



## INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR TIBET

# ICT'S TIBET ROUNDUP — ISSUE 1

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ICT's Tibet Roundup is a twice-monthly compilation of curated news from various sources, including Chinese state media, official Chinese documents, briefings, information reported by Tibetans in Tibet and international commentary on Tibet. The roundup is organized in categories, including law, politics, culture, economics, climate and commentary. The focus is on presenting news and reports with limited analysis and editorializing.

## POLITICS

### **1. Tibet Party Secretary requires United Front Work to execute Xi's key instructions**

Wang Junzheng, Secretary of the Party Committee of the officially designated "Tibet Autonomous Region", instructs united front work to focus on stability and development in Tibet, according to state media [Tibet Daily](#) on February 14th. Highlighting 2025 as the 60th anniversary of establishment of the "Tibet Autonomous Region", Wang required the United Front Work system to fully implement the instructions of the 20th Party Congress held in October 2022 and to execute Xi Jinping's key instructions. Xi Jinping's thoughts on united front work and Tibet governance instructs forging a sense of Chinese national community sinification of Tibetan Buddhism and strengthening ideological and political guidance. The united front system is tasked with consolidating unity of the Chinese motherland, contributing to the construction of a socialist modern Tibet, and ensuring implementation of the Party Central Committee's decisions, according to Wang.

Liu Jiang, executive deputy secretary of the regional party committee, attended a meeting of united front ministers where these directives were conveyed and reported the state media. The meeting stressed the need to enhance the united front work, strengthen ideological guidance, focus on ethnic integration, adapt Tibetan Buddhism to socialist society, and improve united front work in the private sector.

## **2. Deployment of ten thousand cadres to the countryside launched in Qinghai**

Seemingly replicating the Tibet Autonomous Region's annual deployment of 20,000 party cadres to the society since 2011, Qinghai Province launched its ["Ten Thousand Cadres Going to the Countryside"](#) campaign on February 13, 2025. The campaign aims to disseminate central and provincial policies for "social stability maintenance" in Qinghai's rural areas. Cadres are required to work closely with village committees to implement various directives from the center. Like the Tibetan Autonomous Region since 2011, the annual mass deployment of party cadres in Tibetan areas of Qinghai province is expected to replicate the outcomes of the "Tibet Autonomous Region" in Qinghai in terms of political and economic governance through perennial ideological work at the grassroots society.

## **3. Post Dingri earthquake meeting emphasizes border work**

In a post-earthquake "recovery and reconstruction work of the Dingri earthquake" meeting on February 12th, "Tibet Autonomous Region" Party Secretary Wang Junzheng instructed regional Chinese party-state leaders to "ensure that important instructions of General Secretary Xi Jinping and the decisions and arrangements of the Party Central Committee are implemented." Linking recovery and reconstruction work with stabilizing and consolidating the border, Wang instructed developing the border would ensure that "the border of the motherland is built more stable" and called for the construction of a new socialist countryside through comprehensive revitalization of rural areas. While Chinese [state media](#) did not provide details on the "recovery and reconstruction work of the Dingri earthquake," political jargon in the state media reporting indicates the CCP is giving significant focus to Dingri as a border area that needs reconstruction to strengthen Tibet's western international border for the Chinese motherland.

## **4. Indoctrination tour for Tibetan children from border counties**

Continuing the political indoctrination of Tibetan children with CCP's ideologies, a group of 26 junior high school students from four counties in Ngari Prefecture with international borders were taken on an indoctrination tour (February 7-19, 2025) to Beijing. During the "Departure from the Border, Building Dreams in Beijing" themed tour, the Tibetan children were taken to watch the flag-raising ceremony in Tiananmen Square, visit the Great Wall, and universities. Chinese [state media](#) reported that the children were also led to pay respect to Chairman Mao's Memorial Hall.

Typical of such indoctrination tours, scripted propaganda is a prominent feature. The Chinese state media reported that the children wrote messages which indicate scripted propaganda. According to state media, one child

wrote, "Dear Chairman Mao, hello! I am a middle school student from Ali, Tibet. I have come here from afar to meet you. Thank you for all your efforts for the motherland. Today, the motherland is as you wish, with peace and prosperity. We will remember your teachings, study hard, and will definitely be useful to society in the future!" State media featured another child as writing, "Grandpa Mao, we are middle school students from Tibet. We live a very happy life. Thank you."

## RELIGION

### 5. Exerting political loyalty on religious leaders

The [United Front Work Department of Ngari \(Ali\) Prefectural Committee](#) reported that the prefectural level meeting for religious representatives was held on February 10th. Prefecture Party Secretary Sonam Tenzin instructed the implementation of Xi Jinping's directives on religious work, sinification of Tibetan Buddhism, and alignment with a socialist society. He ordered the religious figures to be politically reliable, morally exemplary, and to contribute to the stability and development by upholding national unity, participating in social governance, and promoting a sense of Chinese national community. He also stressed the need for improved monastery management and for religious leaders to suppress freedom activism.

Instructing to the religious representatives, the party secretary said, "The Religious community Ngari must be politically reliable, one must deeply root the love to the Communist Party, and the motherland in the heart combine with practice and action, unwaveringly support the decision of the People's leader of Communist Party, and politically uphold the People's Leader, and closely follow the People's leader in action. It must always uphold the banner of patriotism higher, remain clear-headed in the face of the major issues, stand firm in the face of greater challenges, and be brave and courageous in fighting against all separatist forces".

### 6. Embedding national security in Tashi Lhunpo monastery

Since the 20th CPC National Congress in October 2022 emphasized national security as the foundation for China's rejuvenation and social stability, the Tashi Lhunpo Monastery Management Committee in its [report](#) on February 11th stated that it has implemented the instruction by integrating national security education into various aspects of the monastery. According to the committee, they have incorporated it into the "three awarenesses" education, policy and legal education, and patriotic education for the monks. The committee has organized numerous study sessions, legal publicity events, and patriotic activities to raise awareness about national security laws. They have also established a patriotic national unity education base within the monastery to thwart any freedom activism. Through the program, the monastery management committee reported that it aims to build a strong

ideological defense line among monks, promote the sinification of Tibetan Buddhism, and explore new ways for Tibetan Buddhism to adapt to socialist society.

The implementation of national security education into the monastics' life significantly impacts the daily routines of monks in several ways:

1. Monks undergo frequent study sessions, group discussions, and lectures focused on national security laws, policies, and concepts. In 2024, the management committee of Tashi Lhunpo Monastery organized 94 political group studies for monks, and also covered 45,000 participants from the general public.
2. Monks undergo frequent tests and examinations on national security knowledge.
3. Regular flag-raising ceremonies, film screenings, and national day celebrations are integrated into the monastery's schedule, taking up time that might otherwise be spent on traditional monastic activities.
4. Monks are encouraged to participate in activities that “promote national unity and security” in the surrounding communities, altering their traditional roles and responsibilities.

These changes represent a significant shift in the traditional monastic lifestyle, blending political education with religious practice to achieve the CCP's political objectives.

## **7. 1,000 monastics expelled from Serta Larung Gar Buddhist Academy**

In late November 2024, Chinese authorities strictly began enforcing the 5,000-resident limit at Serta Larung Gar Buddhist Academy, leading to the expulsion of 1,000 monks and nuns over alleged lack of proper documentation, reported the [Tibet Times](#) based in India on February 11th. An evicted nun reported that while family members of deceased residents with valid papers could remain, new applicants were barred from registering. The academy remains under strict surveillance, with over 400 government officials and police personnel monitoring the area. Visitors are now prohibited from bringing phones or cameras, severely restricting photography at the site. These actions are part of ongoing efforts by Chinese authorities to control and reduce the population at Larung Gar, following previous crackdowns in 2016-2017 that saw thousands of residents evicted and dwellings demolished.

## **8. Heightened security during the butter sculpture festival at Kumbum Monastery**

The Butter Sculpture Festival at Kumbum Monastery took place on February 12, 2025, amid heightened security measures. This year's festival saw an unprecedented level of policing that significantly impacted devotees' ability to fully participate in the religious celebrations.

Many visitors who traveled from outside the region to view the intricate butter sculptures, a hallmark of this traditional event, expressed disappointment due to the excessive security presence. The restrictions at Kumbum Monastery appear to be part of a broader pattern, with similar measures reported at other prominent Tibetan Buddhist sites including Labrang Tashi Khyil, Rongwo Monastery in Rebkong, and Gomang Monastery in Ngaba. A revised [“Measures for the Administration of Tibetan Buddhist Temples”](#) announced by the State Administration of Religious Affairs Decree No. 22 took effect on January 1, 2025.

## **9. Revised measures for administration of monasteries tightens CCP's control over Tibetan Buddhism**

The revised "Measures for the Administration of Tibetan Buddhist Temples," which took effect on January 1, 2025, tightens the Chinese Communist Party's [control](#) over Tibetan Buddhism. Key provisions include:

1. Article 4 requires monasteries and clergy to pledge allegiance to the CCP, support socialism, and promote the adaptation of Tibetan Buddhism to socialist society.
2. Article 10 makes loyalty to the CCP a mandatory qualification for religious administrators.
3. Article 11 expands monastic administrators' responsibilities to include conducting political education for monks.
4. Article 15 imposes strict quotas on monastic populations and grants the Buddhist Association of China a prominent role in Sinicizing Tibetan Buddhism.
5. Article 30 introduces a complex multi-tiered approval process for monks and nuns seeking to study under teachers from other monasteries, effectively restricting religious education.

These measures systematically embed political mandates into Tibetan religious administration, reinforcing the CCP's ideological control over Tibetan Buddhism and furthering efforts to assimilate Tibetan religious and cultural identity.

We welcome your feedback! Send any thoughts about ICT's Tibet Roundup and ideas for future changes to [research@savetibet.org](mailto:research@savetibet.org).



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