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Findings

- The Commission did not observe any interest from People’s Republic of China (PRC) officials in resuming formal negotiations with the Dalai Lama’s representatives, the last round of which, the ninth, was held in January 2010.
- The PRC continued to restrict, and seek to control, the religious practices of Tibetans, the majority of whom practice Tibetan Buddhism. Authorities in Tibetan areas issued prohibitions on forms of religious worship, particularly during major religious events or around the times of politically sensitive anniversaries, and restricted access to Tibetan Buddhist religious institutions. The PRC continued to assert control over the process of selection and recognition of Tibetan Buddhist reincarnated teachers, including the Dalai Lama.
- The Commission observed reports of three Tibetan self-immolations, bringing the number of self-immolations since 2009 in Tibetan areas reported to focus on political or religious issues to 154, of which 135 were reportedly fatal. On February 25, 2022, 25-year-old pop singer Tsawang Norbu fatally self-immolated near the Potala Palace in Lhasa municipality, Tibet Autonomous Region. On March 27, 81-year-old Tashi Phuntsog (or Taphun), fatally self-immolated at a police station near Kirti Monastery in Aba (Ngaba) county, Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province. On March 30, Tsering Samdrub (or Tsering) self-immolated in Yushu (Yulshul) city, Yushu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai province.
- Chinese authorities continued to threaten linguistic rights in Tibetan areas and enforce policies promoting or mandating the use of Mandarin Chinese instead of Tibetan or other local languages, including through ordering the closures of Tibetan-language schools. A rights advocacy group reported that nearly 80 percent of all Tibetan students were educated in state-sponsored colonial boarding schools, threatening Tibetans’ linguistic and cultural rights by separating children from their families and communities.
- In contravention of international human rights standards, officials punished residents of Tibetan areas for exercising protected rights, including the expression of religious belief, criticism of PRC policies, and sharing information online. Notable cases this past year included writer Lobsang Lhundrub, better known as Dhi Lhadan, sentenced to four years in prison, possibly because of a book he was writing; Rinchen Kyi, a teacher at a private school that officials shut down in July 2021, detained for “inciting separatism” (and later released); and Lobsang Trinle, a Tibetan Buddhist monk sentenced to five years in prison after he shared the Dalai Lama’s teachings and writings about the Dalai Lama with other Tibetans.
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Recommendations

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are encouraged to:

○ Work with the United Nations and like-minded countries to help set up visits by UN special procedures and human rights experts—including the Special Rapporteur on minority issues, the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, and members of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances—to Tibetan areas of the PRC to independently assess the human rights situation there, free of any restrictions or hindrances by PRC officials, to be followed by a full report to the United Nations on their findings. Advocate for free and transparent access to Tibetan areas by diplomats and foreign journalists.

○ Monitor and report on developments in colonial boarding schools in Tibetan areas of the PRC and determine the necessity of imposing sanctions on Chinese officials responsible for any violations of the rights of Tibetans stemming from the coercive boarding school system.

○ Work with government officials, parliamentarians, and non-governmental organizations in like-minded countries to pressure PRC authorities to respect, as a matter of the right to religious freedom and as recognized under Chinese and international law, that it is the right of Tibetan Buddhists to identify and educate all religious teachers, including the Dalai Lama, in a manner consistent with Tibetan Buddhist practices and traditions.

○ Encourage the resumption of genuine dialogue, without preconditions, between the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama or his representatives. To that end, ensure that calls for dialogue are based on the Tibetan people's right to self-determination under international law, which has been precluded by current Chinese policies, and use available resources to counter disinformation about Tibet from Chinese officials, including disinformation about the history of Tibet, the Tibetan people, and Tibetan institutions, including that of the Dalai Lama.

○ In interactions with Chinese officials, call for the release of Tibetan political prisoners currently detained or imprisoned for the peaceful exercise of their human rights, such as Lobsang Lhundrub (Dhi Lhadon), Lobsang Trinle, Thubten Lodroe, and Go Sherab Gyatso. The records of detained Tibetans in the Commission's Political Prisoner Database provide a useful resource for such advocacy. Urge PRC officials, law enforcement, and security forces to end the use of arbitrary detention, disappearance, beatings, torture, and intimidation to suppress and punish Tibetans for the peaceful exercise of their rights.

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- Urge Chinese officials to invite the U.S. Ambassador to China and representatives of international organizations to meet with Gedun Choekyi Nyima, whom the Dalai Lama recognized as the 11th Panchen Lama, and his parents, all three of whom disappeared shortly after his recognition as Panchen Lama in 1995.
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Status of Negotiations between the Chinese Government and the Dalai Lama or His Representatives

During the Commission’s 2022 reporting year, the Commission did not observe any interest on the part of People’s Republic of China (PRC) officials in resuming formal negotiations with the Dalai Lama’s representatives, the last round of which, the ninth round of negotiations, was held in January 2010.\textsuperscript{1} Penpa Tsering, Sikyong (political leader) of the Tibetan government-in-exile, has made restarting dialogue with the Chinese government a major goal of his administration,\textsuperscript{2} and in September 2021 said that he had received “signals” indicating possible Chinese interest in resuming negotiations;\textsuperscript{3} as of June 2022 the Commission had observed no further developments.

Tibetan Self-Immolations

This past year, the Commission observed for the first time since November 2019 reports of Tibetan self-immolations.\textsuperscript{4} The three self-immolations of Tsewang Norbu, Tashi Phuntsog, and Tsering Samdrub bring the number of self-immolations since 2009 in Tibetan areas of China which were reported to focus on political or religious issues to 154.\textsuperscript{5} Of these self-immolations, 135 were fatal.\textsuperscript{6}

On February 25, 2022, Tibetan pop singer Tsewang Norbu self-immolated near the Potala Palace in Lhasa municipality, Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR),\textsuperscript{7} in protest against Chinese government policies in Tibetan areas.\textsuperscript{8} The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs reportedly cast doubt on accounts of his death, and suggested that a self-immolator—ostensibly referring to Tsewang Norbu—had attempted suicide due to mental illness and had been taken away for treatment.\textsuperscript{9} Shortly after his self-immolation, authorities blocked his Weibo profile.\textsuperscript{10} Tsewang Norbu was 25 years old at the time of his death.\textsuperscript{11}

Tsewang Norbu’s self-immolation was followed a month later by the March 27, 2022, fatal self-immolation of 81-year-old Tashi Phuntsog (or Taphun), in front of a police station near Kirti Monastery in Aba (Ngaba) county, Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province.\textsuperscript{12} Authorities quickly took him away, though reports did not confirm whether he died at the scene or afterward.\textsuperscript{13}

Days later on March 30, Tsering Samdrub (or Tsering) carried out a self-immolation in Jiegu (Kyegudo) subdistrict, Yushu (Yulshul) city, Yushu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai province.\textsuperscript{14} Reporting on his self-immolation was limited; police took him away immediately, and further information, including whether he was alive, was unavailable.\textsuperscript{15}

Religious Freedom for Tibetans

The PRC continued to restrict, and seek to control, the religious practices of Tibetans, particularly practitioners of Tibetan Buddhism. International observers and rights advocacy groups reported on continuing violations of international human rights standards, including the right to freely worship and to choose one’s own reli-

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igion, that result from Chinese religious policy and its implementation. PRC officials exercise political control and supervision of Tibetan Buddhist monastic and educational institutions through the United Front Work Department’s National Religious Affairs Administration. [For more information on religion in China, see Section III—Freedom of Religion.]

During the 2022 reporting year, PRC organizations, including United Front Work Department branches and monastic management committees, continued to target Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns with propaganda on PRC policy on ethnic and religious issues in ideological education sessions held at monastic institutions and other sites. These propaganda efforts incorporated into monastic curricula the study of Party ethnic and religious policy initiatives and priorities, including the “sinicization” of religion; Xi Jinping’s speech during his July 2021 visit to the TAR to mark the 70th anniversary of the “peaceful liberation of Tibet”; Xi’s speech on the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Party on July 1, 2021; and the December 2021 National Conference on Religious Work, as well as Chinese legal provisions, including the Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas and local religious regulations. These study sessions emphasized the Party and government’s primacy over and control of religious institutions and practices such as monastic education and the recognition of reincarnated Tibetan Buddhist teachers.

RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGIOUS PRACTICE

During the 2022 reporting year, authorities in Tibetan areas issued prohibitions on forms of religious worship, particularly during major religious events or around the times of politically sensitive anniversaries, and restricted access to Tibetan Buddhist religious institutions, including monasteries and temples. Illustrative examples included:

- **Kirti Rinpoche.** In August 2021, authorities in Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province, banned religious activities at Aba’s Kirti Monastery and in surrounding areas in both Aba (Ngaba) and Ru’ergai (Dzoego) counties. August 8 was the 80th birthday of Tibetan Buddhist religious leader Kirti Rinpoche (currently in exile), and his birthday is normally widely celebrated by his followers.

- **Monastic expulsions.** In the second half of 2021, authorities in Gansu and Qinghai provinces expelled monks from Tibetan Buddhist monasteries. In July, authorities forcibly closed Hongcheng Monastery in Yongjing county, Linxia Hui Autonomous Prefecture, Gansu, and expelled monks and nuns residing or studying there. Sources asserted that authorities targeted the monastery for closure in order to seize charitable donations collected by the monastery during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Qinghai expulsions, at Ditsa Monastery and Jakhyung Monastery, both located in Hualong (Bayan) Hui Autonomous County, Haidong prefecture, occurred in late October, several weeks after new provincial regulations on religious affairs took effect in Qinghai. Authorities forced several dozen young monks from each monastery to disrobe and banned them from rejoining their monasteries’ schools.
• **Losar restrictions.** In February 2022, authorities in Lhasa municipality, TAR, prohibited religious gatherings to celebrate the early March Tibetan New Year (Losar) at religious institutions and other major cultural sites in the Lhasa area, including Drepung and Sera Monasteries and the Potala Palace. Authorities cited public health concerns from the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic in ordering the restrictions.

• **March 10.** Several weeks later, in the runup to the March 10 anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan uprising, authorities in Tibetan areas of Sichuan and Gansu provinces prohibited religious gatherings by Tibetans.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Revised TAR Implementing Measures for Regulations on Religious Affairs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In September 2021, the TAR government issued revised implementing measures for the national Regulations on Religious Affairs, which took effect in 2018. The revised measures, which took effect on November 1, 2021, are an update of the previous 2007 measures and contain several new provisions restricting the rights of TAR residents to freely practice religion.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Party religious policy.</strong> Article 15 of the revised measures mandates that religious groups work with the government to spread propaganda on Party policy as well as on state laws and regulations.</td>
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<td><strong>Education.</strong> Article 23 stipulates that the TAR government’s responsibilities in managing religious institutions include providing for “patriotic education” and “anti-separatist education,” as well as “managing” and “guiding” religious activities and religious instruction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religious institution limits.</strong> Article 35 prohibits religious institutions from exceeding a prescribed number of instructors, in line with Party policy seeking to prevent an increase in the numbers of both instructors and students at religious schools, including Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and nunneries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Online activities.</strong> Articles 47 through 49 place new limits on online religious activities, requiring application to and approval from TAR government agencies before holding such activities. Article 47 orders those holding or hosting online religious activities to govern the content of these activities such that illegal and “adverse” information is prevented from being broadcast, and violations are recorded and reported to officials.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The revised measures retain provisions prohibiting religious instructors, groups, and organizations from being “controlled” by “foreign forces,” and mandates that the reincarnation of Tibetan Buddhist leaders should not be “subject to control or interference” by “foreign organizations or individuals.”

**CRACKDOWNS ON MONASTIC COMMUNITIES**

In some cases, restrictions on Tibetans’ religious freedom occurred in large-scale crackdowns targeting religious institutions, monastics, and sometimes residents of nearby areas. A prominent example developed in Luhuo (Draggo) county, Ganzi (Kardze) Ti-
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betan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Sichuan province, where in mid-October 2021, authorities detained Palga,48 abbot of Draggo Monastery, and Nyima,49 the monastery’s treasurer, after they refused demands by the Luhuo county government to ensure monks’ and local residents' compliance with orders to demolish a school affiliated with the monastery.50 Sources reported that police tortured Palga and Nyima in custody.51 Luhuo authorities razed a 99-foot-tall statue of the Buddha and 45 prayer wheels near the monastery around December 12, 2021, and on December 21 demolished another 30-foot-tall Buddha statue located inside the monastery.52 Police subsequently detained at least 10 Tibetans, including monks and Luhuo residents, for sharing news of the demolitions outside Tibet.53 Authorities held most of the detainees at a detention facility in Thangnagma, near Niba (Nyipa) township, Luhuo, and subjected some detainees to forced labor and torture.54 Several months later, sources reported that local authorities ordered monks to sign documents taking responsibility for the demolitions.55

A similar crackdown targeting a monastery and local residents continued in Wenbo (Dza Bonpo) town, Shiku (Sershul) county, Ganzi TAP, where on August 22, 2021, public security officials took into custody approximately 59 local residents and monks from Dza Bonpo (or Wonpo) Monastery for possessing images of the Dalai Lama, which are banned by Chinese authorities.56 Authorities had conducted raids on homes in the area in March 2021, and at that time had noted which residents had such images, targeting them in August for detention.57 Among the detainees were 40 local residents and 19 monks from Dza Bonpo Monastery; authorities likely held them at the Shiku Public Security Bureau Detention Center.58 On August 25, officials summoned local residents to a public meeting where they issued warnings against possessing images of the Dalai Lama or contacting people outside China.59 Over the next four days, authorities detained another 53 Tibetans in connection with images of the Dalai Lama, foreign contacts, or membership in an online group promoting Tibetan language rights, holding them at a Shiku-area detention facility.60 On September 3, authorities detained eight more Tibetans in connection with the crackdown: six Dza Bonpo monks and two local laywomen.61 Sources reported that officials abused some of the detainees in custody, including by denying them adequate food and clothing, and ordered the detainees to undergo “political education” sessions.62 Authorities released four unidentified detainees, a monk and three laypersons, around August 31, and all but three of the others by September 27; the remaining three monks were released by late October.63

Chinese authorities continued to penalize Tibetans for expressions of reverence for the Dalai Lama through criminal and other punishments. Authorities in Ganzi TAP detained at least 31 Tibetans in connection with celebrations or observances of the Dalai Lama’s birthday, including the following cases:

- Public security officials in Seda (Serthar) county, Ganzi TAP, detained four Tibetans at a Seda restaurant after police searched their mobile phones.64 The four—Rinchen Zangpo, Loga, Dagther, and Wangchug Kyi—were students at a Seda middle school.65 Authorities were searching Tibetan resi-
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dents’ phones for images of the Dalai Lama, banned in China, around the time of the Dalai Lama’s 86th birthday on July 6.66
• Authorities in Ganzi (Kardze) county, Ganzi TAP, detained Dzapo67 and Konchog Tashi,68 two Tibetan residents of Kalong (Khyaglung) town, Ganzi county, in connection with making social media posts encouraging Tibetans to offer prayers for the Dalai Lama’s birthday.69
• Around the same time, authorities in Litang (Lithang) county, Ganzi TAP, detained at least 25 Tibetans, 15 of whom were monks at Lithang Monastery, possibly in connection with celebrations of the Dalai Lama’s birthday.70 The detainees, none of whom were identified, shared images of the Dalai Lama on the social media platform WeChat.71

Growing Threats to Language Rights

Although China’s Constitution and laws contain provisions affirming the freedom of ethnic minorities to “use and develop”72 their languages, authorities continued to threaten linguistic rights in Tibetan areas, including through active efforts to institute policies promoting or enforcing the use of Mandarin Chinese instead of Tibetan, as well as policies of neglect with regard to minority languages. PRC ethnic policy ignores unrecognized linguistic communities, including in Tibetan areas of China,73 and individuals or communities with languages that lack official recognition are deprived of access to official support in education and other government services.74 The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which China is a State Party,75 recognizes and protects the rights of ethnic and linguistic minority groups to use their languages.76 [For more information on language rights and ethnic policy, see Section VI—Ethnic Minority Rights.]

PRC policy continued to promote the use of Mandarin Chinese at the expense of Tibetan and other local languages. In July 2021, the Ministry of Education issued a circular announcing that beginning in September 2021, kindergartens in ethnic and rural areas would be required to use Mandarin in classrooms, and laying out plans for teachers to receive training to enhance instruction in Mandarin.77 At a September 2021 conference in Xining municipality, Qinghai province, Party and government officials called on Tibetan Buddhist institutions to use Mandarin,78 saying that using Mandarin instead of Tibetan served the Party goal of furthering the “sinicization” of Tibetan Buddhism.79 During the reporting year, authorities ordered local government officials in parts of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) to carry out government business only using Mandarin.80 In spring 2022, local officials in parts of Qinghai and the TAR held a series of workshops aimed at increasing area Tibetan residents’ knowledge of Mandarin so that they can assist their children’s study of the language.81 The workshops were mandatory and reportedly included explicit instruction that the language study was meant, in part, to further PRC political goals.82

Alongside official actions taken to promote the use of Mandarin, during the 2022 reporting year authorities in Tibetan areas continued to restrict the ability of Tibetans to use Tibetan or other local languages in educational settings,83 including by ordering the closure or demolition of several privately run schools in Tibetan areas,
threatening other schools with closure orders, and maintaining or extending bans on supplemental Tibetan-language instruction, eliminating for many Tibetans the option to receive Tibetan-language education.\textsuperscript{84} Examples of these restrictions included:

- **Sengdrug Tagtse Middle School.** In July 2021, authorities in Dari (Darlag) county, Guoluo (Golog) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Qinghai province, ordered the closure of Dari’s private Sengdrug Tagtse (or Sengdruk Taktse) Middle School, which offered classes mainly in Tibetan, with a curriculum focused on Tibetan culture.\textsuperscript{85} Guoluo officials warned other private Tibetan schools that they might be closed in the near future.\textsuperscript{86} Many former Sengdrug Tagtse students faced difficulties in enrolling in other schools in the area.\textsuperscript{87}

- **Gyaltsen Getsa school.** In August 2021, authorities in Ganzi (Kardze) county, Ganzi (Kardze) TAP, Sichuan province, ordered teachers at Gyaltsen Getsa school, a private Tibetan school that provides free education to primary grade students, to switch all instruction and curricula to Mandarin Chinese, and threatened the school with closure if the order was refused.\textsuperscript{88}

- **Ban on winter holiday classes.** In October 2021, Qinghai province officials issued a province-wide ban on Tibetan children attending classes offering instruction in Tibetan outside their schools during the winter school break.\textsuperscript{89}

- **Gaden Rabten Namgyalling school (Draggo Monastery).** In early October 2021, authorities in Luhuo (Draggo) county, Ganzi TAP, forced school staff and local residents to demolish Gaden Rabten Namgyalling school, affiliated with Luhuo’s Draggo Monastery.\textsuperscript{90} The school taught young monks and other local residents and focused instruction on Tibetan traditional culture.\textsuperscript{91}

- **Shiqu (Sershul) county.** Authorities in Shiqu (Sershul) county, Ganzi TAP, ordered that all private schools in the county close by April 20, 2022.\textsuperscript{92} The Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy reported that most of the Tibetan schools closed under this order served nomadic communities, and that the closures followed years of increasing interference from Chinese officials seeking to restrict the ability of Tibetan schools to teach their own curricula.\textsuperscript{93}
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Majority of Tibetan Students Subject to “Colonial” Boarding School System</th>
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| In December 2021, the advocacy group Tibet Action Institute (Tibet Action) issued a report on boarding schools in Tibetan areas of China, where nearly 80 percent of all Tibetan children between the ages of 6 and 18 are educated. Tibet Action described the boarding schools as “colonial” in design and practice, serving the PRC goal of “sinicizing” Tibetans by separating children from their families and communities, educating them mainly in Mandarin Chinese, and implementing a “highly politicized curriculum” intended to inculcate a Chinese identity in students. The percentage of students living at boarding schools was “dramatically higher” for Tibetan students compared to students elsewhere in China, indicating that the boarding school system targeted non-Han Chinese populations. The report noted “high rates of mental and emotional distress” among students in boarding schools, due in part to separation from their families and communities, strict living and teaching conditions at the schools, and bullying and violence among students. The report also highlighted the coercive nature of the schools: Tibetan parents are often faced with no choice but to send their children to boarding schools because of school closures and consolidation—particularly in rural areas with proportionally greater Tibetan populations—and also in some cases fines or threats for noncompliance. Tibet Action later published claims by a Tibetan education expert that authorities in Tibetan areas of China had established a similar system of boarding preschools aimed at eliminating education in Tibetan or focused on Tibetan culture for children between the ages of four and six.

Chinese officials punished Tibetans in connection with language rights, including for expressions of discontent with or opposition to official measures restricting the rights of Tibetans to use their language or languages freely. Representative examples include:

- **Rinchen Kyi.** In August 2021, police in Dari (Darlag) county, Guoluo (Golog) TAP, Qinghai province, detained Rinchen Kyi, a teacher at Dari’s private Sengdrug Tagtse Middle School, on suspicion of “inciting separatism.” Police then took her to Xining municipality, the capital of Qinghai, where she was briefly hospitalized, and then transferred her to an unknown detention location. Rinchen Kyi was a long-time teacher at the school until its closure. In February 2022, six United Nations human rights experts wrote to the Chinese government regarding the cases of Rinchen Kyi and two other Tibetan detainees, expressing “serious concern” that these detentions infringe upon their right to free expression and their cultural and linguistic rights as members of a minority group. Authorities released her in late April.

- **Sherab Dorje.** In August 2021, police in Hezhi (Trotsig) township, Aba (Ngaba) county, Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan, detained several Tibetan students after they refused to attend an Aba county propaganda session on Communist Party policies. Authorities released all but one, 19-year-old Sherab Dorje, whom authorities may have targeted after he and several other students from a sec-
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Secondary school in Maqu (Machu) county, Gannan (Kanlho) Tibet Autonomous Prefecture, Gansu province, submitted a petition to local officials opposing plans to end Tibetan-language instruction there beginning in fall 2021.108

- **Palsang, Sarmo, and Yangkyi.** In October, authorities in Mangkang (Markham) county, Changdu (Chamdo) municipality, TAR, detained three teenage students, Palsang, Sarmo,109 and Yangkyi,111 after they expressed opposition to the replacement of Tibetan with Mandarin Chinese as the language of instruction in local schools.112 Officials reportedly said the three children needed “psychological counseling” and held them in a Mangkang detention facility described by Tibet Watch as a “reform through education center.” 113

**Access to Tibet and Free Flow of Information**

** Remain Heavily Restricted**

During the 2022 reporting year, Chinese authorities continued to severely limit access to Tibetan areas, particularly the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), with foreign journalists and diplomats facing especially heavy restrictions. The TAR remained the only province-level administrative division to require all foreigners to apply for approval to visit,114 while requirements for access to Tibetan areas in other province-level entities were “ambiguous.” 115 The U.S. Department of State, in its report to Congress on reciprocal access to Tibet and Tibetan areas, found again that Chinese officials “systematically impeded travel” and “regularly denied travel permits to international journalists, diplomats, and other officials often with indications the central government had denied the request” to visit Tibetan areas.116 The Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China’s (FCCC) annual report found that central PRC officials tightly controlled foreign journalists’ ability to independently report in Tibetan areas.117 The FCCC reported that authorities limited access in the TAR to only state-organized reporting groups and did not approve any journalists’ applications to independently report from the TAR in 2021,118 and harassed journalists working in Tibetan areas of other provinces.119

**Restrictions on the Free Flow of Information**

Chinese authorities continued to monitor or restrict contact between Tibetans in Tibetan areas of China and individuals or groups abroad, including by threatening to punish those found to have contact with Tibetans in exile—particularly those in India—or who have shared information within Tibetan areas about Tibetans living abroad.120 For example, on August 8, 2021, public security officials in Yushu (Kyegudo) city, Yushu (Yulshul) TAP, Qinghai, took into custody three Tibetan men—Rinchen Dorje,121 Kalsang Nyima,122 and Lhundrub123—after they shared photos of an event celebrating the 70th anniversary of the establishment of the Yushu TAP in a WeChat group, reportedly because the group had members outside China.124

Chinese authorities also strictly monitored WeChat and other online communications platforms to find and punish Tibetans who were alleged to have committed crimes by holding discussions on-
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line.\textsuperscript{125} and maintained or extended restrictions on the kinds of content Tibetans could freely share or post online.\textsuperscript{126} Observers expressed concern that new national measures on online religious content\textsuperscript{127} and at least one set of local regulations\textsuperscript{128} would further shrink the already restricted online space for discussion of Tibetan Buddhism and other religious matters in Tibet.\textsuperscript{129}
Notes to Section IX—Tibet


17. Monastic management committees are organized as joint monastic-official bodies to monitor resident monks and nuns at monastic institutions. International Campaign for Tibet, “Party Above Buddhism: China’s Surveillance and Control of Tibetan Monasteries and Nunneries,” March 2021.

18. See, e.g., Changdu Municipality United Front Work Department, “Zishiqiu fu shuxi, changdu shi wei shui pbub Dunzhu shenru Karuo Qu zuosi si diaoyun zhi si gonggou” [TAR Deputy Chair and Changdu Municipal Committee Secretary Pbub Dunzhu deepens Karuo District's Dzogri Monastery investigation of monastery-resident work], September 7, 2021.

19. See, e.g., Tashi Lhunpo Monastic Management Committee, “Zhashi Lunbu Si Guanweihui zhusi sokuai xwexi guanche Xi Jinping Zongshuji zai Xizang shixia shi de zhongyao jianghua jingben xuanyang dahu,” [Tashi Lhunpo Monastic Management Committee organizes propaganda meeting to study and carry out the spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important speech during his inspection tour of Tibet], August 16, 2021, reprinted in Tibet Autonomous Region United Front Work Department.

20. See, e.g., Sakya Monastery Monastic Management Committee, “Sajia Si Guanweihui zushizhaika Zhongnanxi Jinpingzongshu ji zing zhongnanshou zhangchuan zhengli 100 zhounian dahuai sang de zhongnanshou zhangshu zhanxi Jinpingzongshu ji zingzhongzhan zhengli 100 zhounian dahuai,” [Sakya Monastery Monastic Management Committee organizes a propaganda event on the spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important speech celebrated for the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party], July 26, 2021, reprinted in Tibet Autonomous Region United Front Work Department; Anduo County United Front Work Department, “Anduo Xian zongziao lingyu xianqian xwexi Xi Jinping Zongshuji ‘Qi Yi’ zhongyao jianghua he shixia Xizang shi de zhongyao jianghua jingben gaozhou,” [Surge among Anduo County religious sector in studying General Secretary Xi Jinping’s major ‘July 1’ speech and the spirit of his important speech during his inspection tour of Tibet], August 16, 2021.

21. See, e.g., Tashi Lhunpo Monastery Monastic Management Committee, “Zhashi Lunbu Si zhasokai sengchong xwexi Dang de Shijiu ji Lie Zhongguanhe he Zishiqiu Di Shi ci Dang Daibinzhai jingben xuanxiang dahu,” [Tashi Lhunpo Monastery convenes propaganda event for monks on studying the Sixth Plenum of the Party’s Nineteenth Congress and the spirit of the
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See, e.g., Pulan County Committee United Front Work Department, "Zhishe xuanjiang tian fu Pulan Xian kaizhan Zangchuan Fojiao Huofo Zhananxi Guanli Banfa xunhui xuanjiang huodong" (TAR propaganda group holds touring propaganda activities on "Measures for the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism" in Pulan County), August 26, 2021; Naqu Municipal Committee United Front Work Department, "Naqu Shi zuozi gaoseng da sheermu ge simiao kaizhan Zangchuan Fojiao Huofo shanhuai guanli fagui zhengce xuanjiang huodong" (Naqu municipality organizes senior monks' visits to various monasteries to hold propaganda activities on laws, regulations, and policy on the management of the reincarnation of living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism), November 17, 2021.

See, e.g., Baqing County Committee United Front Work Department, "Baqing Xian kaizhan 'Falu, zhenge jin simiao' xunhui xuanjiang huodong" (Baqing County holds touring propaganda activities for "law and policy entering monasteries"), February 28, 2022.

See, e.g., Shannan Municipal Committee United Front Work Department, "Shannan Shi di shiyi, shi'er Zangchuan Fojiao zongjiao jiaozhi renyuan peixun ban kaiban" (Shannan municipality holds eleventh and twelfth sessions of Tibetan Buddhist religious personnel training), December 10, 2021.

See, e.g., Pulan County Committee United Front Work Department, "Zhishe xuanjiang tian fu Pulan Xian kaizhan Zangchuan Fojiao Huofo Zhananxi Guanli Banfa xunhui xuanjiang huodong" (TAR propaganda group holds touring propaganda activities on "Measures for the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism" in Pulan County), August 26, 2021; Naqu Municipal Committee United Front Work Department, "Naqu Shi zuozi gaoseng da sheermu ge simiao kaizhan Zangchuan Fojiao Huofo shanhuai guanli fagui zhengce xuanjiang huodong" (Naqu municipality organizes senior monks' visits to various monasteries to hold propaganda activities on laws, regulations, and policy on the management of the reincarnation of living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism), November 17, 2021; Shannan Municipal Committee United Front Work Department, "Shannan Shi di shiyi, shi'er Zangchuan Fojiao zongjiao jiaozhi renyuan peixun ban kaiban" (Shannan municipality holds eleventh and twelfth sessions of Tibetan Buddhist religious personnel training), December 10, 2021.


Tibet Watch, "80 Tibetan Monks Forcibly Expelled From Their Monasteries," December 5, 2021.

Qinghai Sheng Zongjiao Shihua Taofu (Qinghai Province Regulations on Religious Affairs), passed July 25, 2021, effective October 1, 2021.


The 2007 TAR measures implemented the previous version of the national Regulations on Religious Affairs, which took effect in 2006. Xizang Zhishe Shishi "Zongjiao Shihua Taofu" (Tibet Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for "Regulations on Religious Affairs (Trial)"), passed May 18, 2006, effective July 1, 2007; State Council, Zongjiao Shihua Taofu (Regulations on Religious Affairs), issued November 30, 2004, amended June 14, 2017, effective February 1, 2018.


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47. Xizang Zizhiqu Shishi "Zangqiang Shisi Tiandi" Banzha [Tibet Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for "Regulations on Religious Affairs"], passed April 30, 2021, issued September 26, 2021, effective November 1, 2021, art. 47.

48. Xizang Zizhiqu Shishi "Zangqiang Shisi Tiandi" Banzha [Tibet Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for "Regulations on Religious Affairs"], passed April 30, 2021, issued September 26, 2021, effective November 1, 2021, art. 34.

49. For more information on Panyia, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00033.

50. For more information on Nyima, see the Commission's Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00083.


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67. For more information on Drapo, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00005.

68. For more information on Kunchog Tashi, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00006.


73. See, e.g., State Council Information Office, "Minzu Quyu Zhidu zai Xizang de Chengguang Shijian" [Successful Practice of Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet], September 6, 2015, sec. 6. The State Council white paper on the ethnic autonomy system in the Tibet Autonomous Region notes bilingual education policy in Tibetan and Chinese, but does not mention use of any other languages in schools or any other context.


79. "Fuchung yong guorong yuanren wenzu kecheng jianhua yantaohui zai Qinghai sheng Zangyu xi Fuxue Yuan juxing" [Seminar on course construction for using the standard spoken and written Chinese language in Buddhist studies held at Qinghai Province Tibetan Language Buddhist Institute], Qinghai Daily, reprinted in Buddhist Association of China, September 30, 2021.


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86 Tibet Watch, “Renowned Tibetan School Ordered to Teach in Chinese or Face Shutdown,” August 23, 2021.


96 For more information on Rinchen Kyi, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2021-05640.


100 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Letter from the Mandates of the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights; the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention; the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances; the Special Rapporteur on the right to education; the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression; and the Special Rapporteur on minority issues to Chen Xu, Permanent Representative to the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN Office at Geneva and Other International Organizations in Switzerland, AL, CHN 14/2021, February 17, 2022.


103 Tibet Watch, “Tibetan Man Arrested in Sichuan for Failure to Attend Chinese Propaganda Lecture,” Radio Free Asia, August 18, 2021; Tibet Watch, “Teenage Tibetan Petitioner Arrested in Ngaba by Chinese Police Authorities,” August 18, 2021. For more information on Sherab Dorje, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2021-06541.

For more information on Paleang, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00099.

For more information on Sarmo, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00100.

For more information on Yangkhyi, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00101.

"Bad rigs blo ma geun 'dzin bzang bkag nyar byas yod 'dug’ [Three Tibetan students detained and held in custody], *Tibet Times*, March 15, 2022; "Rgya grzungs gis chab mo dko khul gyi bod pa slo phurg gnang 'dzin bzang’ [Chinese authorities detained three Tibetan students in Chamdo], *Voice of America*, March 17, 2022; Matthew McDonald, “San ming Xizang xueheng kangyi hanhua jiaoyu bei Zhonggong jubu” [Three Tibetan students detained by CCP for protesting normalized education], *Tibet Post International*, March 18, 2022; Tibet Watch, "Three Children Arrested after New Language Restriction Announced," March 21, 2022.


For more information on Rinchen Dorje, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00035.

For more information on Kalsang Nyima, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00036.

For more information on Lhundrub, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00037.

"Skad 'phrin nang par ris bskur rkyen skye yug mdo nas bod mi geun 'dzin bzang btsan khyab yod 'dug’ [For sending photos on WeChat, three Tibetans from Kyegudo taken away to detention], *Radio Free Asia*, August 9, 2021; Tibet Watch, "Three Tibetans Arrested for Sharing Photos of an Official Event in WeChat Group," August 10, 2021.

See, e.g., "Tibetan Monk Held in Sichuan’s Ngaba County on Unknown Charges," *Radio Free Asia*, August 5, 2021; Dasing, "Xizang Guohua Zangren ji Zhonggong hanhua zhengce fabao yi yi zaubu hou, shujin xialuo buning" (After Tibetan is detained in Golgo, Tibet, for speaking out in opposition to CCP’s assimilation policy, his whereabouts are still unknown), *Voice of Tibet*, March 23, 2022. For more information, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database records 2022-00025 on Konne and 2022-00114 on Paleang.


