xinhua, 22 June 12 (Open Source Center, 22 June 12); “Tibetan Monk Admits Spreading Shooting Rumors,” Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily, 5 March 09; Tendar Tsering, “Tabey Is Alive but Crippled: Wooser,” Phayul, 17 December 11; International Campaign for Tibet, “Monk in Tibet Sets Himself on Fire; Shot by Police During Protest,” 27 February 09. See also “Special Report: Tibetan Monastic Self-Immolations Appear To Correlate With Increasing Repression of Freedom of Religion,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 24 January 12, 1.

¹² See, e.g., “CECC Update: Tibetan Self-Immolations,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 April 14. Of the self-immolations numbered 1–13 spanning the period February 2009–December 2011, all 13 were current or former monks or nuns; 12 of the 13 took place in Sichuan province. For information on the shift during 2012 of the profile of Tibetan self-immolations, see “Special Report: Tibetan Self-Immolation—Rising Frequency, Wider Spread, Greater Diversity,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 August 12. To track self-immolation developments, the Commission has posted under the Special Topics section of the Resources tab on its Web site (www.cecc.gov) a series of summaries of information on Tibetan self-immolations. The summaries include a breakdown by gender, location, and occupation type.

¹³ See, e.g., “CECC Update: Tibetan Self-Immolations,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 23 January 13. In the first of a series of summaries of information on Tibetan self-immolation, the update states: “51 of the 95 self-immolators reportedly were laypersons; 44 were current or former monks or nuns”; and “52 of the 95 self-immolations reportedly took place in Qinghai and Gansu provinces and the Tibet Autonomous Region; 43 took place in Sichuan province.” For additional information on the shift during 2012 of the profile of Tibetan self-immolations, see “Special Report: Tibetan Self-Immolation—Rising Frequency, Wider Spread, Greater Diversity,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 August 12.

¹⁴ “CECC Update: Tibetan Self-Immolations,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 April 14. The update contains a list of self-immolations. The six monastics who self-immolated during the 12-month period September 2013–August 2014 were: monk Tsering Gyal (November 11, 2013; Akyong Monastery, Qinghai province); monk Tsultrim Gyatso (December 19, 2013; Achog Monastery, Gansu province); monk Lobsang Dorje (February 13, 2014; Kirti Monastery, Sichuan province); monk Lobsang Palden (March 16, 2014; Kirti Monastery, Sichuan); monk Jigme Tenzin (March 16, 2014; Sonag Monastery, Qinghai); and nun Drolma (March 29, 2014; unidentified nunnery, Sichuan).

¹⁵ Ibid. The update contains a list of self-immolations. The four laypersons who self-immolated during the 12-month period September 2013–August 2014 were: male Shichung (September 28, 2013; Sichuan province); male Konchog Tseten (December 3, 2013; Sichuan); male Phagmo Samdrub (February 5, 2014; Qinghai province); and male Trinle Namgyal (Trinley Namgyal, April 15, 2014; Sichuan).

¹⁶ Ibid. The update contains a list of self-immolations. The six self-immolations in Sichuan province during the 12-month period September 2013–August 2014 were: male Shichung (September 28, 2013); male Konchog Tseten (December 3, 2013); monk Lobsang Dorje (February 13, 2014; Kirti Monastery); monk Lobsang Palden (March 16, 2014; Kirti Monastery); nun Drolma (March 29, 2014; unidentified nunnery); and male Trinle Namgyal (Trinley Namgyal, April 15, 2014).

¹⁷ Ibid. The update contains a list of self-immolations. The four self-immolations in Qinghai or Gansu province during the 12-month period September 2013–August 2014 were: monk Tsering Gyal (November 11, 2013; Akyong Monastery, Qinghai province); monk Tsaltrim Gyatso (December 19, 2013; Achog Monastery, Gansu province); male Phagmo Samdrub (February 5, 2014; Qinghai); and monk Jigme Tenzin (March 16, 2014; Sonag Monastery, Qinghai).

¹⁸ See, e.g., “CECC Update: Tibetan Self-Immolations,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 April 14. The summary reported that of 126 self-immolators, 68 were laypersons and 58 were current or former monks or nuns. Of the 126 self-immolations, 64 took place in Qinghai and Gansu provinces and the Tibet Autonomous Region; 62 took place in Sichuan province.

¹⁹ CECC, 2013 Annual Report, 10 October 13, 174–78; CECC, 2012 Annual Report, 10 October 12, 157–60.

²⁰ See, e.g., International Campaign for Tibet, “Tibetan Father of Two Sets Fire to Himself and Dies in Ngaba,” 29 September 13; Free Tibet, “Tibetan Farmer Self-Immolates and Dies at Prayer Festival,” 29 September 13; “Chinese Authorities Order Self-Immolator’s Ashes ‘Thrown in River,’” Radio Free Asia, 30 September 13.

²¹ See, e.g., “Tibetan Protester Dies of His Burns,” Radio Free Asia, 12 November 13; International Campaign for Tibet, “Tibetans Gather at Monastery in Golok After Self-Immolation of Young Monk,” 11 November 13; “Tibetan Monk Succumbs to His Burns in the Latest Self-Immolation in Tibet,” Voice of America, 12 November 13.

²² See, e.g., International Campaign for Tibet, “Tibetan Father of Two Sets Fire to Himself in Ngaba,” 4 December 13; “Tibetan Youth Self-Immolates in Ngaba Raising the Toll to 124,” Voice of America, 4 December 13; “Tibetan Father of Two Self-Immolates in Ngaba,” Radio Free Asia, 4 December 13.

²³ See, e.g., Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Tibetan Monk Dies of Self-Immolation. Calls for Unity Among Tibetans in Last Note,” 19 December 13; “Tibetan Monk From Sangchu Dies After Setting Himself on Fire,” Voice of America, 19 December 13; “Respected Tibetan Monk Burns Himself to Death in Gansu,” Radio Free Asia, 19 December 13; International Campaign for Tibet, “Monks Gather To Pray After Self-Immolation of Respected Tibetan Monk in Amchok,” 20 December 13.

²⁴ See, e.g., International Campaign for Tibet, “Self-Immolation of Tibetan Father of Two in Tsekhog,” 7 February 14; “Tibetan Man Carries Out Self-Immolation Protest,” Voice of America, 6 February 14; “Tibetan Man Sets Himself Ablaze in First Burning Protest This Year,” Radio Free Asia, 6 February 14.

²⁵ See, e.g., “Latest Tibetan Self-Immolation Protester Dies,” Radio Free Asia, 17 February 14; International Campaign for Tibet, “Security Intensified in Ngaba After Former Kirti Monk Self-Immolates,” 14 February 14; “Ngaba Self-Immolator Lobsang Dead, Cremated Without Family’s Consent,” Phayul, 18 February 14.

²⁶ See, e.g., Phuntsok Yangchen, “Tibetan Self-Immolator Lobsang Palden Dies,” Phayul, 23 March 14; “Two Tibetan Monks Self-Immolate on Crackdown Anniversary,” Radio Free Asia, 16 March 14; “Two Tibetan Monks Self-Immolate,” Voice of America, 17 March 14.

²⁷ See, e.g., “Monk Self-Immolates in NW China,” Xinhua, 16 March 14, reprinted in China Internet Information Center (provides name of monastery as “Shaderi”); “Tibetan Self-Immolation Protesters Die of Their Burns,” Radio Free Asia, 25 March 14 (provides alternate name for Sonag Monastery as “Shador”); “Tsekhog Self Immolator Died Hours After Self Immolation: Sources,” Phayul, 26 March 14; “Two Tibetan Monks Self-Immolate on Crackdown Anniversary,” Radio Free Asia, 16 March 14; Free Tibet, “March 16 Self-Immolation Protester Identified as Jigme Tenzin,” 25 March 14.

²⁸ See, e.g., International Campaign for Tibet, “Tibetan Nun Sets Fire to Herself Outside Monastery in First Self-Immolation in Bathang,” 31 March 14 (“survived after receiving emergency medical treatment at the hospital”); “Tibetan Nun Self-Immolator Identified,” Radio Free Asia, 31 March 14; “Tibetan Nun Immolates Self in Kham Bathang,” Phayul, 30 March 14.

²⁹ See, e.g., “Tibetan Man Burns Himself to Death in Eastern Tibet,” Tibet Express, 16 April 14; “Tibetan Immolates Self in Tawu,” Phayul, 15 April 14 (“body was . . . later handed over to his family”); “Tibetan Man Self-Immolates in Kham Tawu,” Voice of America, 15 April 14.

³⁰ Ruogergai County People’s Government, Notice of Interim Anti-Self-Immolation Provisions [Guanyu fan zifen gongzuo zanxing guiding de tongzhi], 8 April 13, reprinted and translated in China Digital Times, “Community Punished for Self-Immolations,” 18 February 14. See also Human Rights Watch, “China: Tibetan Immolations, Security Measures Escalate,” 29 November 12. The HRW report included a translation of a November 14, 2012, notice issued jointly by the Communist Party and the local government in Huangnan (Malho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai province, that included collective punishment.

³¹ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “China Announces Unprecedented Harsh Measures To Deter Self-Immolations in Tibet’s Dzoegge County,” 14 February 14; China Digital Times, “Community Punished for Self-Immolations,” 18 February 14; International Campaign for Tibet, “‘Absurd and Terrifying’ New Regulations Escalate Drive To Criminalize Self-Immolations by Targeting Family, Villagers, Monasteries,” 24 February 14.

³² Ruo'ergai County People's Government, Notice of Interim Anti-Self-Immolation Provisions [Guanyu fan zifen gongzuo zanzing guiding de tongzhi], 8 April 13, arts. 1–3, 9–11, 13, reprinted and translated in China Digital Times, "Community Punished for Self-Immolations," 18 February 14.

³³ Ibid., arts. 4, 6, 10.

³⁴ Ibid., arts. 5–9, 13.

³⁵ Ibid., arts. 5–8, 13–15.

³⁶ Ibid., arts. 13–14.

³⁷ Ibid., art. 4.

³⁸ Ibid., art. 9.

³⁹ Ibid., art. 9.

⁴⁰ Ibid., art. 1.

⁴¹ Ibid., art. 10. The provisions contain no definition or description of an "active participant."

⁴² Ibid., art. 10.

⁴³ Ibid., art. 15.

⁴⁴ Ibid., art. 10.

⁴⁵ Ibid., art. 6.

⁴⁶ Ibid., art. 7. Article 7 also stipulates that if another self-immolation occurs, the security deposit would be placed in the national treasury and payment of an additional security deposit would be required.

⁴⁷ Ibid., art. 5.

⁴⁸ Ibid., art. 5.

⁴⁹ Ibid., art. 14; Dzoegge County People's Government, Notice of Provisional Anti-Self-Immolation Regulations, art. 14, translated in International Campaign for Tibet, "'Absurd and Terrifying' New Regulations Escalate Drive To Criminalize Self-Immolations by Targeting Family, Villagers, Monasteries," 24 February 14.

⁵⁰ Ruo'ergai County People's Government, Notice of Interim Anti-Self-Immolation Provisions [Guanyu fan zifen gongzuo zanzing guiding de tongzhi], 8 April 13, art. 13, reprinted and translated in China Digital Times, "Community Punished for Self-Immolations," 18 February 14.

⁵¹ Ibid., art. 13.

⁵² Ibid., art. 12.

⁵³ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, "China Holds Tibetan Livelihood to Ransom To Secure Political Stability," 30 July 14. The TCHRD report provided the following translation for the title on the cover of the document: "Information Handbook for the Enforcement of Two Separate Regulations Issued by Diru County People's Government" [Bri-ru rdzong midmangs srid-gzhung gi—"gtan-bebs khag gnyis" kyi—dril-bsgrags lag-deb]. The date "June 2014" is on the cover.

⁵⁴ Ibid. According to TCHRD's partial translation of the incomplete document, Articles 2 and 3, which address attending the "Great Prayer Festival," a reference to the Dalai Lama's July 2014 Kalachakra teaching in India, according to TCHRD, contain language banning individuals who traveled to the event and "their parents, spouses, [and] children" from gathering *cordyceps sinensis* ("caterpillar fungus") for a period of three to five years.

⁵⁵ Ibid. According to TCHRD's partial translation of the incomplete document, Articles 2 to 6 address attendance of the "Great Prayer Festival," a reference to the Dalai Lama's July 2014 Kalachakra teaching in India, according to TCHRD.

⁵⁶ Ibid. According to TCHRD's partial translation of the incomplete document, Article 16 defines "illegal acts of religious education" as when "religious professionals, and those people who engage in religious pursuits in the society without any permanent status, as well as general masses who travel on their own to areas outside one's locality without getting permission from the United Front and Religious Bureau office of their respective localities."

⁵⁷ Ibid. According to TCHRD's partial translation of the incomplete document, "having strong nationalistic fervor" is included in the first of eight categories of "illegal activities" listed in Article 10.

⁵⁸ Ibid. According to TCHRD's partial translation of the incomplete document, Article 11 includes using the Internet to spread "harmful information."

⁵⁹ Ibid. According to TCHRD's partial translation of the incomplete document, "propagating videos or songs in praise of the 14th Dalai and his separatist organization" is the fifth of eight categories of "illegal activities" in Article 10.

⁶⁰ Ibid. According to TCHRD's partial translation of the incomplete document, Article 22 addresses "[those] who fail to hoist the Chinese national flag within the specific period."

⁶¹ Ibid. According to TCHRD's partial translation of the incomplete document, Articles 10, 11, and 22 stipulate an individual prohibition on harvesting "caterpillar fungus" for periods of "more than one year," two years, and one year, respectively.

⁶² Ibid. According to TCHRD's partial translation of the incomplete document, Articles 2 and 3 stipulate a three- to five-year prohibition on harvesting "caterpillar fungus" by an individual and that person's "parents, spouses, and children." In the case of a minor (age 16 or below) who "[indulged] in making and propagating rumors or spreading harmful information on the Internet," Article 14 stipulates a one-year prohibition on harvesting "caterpillar fungus" for the minor as well as the persons "responsible for looking after" the minor.

⁶³ For reports on the value and economic importance of *cordyceps sinensis* to Tibetans in some areas, see, e.g., Huang Jingjing, "Physicians Challenge Craze for Exorbitantly Priced TCM Fungus," Global Times, 30 July 14; Daniel Winkler, "Yartza Gunbu (*Cordyceps sinensis*) and the Fungal Commodification of Tibet's Rural Economy," Economic Botany, Vol. 62, No. 3 (2008), 291; Jonathan Watts, "Fungus Gold Rush in Tibetan Plateau Rebuilding Lives After Earthquake," Guardian, 16 June 10; Human Rights Watch, "They Say We Should Be Grateful—Mass Relocating and Relocation Programs in Tibetan Areas of China," 27 June 13.

⁶⁴ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, "China Holds Tibetan Livelihood to Ransom To Secure Political Stability," 30 July 14. According to TCHRD's partial translation of the

incomplete document, Articles 2–4, 10–11, 17, and 22 include cancellation of welfare benefits. Of those, Articles 2–3 appear to involve collective punishment of family members.

⁶⁵ Ibid. According to TCHRD's partial translation of the incomplete document, Articles 3 and 6 provide for cancellation of household registration.

⁶⁶ Ibid. According to TCHRD's partial translation of the incomplete document, Articles 2, 9–11, 14, 18, and 22 include periods of legal education ranging from two to six months. Of those, Articles 2 and 14 appear to involve collective punishment of family members.

⁶⁷ Ibid. According to TCHRD's partial translation of the incomplete document, Articles 4 and 17 provide for the expulsion of monks and nuns from monasteries and nunneries, the revocation of certificates permitting them to engage in religious study, and cancellation of their welfare benefits.

⁶⁸ "Ensure Absolute Security in the Ideological Field—Fourth Discussion on Earnestly Implementing the Spirit of the Regional Propaganda and Ideological Work Conference" [Quebao yishixingtai lingyu juehui anquan—si lun renzhen guanhe quanqu xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo huiyi jingshen], Tibet Daily, 3 October 13 (translated in Open Source Center, 6 October 13); Wang Zuo'an, "Religious-Related Work Is by Nature Mass Work" [Zongjiao gongzuo benzhi shang shi qunzhong gongzuo], People's Daily, 26 November 13 (translated in Open Source Center, 15 January 14). Director Wang Zuo'an of the State Administration for Religious Affairs called for the government's "religious-related work" to be "placed in a more important position to further bring the relationship between the Party and religious people closer," and said that the "rule of law" must guide religious leaders "to correctly view the relationship between religious doctrine and national laws."

⁶⁹ "Ensure Absolute Security in the Ideological Field—Fourth Discussion on Earnestly Implementing the Spirit of the Regional Propaganda and Ideological Work Conference" [Quebao yishixingtai lingyu juehui anquan—si lun renzhen guanhe quanqu xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo huiyi jingshen], Tibet Daily, 3 October 13 (translated in Open Source Center, 6 October 13). Tibet Autonomous Region Communist Party Secretary Chen Quanguo characterized "the Dalai" as "the biggest obstacle to the establishment of normal order in Tibetan Buddhism."

⁷⁰ Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "Tibetan Philosophy," last visited 23 April 14. The Dalai Lama is the principal teacher of the Gelug tradition of Tibetan Buddhism, the dominant tradition from the 17th century (i.e., from the time of the Fifth Dalai Lama). The Nyingma, Sakya, and Kagyu traditions predate the Gelug and have their own spiritual leaders. Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, "The Dalai Lamas," last visited 23 April 14. The Dalai Lama's official Web site provides the dates 1617–1682 for the Fifth Dalai Lama.

⁷¹ Chen Quanguo, "Ensuring Ideological Security in Tibet With the Spirit of Daring To Go Into Battle—Earnestly Studying the Thorough Implementation of the Spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping's Important Speech at the National Propaganda and Ideology Work Conference" [Yi ganyu liang jian de jingshen quebao xizang yishixingtai lingyu anquan—renzhen xuexi guanhe xi jingping zongshuji zai quanguo xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo huiyi shang de zhongyao jianghua jingshen], Seeking Truth, 1 November 13 (translated in Open Source Center, 12 November 13). Tibet Autonomous Region Communist Party Secretary Chen Quanguo called for "cadres and masses . . . to separate the tradition of Tibetan Buddhism and the 14th Dalai Lama and to separate the 14th Dalai Lama and the traditional title of Dalai Lama."

⁷² "While Inspecting Tibet, Yu Zhengsheng Emphatically Says That It Is Necessary To Adhere to a Development Path With Chinese Characteristics and Tibetan Features, Promote Leap-Forward Economic and Social Development and Long-Lasting Stability in Tibet" [Yu zhengsheng zai xizang kaocha diaoyan shi qiangdiao—jianchi zou you zhongguo tese xizang tedian de fazhan luzi, cujin xizang jingji shehui kuayueshi fazhan he changzhi jiu'an], Tibet Daily, 8 August 13 (translated in Open Source Center, 14 August 13). According to Tibet Daily, Yu Zhengsheng, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee, and Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, stated, "Only when the motherland becomes strong, our society develops, and the people improve their living condition, can Tibetan Buddhism enjoy healthy development."

⁷³ Ai Feng, "Tibet Supervision Head: For the First Time in Tibet's History, Work Teams Are Stationed in Every Village" [Xizang jiancha zhang: xizang lishi shang shouci suoyou cun dou paizhu gongzuodui], China Net, 8 March 12, reprinted in Phoenix Net.

⁷⁴ Li Yuan and Wen Tao, "Tibet Sends More Than 60,000 Cadres to the Grassroots Over Two Years, the Most Extensive in 60 Years" [Xizang liang nian xuanpai yu 6 wan ganbu xia jiceng—wei 60 nian lai zui da guimo], Xinhua, 10 September 13. According to the article, since October 2011, the TAR government and Party had sent "more than 60,000 cadres" to the TAR's "5,459 villages and 1,877 temples."

⁷⁵ Ai Feng, "Tibet Supervision Head: For the First Time in Tibet's History, Work Teams Are Stationed in Every Village" [Xizang jiancha zhang: xizang lishi shang shouci suoyou cun dou paizhu gongzuodui], China Net, 8 March 12, reprinted in Phoenix Net. According to the article, "NPC delegate and Supervision Department Head" Weise (Oezer, Woesser) said, "A total of 21,000 cadres were dispatched for the activity, going to a total of 5,451 villages throughout Tibet, and this is the first time that work teams have been posted to every village in Tibet." China Directory 2012 (Tokyo: Radiopress, 2011), 435. According to China Directory 2012, Weise was Director of the TAR Supervision Department.

⁷⁶ Li Yuan and Wen Tao, "Tibet Sends More Than 60,000 Cadres to the Grassroots Over Two Years, the Most Extensive in 60 Years" [Xizang liang nian xuanpai yu 6 wan ganbu xia jiceng—wei 60 nian lai zui da guimo], Xinhua, 10 September 13. According to the article, Tibet Autonomous Region People's Congress Deputy Director, Mazi Bishui, made the remark. For different perspectives on the People's Liberation Army invasion of what would later be named the Tibet Autonomous Region, see, e.g., Elliot Sperling, *The Tibet-China Conflict: History and Polemics* (Washington, DC: East-West Center Washington, 2004), xiii–ix, 23, 32–33; International Campaign for Tibet, "History, Politics, Legal Situation," last visited 22 April 14; "Peaceful Liberation of Tibet," China Tibet Online, 21 January 11.

⁷⁷ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, "China Expands New Measures To Directly Control Tibetan Monasteries," 18 May 14 (on Yushu (Yulshul) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP)); "Chinese Authorities Impose New Restrictions on Restive Tibetan County," Radio Free Asia, 20 May 14 (on Guoluo (Golog) TAP).

⁷⁸ Yushu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Yushu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], issued and effective 11 September 13. The Yushu regulations were under preparation by late 2009 and were listed as part of the Qinghai Province People's Congress Standing Committee legislative agenda in 2010. "Qinghai People's Congress Standing Committee 2010 Legislation Program" [Qinghai sheng renda changweihui 2010 nian lifa jihua], 14 December 09, reprinted in Qinghai Province People's Congress Standing Committee, 3 March 10. The Commission has no information on why the regulations were not issued and effective until September 2013. For additional information on Tibetan Buddhist affairs regulations that took effect in other Tibetan autonomous prefectures, see CECC, Annual Report 2011, 10 October 11, 209–12; "Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations Taking Effect in Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 March 11.

⁷⁹ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, "China Expands New Measures To Directly Control Tibetan Monasteries," 18 May 14. According to a TCHRD source, officials in Chenduo (Tridu) county ordered the replacement of "monastic staff and management committee members with government and party appointees by 7 June 2014." The Commission has not observed information on whether or not such activity was underway in other Yushu counties.

⁸⁰ Regulatory measures on Tibetan Buddhist affairs took effect in Guoluo in September 2010. Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], issued and effective 30 September 10. For additional information on Tibetan Buddhist affairs regulations that took effect in other Tibetan autonomous prefectures, see CECC, Annual Report 2011, 10 October 11, 209–12; "Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations Taking Effect in Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures," Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 March 11.

⁸¹ "Chinese Authorities Impose New Restrictions on Restive Tibetan County," Radio Free Asia, 20 May 14. According to the RFA report, officials conducted the campaign in Banma (Pema) county. The Commission has not observed information on whether or not such activity was underway in other Guoluo counties.

⁸² "Chinese Authorities Detain 16 Tibetans Rallying for Religious Leader's Release," Radio Free Asia, 26 December 13. According to an RFA source, "Another monk, Gyurme Tsultrim, who was taken away from Takna monastery in Nangchen on Nov. 29, has been released from detention but placed under house arrest." (Tagna Monastery is in Nangqian (Nangchen) county, Yushu (Yulshul) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai province.) "China Detains Two Senior Tibetan Monks," Radio Free Asia, 17 December 13. According to an RFA source, "Local Tibetans suspect he was detained because of a speech he gave during a prayer festival in Nangchen in which he urged the promotion of Tibetan Buddhism, the Tibetan language, and moral ethics." For more information on Gyurme Tsultrim, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2014-00015.

⁸³ Tsering Woesser, "Weise: Cross-Province Arrest of Khenpo Karma Tsewang," [Weise: zao kuasheng zhuabu de nangqian kanbu gama caiwang], Invisible Tibet (blog), 8 January 14; "China Detains Two Senior Tibetan Monks," Radio Free Asia, 17 December 13; "Hundreds of Tibetan Protesters Demand Release of Detained Monks," Radio Free Asia, 16 January 14. The January 16, 2014, RFA report described Karma Tsewang as "well-respected among Tibetans for his work to protect and promote the Tibetan language, culture, and religion." International Campaign for Tibet, "Rare Vigil Outside Prison To Support Popular Tibetan Monk," 17 January 14. ICT characterized Karma Tsewang as "well-known for his community initiatives to preserve Tibetan language, including teaching the language to young Tibetans." "Jailed Tibetan Religious Leader in Failing Health, Meets With Lawyer," Radio Free Asia, 11 March 14. An RFA source stated that officials "specifically accused [Karma Tsewang] of harboring fugitive monks from Chamdo's Karma monastery at his own Japa [or Gongyal] monastery," and that lawyer "Tang Tian Hao" (Tang Tianhao) "rejected as unrealistic" the charges. For more information on Karma Tsewang, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2014-00014.

⁸⁴ "Driru Area Tibetans Sentenced in Secret," Radio Free Asia, 1 April 14; "Chantleader of Drongna Monastery in Driru Sentenced to Eighteen Years," Phayul, 1 April 14. According to the Phayul report, chant master Thardoe Gyaltzen of Drongna Monastery in Biru (Driru) county, Naqu (Nagchu) prefecture, Tibet Autonomous Region, possessed "pictures of the Tibetan leader the Dalai Lama and recordings of his speeches and teachings." Officials reportedly closed Drongna in November 2013 and detained the monastery's "debate master," Kalsang Dondrub. For more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2014-00141 on Thardoe Gyaltzen and 2014-00056 on Kalsang Dondrub.

⁸⁵ Mandala, "What Is a Geshe?" April–May 2007. According to the article, a Geshe degree is "a scholastic degree in large monastic universities that can take two decades or more to complete."

⁸⁶ "Senior Tibetan Monk Beaten to Death in Chinese Police Custody," Radio Free Asia, 19 December 13. According to RFA sources, Ngawang Jamyang was titled Geshe and taught at Tarmoe Monastery, located in Biru (Driru) county, Naqu (Nagchu) prefecture, Tibet Autonomous Region. Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, "Diru Crackdown: Senior Tibetan Buddhist Scholar Beaten to Death in Police Custody," 19 December 13. According to a TCHRD source, "It was clear that Ngawang Jampel was beaten to death while in secret detention. He was a healthy, robust man when he left his monastery to visit Lhasa." For more information on Ngawang Jamyang, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2008-00570.

⁸⁷ Phuntsok Yangchen, "Abbot Among Five Tibetans Arrested," Phayul, 17 April 14; "Monks Among Five Held in Tibet on Suspicion of Challenging Chinese Rule," Radio Free Asia, 16 April 14. The RFA report cited a source from the area who described the prayers as on behalf of Tibetans who "sacrificed their lives for the Tibetan cause." For more information on Khedrub, see

the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2014-00146. Based on Commission monitoring and analysis, such language used from 2011 onward is likely to refer principally to Tibetan self-immolators. The Commission has posted under the Special Topics section of the Resources tab on its Web site (www.cecc.gov) a series of summaries of information on Tibetan self-immolations. The summaries include a breakdown by gender, location, and occupation type.

⁸⁸State Administration for Religious Affairs, Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism [Zangchuan fojiao huofu zhuanshi guanli banfa], issued 18 July 07, effective 1 September 07. For more information on the measures, see CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 196–97; “New Legal Measures Assert Unprecedented Control Over Tibetan Buddhist Reincarnation,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 5 May 08; “Dalai Lama Rejects Communist Party ‘Brazen Meddling’ in Tibetan Buddhist Reincarnation,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 24 January 12, 1.

⁸⁹Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Ancient Tibetan Monastery Under Siege Over Reincarnation Issue; Mother of Two Attempts Suicide Protest,” 10 September 13. According to the TCHRD report, the name of the teacher who Tibetans believe reincarnates is Rongpo Choeje (often used with the honorific “Rinpoche”).

⁹⁰Ibid. According to the TCHRD report, the mother, Drolma Yangkyi (“Dolma Yangkey”), tried to kill herself by attempting to crash her motorcycle at high speed; instead, she fell off and injured herself seriously.

⁹¹Ibid. According to the TCHRD report, the court sentenced Dawa Khyenrab Wangchug “on charges that he contacted His Holiness the Dalai Lama during the search for [the reincarnation],” “at least one” TCHRD source reported that Dawa Khyenrab Wangchug had been released on medical parole. Phurba Thinley, “Religious Oppression Forces Senior Monk To Commit Suicide,” Phayul, 27 July 10. For more information on Dawa Khyenrab Wangchug, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2010-00263.

⁹²“Chinese Authorities Allow Tibetan Spiritual Teacher To Return to Monastery,” Radio Free Asia, 13 August 14; “China Allows Banned Tibetan Lama To Visit His Monastery,” Tibet Express, 11 August 14; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Ancient Tibetan Monastery Under Siege Over Reincarnation Issue; Mother of Two Attempts Suicide Protest,” 10 September 13. See also “Government Policy on Tibetan Reincarnation Leads to Expulsions, Detentions, Suicide,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 8, 9 November 10, 2.

⁹³International Campaign for Tibet, “China Tightens Control, Prevents Pilgrimage, Before Major Dalai Lama Teaching in Exile,” 12 June 14.

⁹⁴Ibid. The 15th day of the 4th lunar month traditionally marks the birth, death (“paranirvana”), and enlightenment of the historical Buddha. For a Tibetan calendar, see Men-Tsee-Khang, “Calendar,” last visited 3 September 14.

⁹⁵“Happy Tibetan New Year,” Nine Ways (blog), 2 March 14 (regarding Wood Horse year); “A New Beginning: Happy Losar,” Nine Ways (blog), 10 February 13 (regarding 60-year cycle).

⁹⁶International Campaign for Tibet, “China Tightens Control, Prevents Pilgrimage, Before Major Dalai Lama Teaching in Exile,” 12 June 12.

⁹⁷“Ensure Absolute Security in the Ideological Field—Fourth Discussion on Earnestly Implementing the Spirit of the Regional Propaganda and Ideological Work Conference” [Quebao yishixingtai lingyu juehui anquan—si lun renzhen guanche quanqu xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo huiyi jingshen], Tibet Daily, 3 October 13 (translated in Open Source Center, 6 October 13).

⁹⁸Chen Quanguo, “Ensuring Ideological Security in Tibet With the Spirit of Daring To Go Into Battle—Earnestly Studying the Thorough Implementation of the Spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Important Speech at the National Propaganda and Ideology Work Conference” [Yi ganyu liang jian de jingshen quebao xizang yishixingtai lingyu anquan—renzhen xuexi guanche xi jinping zongshuji zai quanguo xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo huiyi shang de zhongyao jianghua jingshen], Seeking Truth, 1 November 13 (translated in Open Source Center, 12 November 13). For more information on the Tibet Autonomous Region village-level deployment of Communist Party cadres, which began in 2011, see Li Yuan and Wen Tao, “Tibet Sends More Than 60,000 Cadres to the Grassroots Over Two Years, the Most Extensive in 60 Years” [Xizang liang nian xuanpai yu 6 wan ganbu xia jiceng—wei 60 nian lai zui da guimo], Xinhua, 10 September 13.

⁹⁹“Ensure Absolute Security in the Ideological Field—Fourth Discussion on Earnestly Implementing the Spirit of the Regional Propaganda and Ideological Work Conference” [Quebao yishixingtai lingyu juehui anquan—si lun renzhen guanche quanqu xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo huiyi jingshen], Tibet Daily, 3 October 13 (translated in Open Source Center, 6 October 13). According to Tibet Daily, Chen Quanguo stated: “We must extensively carry out thematic educational activities, deeply carry out patriotic educational activities, implement the ‘patriotic revolutionary history and culture exploration project,’ and build a network of patriotic educational bases that covers the entire region; we must deeply conduct education on comparison between the new and old Tibets and carry out the ‘new and old Tibets comparison historical records exploration project’ to educate the masses of all ethnic groups, especially the younger generation;

¹⁰⁰“Ensure Absolute Security in the Ideological Field—Fourth Discussion on Earnestly Implementing the Spirit of the Regional Propaganda and Ideological Work Conference” [Quebao yishixingtai lingyu juehui anquan—si lun renzhen guanche quanqu xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo huiyi jingshen], Tibet Daily, 3 October 13 (translated in Open Source Center, 6 October 13). For an explanation of “the three inseparables,” see Yang Jing and Yang Chuantang, “Great Progress in Ethnic Minority Relations,” Seeking Truth Journal, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2010), updated 19 September 11. According to the article, “[The third generation of the central collective leadership of the CPC with Jiang Zemin at the core] advocated the important idea that ‘the Han ethnic group cannot be separated from the minority ethnic groups, the minority ethnic groups cannot be separated from the Han ethnic group and no minority ethnic group can be separated from the others (This became known as the ‘three inseparables’ in Chinese),’ stressing that all ethnic

groups should share a common fate, should all be of one mind and should continuously work to strengthen the cohesive force of the Chinese nation.”

¹⁰¹For information on reports observed during the Commission's 2014 reporting year of Tibetan detentions linked to promoting “unity” among Tibetans, see, e.g., the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records: (arranged in descending chronological order by date of detention): records 2014-00193 on Gebhe, 2014-00016 on Phuntsog Namgyal, 2014-00017 on Pema Tsultrim, 2014-00018 on Dorje Lodroe, 2014-00019 on Yungdrung, 2014-00020 on Tatob, 2014-00021 on Tashi Namgyal, 2014-00022 on Dorje Rigzin, 2014-00023 on Sonam, 2014-00012 on Gonpo Tenzin, 2014-00009 on Trinle Tsekar, and 2013-00377 on Tamdrin.

¹⁰²“Tibetans Clash With Police Over Chinese Flag Campaign,” Radio Free Asia, 2 October 13; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Beatings, Detention, Threats After Tibetans Reject China's ‘Mass Line’ Policy in Diru,” 5 October 13; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Diru Under Lockdown: One Tibetan Sentenced; More Injured by Gunshots and Disappeared,” 8 October 13.

¹⁰³As of September 1, 2014, the Commission's Political Prisoner Database contained the following 58 records of detention or imprisonment linked to the Biru (Driru) county crackdown (arranged in descending chronological order by date of detention): records 2014-00068 on Konchog Dragpa, 2014-00141 on Thardoe Gyaltsen, 2014-00070 on Tsultrim Nyandrag, 2014-00061 on Choedron, 2014-00060 on Yangchen, 2014-00059 on Bumchog, 2014-00010 on Choekyab, 2014-00011 on Tselha, 2014-00012 on Gonpo Tenzin, 2014-00062 on Sonam Tobgyal, 2014-00137 on Ngangdrag, 2014-00135 on Rigsal, 2014-00024 on Kalsang Choglang, 2008-00570 on Ngawang Jamyang, 2014-00055 on Pasang Tashi, 2014-00009 on Trinle Tsekar, 2014-00056 on Kalsang Dondrub, 2014-00047 on Konchog Choephel, 2014-00054 on Lobsang Choeying, 2014-00064 on Drolma Tsephel, 2013-00355 on Gabug, 2013-00360 on Jigme Phuntsog, 2013-00354 on Kundrag, 2013-00361 on Lamsang, 2013-00348 on Sarkyi, 2013-00358 on Sota, 2013-00353 on Tador, 2013-00357 on Thubchen, 2014-00063 on Trinle Palmo, 2013-00351 on Tsering, 2013-00359 on Tsering Jangchub, 2013-00352 on Tsering Phuntsog, 2013-00356 on Tsering Tenpa, 2013-00362 on Tsewang Lhakyab, 2013-00349 on Tsophan, 2013-00350 on Yangkyi, 2014-00067 on Dargye, 2014-00066 on Konchog Jinpa, 2014-00046 on Tobden, 2013-00329 on Dorgyal, 2013-00331 on Kalsang Namdrol, 2013-00330 on Lhamo, 2013-00332 on Mengyal, 2013-00328 on Shodar, 2013-00327 on Tenzin Rangdrol, 2013-00323 on Jampa Legshe, 2013-00324 on Kalnam, 2013-00325 on Dawa Lhundrub, 2013-00326 on Jampa, 2013-00368 on Chogsar, 2013-00366 on Sonam Dondrub, 2013-00367 on Tsering Tashi, 2013-00319 on Yulgyal, 2013-00321 on Kalsang, 2013-00318 on Tsultrim Gyaltsen, 2010-00456 on Dorje Dragtsal, 2013-00317 on Tsering Gyaltsen, and 2013-00294 on Dayang.

¹⁰⁴As of September 1, 2014, the Commission's Political Prisoner Database contained the following 15 records of imprisonment linked to the Biru (Driru) county crackdown (arranged in descending order by sentence length and date of detention): records 2014-00141 on Thardoe Gyaltsen (18 years), 2014-00010 on Choekyab (13 years), 2013-00318 on Tsultrim Gyaltsen (13 years), 2010-00456 on Dorje Dragtsal (11 years), 2014-00137 on Ngangdrag (10 years), 2014-00135 on Rigsal (10 years), 2014-00024 on Kalsang Choglang (10 years), 2013-00319 on Yulgyal (10 years), 2014-00070 on Tsultrim Nyandrag (9 years), 2014-00009 on Trinle Tsekar (9 years), 2014-00047 on Konchog Choephel (6 years), 2014-00046 on Tobden (5 years), 2013-00327 on Tenzin Rangdrol (5 years), 2014-00011 on Tselha (3 years), and 2013-00294 on Dayang (2 years and 6 months).

¹⁰⁵See, e.g., “Tibetans Clash With Police Over Chinese Flag Campaign,” Radio Free Asia, 2 October 13 (“Internet and other communication channels in the area are now blocked”); “Chinese Police Fire on Unarmed Tibetan Protesters in Driru,” Radio Free Asia, 7 October 13 (“confiscated Tibetans’ cell phones and blocked communications by phone and the Internet”); Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “China Disappears More Tibetans in Diru as Crackdown Spreads,” 19 October 13 (“all communication channels remain blocked”); “Three More Arrests in Driru,” Phayul, 2 December 13 (“strictly monitoring all movements in and out of Driru, intercepting all communication lines”); Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Repression Escalates in Tibet's Diru County: Tibetan Youth Beaten to Death, Two Others Given Heavy Sentences and Another Disappeared,” 7 February 14 (“fate of many more remain unknown due to restrictions on communication lines”).

¹⁰⁶“Elderly Tibetan Severely Beaten for Questioning Chinese ‘Political Education,’” Radio Free Asia, 11 September 13. For more information on Dayang, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2013-00294.

¹⁰⁷“Elderly Tibetan Beaten and Jailed for Seeking Freedom,” Radio Free Asia, 8 October 13. The RFA report did not identify the criminal charge against Dayang. For more information on Dayang, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2013-00294.

¹⁰⁸“Tibetans Clash With Police Over Chinese Flag Campaign,” Radio Free Asia, 2 October 13.

¹⁰⁹Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “China Disappears a Father of Three, Arrests 10 Others in Ongoing Crackdown in Diru,” 21 October 13. An image in the TCHRD report provides a clear view of People's Armed Police in Xiachu (Shagchu) township, Biru (Driru) county, Naqu (Nagchu) prefecture, Tibet Autonomous Region, with what appear to be anti-riot guns slung across their backs, possibly on October 19, 2013. The image provides a basis for inferring that similar weaponry may have been used in other Biru communities.

¹¹⁰Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Beatings, Detention, Threats After Tibetans Reject China's ‘Mass Line’ Policy in Diru,” 5 October 13. According to the TCHRD report, the “open confrontation” involved Tibetans who “used sticks and stones to respond to the firing from Chinese security forces.”

¹¹¹Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Diru Under Lockdown: One Tibetan Sentenced; More Injured by Gunshots and Disappeared,” 8 October 13; “Tibetan Man Critical, Severely Beaten for Protesting Chinese Flag Campaign,” Tibet Express, 7 October 13. For more information on Tsering Gyaltsen, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2013-00317.

¹¹²“Chinese Police Fire on Unarmed Tibetan Protesters in Diru,” Radio Free Asia, 7 October 13 (“Dorje Draktsel”); Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Diru Under Lockdown: One Tibetan Sentenced; More Injured by Gunshots and Disappeared,” 8 October 13 (“Dorje Dragtsel”). For more information on Dorje Dragtsel, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2010-00456.

¹¹³Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “China Disappears a Father of Three, Arrests 10 Others in Ongoing Crackdown in Diru,” 21 October 13. An image in the TCHRD report provides a clear view of People’s Armed Police in Xiachu (Shagchu) township, Biru (Diru) county, Naqu (Nagchu), Tibet Autonomous Region, with what appear to be anti-riot guns slung across their backs, possibly on October 19, 2013. The image provides a basis for inferring that similar weaponry may have been used in other Biru communities.

¹¹⁴“Chinese Police Fire on Unarmed Tibetan Protesters in Diru,” Radio Free Asia, 7 October 13; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Diru Under Lockdown: One Tibetan Sentenced; More Injured by Gunshots and Disappeared,” 8 October 13; “Chinese Forces Fire Live Bullets at Tibetans in Nagchu,” Tibet Express, 7 October 13. See also Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “China Disappears a Father of Three, Arrests 10 Others in Ongoing Crackdown in Diru,” 21 October 13. An image in the TCHRD report provides a clear view of People’s Armed Police in Xiachu (Shagchu) township, Biru (Diru) county, Naqu (Nagchu), Tibet Autonomous Region, with what appear to be anti-riot guns slung across their backs, possibly on October 19, 2013. The image provides a basis for inferring that similar weaponry may have been used in other Biru communities.

¹¹⁵“Chinese Police Fire on Unarmed Tibetan Protesters in Diru,” Radio Free Asia, 7 October 13.

¹¹⁶“Four Tibetans Shot Dead as Protests Spread in Diru County,” Radio Free Asia, 11 October 13.

¹¹⁷“WeChat Leads to Tibetan Woman’s Arrest in Diru,” Phayul, 17 October 13; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “China Disappears More Tibetans in Diru as Crackdown Spreads,” 19 October 13 (“Kelsang”). According to the TCHRD report, the “exact details” of accusations against Kalsang were unclear. For more information on Kalsang, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2013-00321.

¹¹⁸Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Crackdown in Diru Widens: Tibetan Writer and a Former Policeman Detained,” 14 October 13. According to the TCHRD report, officials also accused Tsultrim Gyaltzen of “[disrupting] social stability by spreading rumours.” For more information on Tsultrim Gyaltzen, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2013-00318.

¹¹⁹International Campaign for Tibet, “New Images of Deepening Crackdown in Nagchu, Tibet,” 15 October 13. For more information on Tsultrim Gyaltzen, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2013-00318.

¹²⁰Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Crackdown in Diru Widens: Tibetan Writer and a Former Policeman Detained,” 14 October 13 (“Yugyal”). According to the TCHRD report, officials also accused Yulgyal of “spreading rumours to harm social stability.” For more information on Yulgyal, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2013-00319.

¹²¹Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “China Disappears More Tibetans in Diru as Crackdown Spreads,” 19 October 13 (“Lhundup”). See also PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, art. 111. Based on TCHRD’s report, officials may have suspected Jampa and Dawa Lhundrub of sharing “state secrets or intelligence” with “an organ, organization or individual outside the territory of China.” For more information, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database records 2013-00326 on Jampa and 2013-00325 on Dawa Lhundrub.

¹²²Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “China Disappears More Tibetans in Diru as Crackdown Spreads,” 19 October 13 (“Jampa Lekshay and Kelnam”). See also PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, art. 111. Based on TCHRD’s report, officials may have suspected monks Jampa Legshe and Kelnam of sharing “state secrets or intelligence” with “an organ, organization or individual outside the territory of China.” For more information, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database records 2013-00323 on Jampa Legshe and 2013-00324 on Kelnam.

¹²³Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “China Disappears a Father of Three, Arrests 10 Others in Ongoing Crackdown in Diru,” 21 October 13 (“Tenzin Rangdol”). According to TCHRD, Tibetans sought Tenzin Rangdol’s release by criticizing “the Chinese government’s entrenched practice of criminalising Tibetan people’s peaceful means of expressing their grievances.” For more information on Tenzin Rangdol, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2013-00327.

¹²⁴“Tibetan Arrested in Diru, Hundreds Confront Police,” Phayul, 21 October 13; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “China Disappears a Father of Three, Arrests 10 Others in Ongoing Crackdown in Diru,” 21 October 13. For more information on Tenzin Rangdol, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2013-00327.

¹²⁵Ibid. The Phayul and TCHRD reports are inconsistent on the initial and eventual size of the protest. According to Phayul, “Forty Tibetans from Gochu arrived outside the administrative building and demanded the release of Rangdol. They were later joined by hundreds others” According to TCHRD, “The protest was staged by about 40 Tibetans from Gochu Village and about a hundred other Tibetans from surrounding villages” For more information on Tenzin Rangdol, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2013-00327.

¹²⁶Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “China Disappears a Father of Three, Arrests 10 Others in Ongoing Crackdown in Diru,” 21 October 13 (“Tenzin Rangdol”). For more

information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2013-00327 on Tenzin Rangdrol.

¹²⁷ "Tibetan Arrested in Diru, Hundreds Confront Police," Phayul, 21 October 13.

¹²⁸ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, "China Disappears a Father of Three, Arrests 10 Others in Ongoing Crackdown in Diru," 21 October 13 ("Tenzin Rangdol"). For more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2013-00327 on Tenzin Rangdol.

¹²⁹ "China Sentences Tibetan Writer and Ex Cop Up to Thirteen Years in Prison," Phayul, 1 April 14 ("Yongyal"). The Phayul report did not identify the court, the criminal charge(s) against the men, or provide information on the short interval between detention and sentencing. For more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2013-00318 on Tsaltrim Gyaltzen and 2013-00319 on Yulgyal. For information on Tsaltrim Gyaltzen's and Yulgyal's detention, see Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, "Crackdown in Diru Widens: Tibetan Writer and a Former Policeman Detained," 14 October 13.

¹³⁰ "Fifteen Tibetans Detained for Pushing for Writer's Release," Radio Free Asia, 8 November 13; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, "No Let-Up in Diru Crackdown: 17 Tibetans Detained as Party Officials Greet Armed Police," 8 November 13.

¹³¹ "China Arrests Woman in Diru, Releases 12 of 15," Phayul, 25 November 13 (lists names of 12 of the 15 detainees); "Tibetan Man Arrested in Diru, Five Released," Phayul, 18 December 13 (lists names of the remaining 3 detainees). For more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2013-00348 on Sarkyi, 2013-00349 on Tsophan, 2013-00350 on Yangkyi, 2013-00351 on Tsering, 2013-00352 on Tsering Phuntsog, 2013-00353 on Tador, 2013-00354 on Kundrag, 2013-00355 on Gabug, 2013-00356 on Tsering Tenpa, 2013-00357 on Thubchen, 2013-00358 on Sota, 2013-00359 on Tsering Jangchub, 2013-00360 on Jigme Phuntsog, 2013-00361 on Lamsang, and 2013-00362 on Tsewang Lhakyab.

¹³² Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, "Diru Crackdown: Three Tibetans Sent to Prison for up to 13 Years, Singer Gets 9 Years in Prison," 23 December 13. According to TCHRD, police detained Choekyab ("Choekyap") and Tselha in the third week of November 2013 and Trinle Tsekar ("Trinley Tsekar") on November 20.

¹³³ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, "Diru Crackdown: Three Tibetans Sent to Prison for up to 13 Years, Singer Gets 9 Years in Prison," 23 December 13. According to the TCHRD report, the three men were "charged of instigating one of [2013's] largest protests against Chinese mining activities at the sacred Naglha Dzamba Mountain in Diru County"; the TCHRD report links the quoted text to a May 28, 2013, Radio Free Asia report that states: "As many as 5,000 Tibetans have protested against Chinese mining operations at a site considered sacred by local residents." "Thousands of Tibetans Protest Against Mine," Radio Free Asia, 28 May 13. For more information on the protest, see CECC, Annual Report 2013, 10 October 13, 184. For more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2014-00010 on Choekyab, 2014-00009 on Trinle Tsekar, and 2014-00011 on Tselha.

¹³⁴ "China Jails Three Tibetans Over Anti-Mining Protest," Radio Free Asia, 23 December 13 (RFA source: "sentenced for their roles in the protest against Chinese mining activities"); Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, "Diru Crackdown: Three Tibetans Sent to Prison for up to 13 Years, Singer Gets 9 Years in Prison," 23 December 13 (TCHRD: sentenced for "allegedly 'attempting to split the Chinese nation'"). The TCHRD report of sentencing for charges related to "separatist activities" may be inaccurate since the case was tried before the Biru (Diru) County People's Court which, by law, cannot try a case involving state security such as separatism. PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi susong fa], passed 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 14 March 12, effective 1 January 13, art. 20. Article 20 requires an intermediate people's court to "have jurisdiction as courts of first instance" in cases including "cases endangering State security." PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, art. 103 ("splitting the State or undermining unity of the country"). For more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2014-00010 on Choekyab, 2014-00009 on Trinle Tsekar, and 2014-00011 on Tselha.

¹³⁵ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, "China Sentences Two Tibetan Village Leaders to 10 Years' Imprisonment in Diru County," 3 April 14; "Tibetan Village Leaders Sentenced for Anti-Flag Campaign," Radio Free Asia (RFA), 4 April 14. Neither the TCHRD or RFA report identified the court or criminal charge(s) against the men. For more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2014-00137 on Ngangdrag and 2014-00135 on Rigdal.

¹³⁶ State Council Information Office, "White Paper on Progress in China's Human Rights in 2013," reprinted in Xinhua, 26 May 14.

¹³⁷ See United Nations, "International Mother Language Day: 21 February," last visited 29 May 14. According to the UN Web site, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) established International Mother Language Day in November 1999 in order "to promote the preservation and protection of all languages used by peoples of the world." International Mother Language Day has been observed on February 21 since 2000.

¹³⁸ "Tibetan Language Promotion Event Blocked by China," Radio Free Asia, 22 April 14. According to the RFA report, the event was to have been held in Songpan (Zungchu) county, Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province.

¹³⁹ "Authorities Concerned Over Popular Tibetan Language, Religious Classes," Radio Free Asia, 21 May 14. According to the RFA report, which used present progressive verb tenses to describe events underway in May 2014, the programs were operating in Ganzi (Kardze) county, Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province.

¹⁴⁰ "Authorities Concerned Over Popular Tibetan Language, Religious Classes," Radio Free Asia, 21 May 14.

¹⁴¹“Tibetan Private School Ordered Shut in China's Qinghai Province,” Radio Free Asia, 8 May 14. According to the RFA report, the school was located in Jianzha (Chentsa) county, Huangnan (Malho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai province. The report implied a link between the alleged political imprisonment of a teacher, Phagpa, and the school's shutdown, but does not provide any details about Phagpa's alleged crime or the reason for the school's closure.

¹⁴²“Tibetan Private School Ordered Shut in China's Qinghai Province,” Radio Free Asia, 8 May 14.

¹⁴³“Tibetan Singer Held After Belting Out Song Calling for Language Protection,” Radio Free Asia, 26 May 14. According to the RFA report, the concert where Gebe (or Gebhe) performed took place in Songpan (Zungchu) county, Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture. For more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2014-00193 on Gebe.

¹⁴⁴Amy Qin, “Tibetan Protest Singer Is Said To Be Under Arrest,” New York Times, 28 May 14. The New York Times article provides a translation of the song that allegedly resulted in the detention of Gebe (or Gebhe) and cites the translation to Free Tibet. Free Tibet, “Gaybay,” last visited 29 May 14. For more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2014-00193 on Gebe.

¹⁴⁵“While Inspecting Tibet, Yu Zhengsheng Emphatically Says That It Is Necessary To Adhere to a Development Path With Chinese Characteristics and Tibetan Features, Promote Leap-Forward Economic and Social Development and Long-Lasting Stability in Tibet” [Yu zhengsheng zai xizang kaocha diaoyan shi qiangdiao—jianchi zou you zhongguo tese xizang tedian de fazhan luzi—cujin xizang jingji shehui kuayueshi fazhan he changzhi jiu'an], Tibet Daily, 8 August 13 (translated in Open Source Center, 14 August 13). According to Tibet Daily, Yu Zhengsheng, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee, and Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, stressed that Party members should, among other things, “make more contributions to promoting leap-forward economic and social development and long-lasting stability in Tibet.” Xu Wenhui et al., “Theoretical Meanings of the Strategic Thinking of Managing Borders, Stabilizing Tibet” [Zhi bian wen zang zhanlue sixiang de lilun yiyun], Tibet Daily, 17 August 13 (translated in Open Source Center, 26 August 13). The article calls on the Party to “... correctly handle the relationship among reform, development, and stability, handle well the relationship among the resource environment, the masses' interests, and economic development, step up social construction efforts, regard livelihoods construction as the top priority in economic and social development, . . .”

¹⁴⁶See, e.g., “Tibetan Mine Protesters Detained in Palyul,” Radio Free Asia, 24 April 14; “Tibetans Renew Protest Over Land Seized for Highway,” Radio Free Asia, 2 April 14; “Hundreds of Tibetans Protest Land Seizure Over Gold Mining Activities,” Radio Free Asia, 22 March 14; “China Jails Three Tibetans Over Anti-Mining Protest,” Radio Free Asia, 23 December 13.

¹⁴⁷See, e.g., “Officials in Tibetan Protest Area Block Investigation by Beijing,” Radio Free Asia, 7 November 13; “Chinese Mine Spill Kills Animals, Pollutes Water in Tibetan Area,” Radio Free Asia, 18 October 13; “Tibetans Clash with Chinese Poachers in a Protected Zone,” Radio Free Asia, 27 August 13.

¹⁴⁸See, e.g., “China Detains Two Tibetan Activists, Frees Jailed Writer,” Radio Free Asia, 14 January 14; “China Jails Three Tibetans Over Anti-Mining Protest,” Radio Free Asia, 23 December 13.

¹⁴⁹“China Detains Four Tibetans for Refusing To Sell Land,” Tibet Express, 25 April 14; “Tibetan Mine Protesters Detained in Palyul,” Radio Free Asia, 24 April 14; “Tibetans Renew Protest Over Land Seized for Highway,” Radio Free Asia, 2 April 14; “Hundreds of Tibetans Protest Land Seizure Over Gold Mining Activities,” Radio Free Asia, 22 March 14.

¹⁵⁰“Hundreds of Tibetans Protest Land Seizure Over Gold Mining Activities,” Radio Free Asia, 22 March 14; “Officials in Tibetan Protest Area Block Investigation by Beijing,” Radio Free Asia, 7 November 13; “Chinese Mine Spill Kills Animals, Pollutes Water in Tibetan Area,” Radio Free Asia, 18 October 13; “Tibetans Clash with Chinese Poachers in a Protected Zone,” Radio Free Asia, 27 August 13.

¹⁵¹Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Repression Escalates in Tibet's Diru County: Tibetan Youth Beaten to Death, 2 Others Given Heavy Sentences and Another Disappeared,” 7 February 14; “Young Tibetan Mining Protester Dies in Prison After Torture,” Radio Free Asia, 6 February 14. The TCHRD and RFA reports cite sources linking Konchog Dragpa's December 2013 detention and death in custody to his protests against environmental damage linked to mining. For more information on Konchog Dragpa, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2014-00068. Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Diru Crackdown: Three Tibetans Sent to Prison for up to 13 Years, Singer Gets 9 Years in Prison,” 23 December 13; “China Jails Three Tibetans Over Anti-Mining Protest,” Radio Free Asia, 23 December 13. The TCHRD and RFA reports cite sources linking the imprisonment of Choekyab, Trinle Tsekar (or “Trinley”), and Tselha to “opposing mining operations deemed harmful to the environment.” For more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2014-00010 on Choekyab, 2014-00009 on Trinle Tsekar, and 2014-00011 on Tselha.

¹⁵²“China Detains Two Tibetan Activists, Frees Jailed Writer,” Radio Free Asia, 14 January 14. According to the report, public security officials detained Tseten Dondrub on September 18, 2013, and Dzumga on December 25, allegedly because they “opposed Chinese mining operations over environmental concerns.” For more information, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database records 2014-00048 on Tseten Dondrub and 2014-00049 on Dzumga.

¹⁵³“Tibetans Renew Protest Over Land Seized for Highway,” Radio Free Asia, 2 April 14; “Hundreds of Tibetans Protest Land Seizure Over Gold Mining Activities,” Radio Free Asia, 22 March 14. According to the March RFA report, which cited local sources, Tibetans in Xiahe (Sangchu) county, Gannan (Kamho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, reportedly protested against “the seizure of farm land for the construction of highways catering to state-linked gold mining and industrial activities that are polluting the environment and destroying livestock.”

¹⁵⁴“China Detains Four Tibetans for Refusing To Sell Land,” Tibet Express, 25 April 14; “Tibetan Mine Protesters Detained in Palyul,” Radio Free Asia, 24 April 14. According to the RFA report, citing local and exiled sources, on April 21, 2014, public security officials detained four village leaders in Baiyu (Palyul) county, Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, after villagers refused “to sell land to Chinese miners for the excavation of gold in the area.” For more information, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database records 2014-00155 on Thubga, 2014-00156 on Gade, 2014-00157 on Kyamo, and 2014-00158 on Jamyang.

¹⁵⁵“Tibetan Women Attacked, Beaten at Anti-Mine Rally,” Radio Free Asia, 2 July 14. According to the RFA report, “armed police and paramilitary forces” beat “a group of Tibetan women” who were protesting against copper mining on land they regarded as “sacred.” Phuntsok Yangchen, “Nine Arrested in Anti-Mining Protests in Dechen County,” Phayul, 2 July 14. According to the Phayul report, “around two hundred policemen” came to the protest site and “several Tibetans” were injured; some Tibetans reportedly alleged that the mining was “illegal.”

¹⁵⁶“Tibet Starts Building 5th Civil Airport,” Xinhua, 30 April 09. According to the report, “Construction on the 11-billion-yuan [US\$1.61 billion] Qinghai-Tibet railway’s extension line started in 2008 and was expected to be completed in 2010.”

¹⁵⁷“Xinhua Insight: Tibet’s Second Railway Line Opens,” Xinhua, 15 August 14. The August 15 Xinhua report stated that the first passenger train to Shigatse (“Xigaze,” Rikaze) would depart on “Saturday” (August 16). See also “China Finishes Railway Connecting Lhasa to Shigatse,” Xinhua, 13 August 14. The August 13 Xinhua report described the railway as “completed” and stated, “Testing on the line . . . is set to begin soon.” (Information was unavailable on whether passenger service was planned to begin before testing was completed.)

¹⁵⁸“Qinghai-Tibet Railway Ready for Operation on July 1,” Xinhua, 29 June 06. According to the Xinhua report, “The Qinghai-Tibet railway stretches 1,956 km from Xining, capital of Qinghai Province, to Lhasa, capital of Tibet Autonomous Region. The 814 km section from Xining to Golmud began operation in 1984.” Zhu Zhensheng, the vice director of an office managing the railway, reportedly stated that the railway startup is one year ahead of schedule due to “good construction, environment, and safety conditions.”

¹⁵⁹“Callers Decry Impact of Tibet Railway,” Radio Free Asia, 31 July 07 (RFA callers: “wherever you go, you get the impression of overcrowding”; “Chinese migrants were moving fast into formerly Tibetan neighborhoods and businesses”); Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Tibetan People in Lhasa Reel Under Influx of Chinese Migrants,” reprinted in Phayul, 3 August 07 (“thousands of unemployed migrants roamed Lhasa looking for work”; “pressure on the local Tibetans and their day-to-day livelihood”). See also CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 203–204; “Qinghai-Tibet Railway Statistics Add to Confusion, Mask Impact on Local Population,” CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, February 2008, 4.

¹⁶⁰See box on “TAR Statistics Show Little Increase in Non-Tibetan Population After Qinghai-Tibet Railway Startup” in Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008–2009, Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 October 09, 45–46.

¹⁶¹According to Commission analysis, “Nearly all (89 percent) of TAR population growth from 2005 to 2007 was made up of Tibetans, according to the 2008 TAR yearbook.” Tibet Statistical Yearbook 2008 (Beijing: China Statistics Press, June 2008), Table 3–4, “Population Nationality,” 33. According to Table 3–4, in the period from 2005 to 2007, Tibetan population increased from 2,549,293 to 2,602,788, an increase of 53,495 Tibetans; Han population increased from 104,647 to 110,429, an increase of 5,782 Han. The total TAR population increased by 60,347 persons in the period from 2005 to 2007. Tibetans made up 53,495 (89 percent) of the increase. See Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008–2009, Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 October 09, 45–46.

¹⁶²The national census and provincial annual statistical yearbooks do not use the same method of enumeration. Provincial annual statistical yearbooks rely on data compiled by the local public security bureau. See, e.g., Sichuan Statistical Yearbook 2005 (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2005), Table 3–1, “Population and Its Composition,” 41. A note appended to Table 3–1 states: “Data in this table were taken from the annual reports of the Bureau of Public Security, which were different than from that of permanent residents.”

¹⁶³The national census and provincial annual statistical yearbooks do not use the same method of enumeration. The national census uses a method of enumeration (see below) that attempts to record more of the population as present in the locations where they actually are, rather than at the location recorded on their permanent residence registration certificates. See National Bureau of Statistics of China, “Measures for Fifth National Population Census,” 23 April 02, chap. 2, art. 7. Article 7 includes instructions that the following persons should be enumerated in the places where they are: “those who have resided in the townships, towns and street communities for more than half a year but the places of their permanent household registration are elsewhere”; “those who have resided in the townships, towns and street communities for less than half a year but have been away from the place of their permanent household registration for more than half a year”; and “those who live in the townships, towns and street communities during the population census but the places of their household registration have not yet settled.”

¹⁶⁴Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China, Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, September 2003), Table 10–1. According to Table 10–1, in 2000, the national census recorded 158,670 Han in the TAR. Tibet Statistical Yearbook 2008 (Beijing: China Statistics Press, June 2008), Table 3–4, “Population Nationality,” 33. According to Table 3–4, in 2007 there were 110,429 Han in the TAR.

¹⁶⁵Commission staff verified that Tibet Statistical Yearbooks did not contain county-level population statistics after the 2009 edition.

¹⁶⁶In addition to the 385 Tibetans detained on or after March 10, 2008, whom courts sentenced to imprisonment, are 8 Tibetans believed charged with a crime (and who may face trial);

6 Tibetans believed charged and tried (and who may have been sentenced); and 1 Tibetan who was charged and released.

¹⁶⁷In addition to the 621 Tibetan political prisoners believed or presumed to be currently detained or imprisoned and who were detained on or after March 10, 2008, the Commission's Political Prisoner Database recorded, as of September 1, 2014, another 1,112 Tibetan political prisoners detained or imprisoned on or after March 10, 2008, who are believed or presumed to have been released, or who reportedly escaped or died.

¹⁶⁸Tibetan Buddhists believe that a *trulku* is a teacher who is a part of a lineage of teachers that are reincarnations.

¹⁶⁹Of the 167 fixed terms of imprisonment, 165 were judicial sentences ranging from 1 year and 6 months to 20 years, and 2 were periods of reeducation through labor of 2 years.

¹⁷⁰PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], passed 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, art. 50. A sentence of death with a two-year reprieve may be commuted to life imprisonment upon expiration of the two-year reprieve if a prisoner "commits no intentional crime" during the reprieve. If a prisoner "has truly performed major meritorious service," then the sentence may be commuted to a fixed-term sentence of 25 years upon expiration of the two-year reprieve. If the prisoner "has committed an intentional crime" during the period of suspension, the death penalty "shall be executed upon verification and approval of the Supreme People's Court."