



INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR TIBET

ICT'S TIBET ROUNDUP — ISSUE 7

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ICT's Tibet Roundup is a compilation of curated news from various sources, including Chinese state media, official Chinese documents, briefings, information reported by Tibetans in Tibet and international commentary on Tibet. The presentation of information in the roundup should not be construed as amplifying Chinese political rhetoric but as a catalog of information from Chinese state media discourse for deeper research to uncover the truth. The roundup is organized in categories, including law, politics, culture, economics, climate, and commentary. The focus is on presenting news and reports with limited analysis and editorializing.

POLITICS

1. CCP Politburo member signals intensified control over Tibetans

From June 13 to 15, Chen Wenqing, a senior Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo member and Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission Secretary, inspected Qinghai for the CCP's iron grip on security and stability in Tibetan inhabited areas. Framed as a commitment to national safety, Chen's visit, as reported by [Xinhua](#), reveals a push to tighten control over ethnic and religious affairs, prioritizing state security over cultural autonomy in Qinghai, a key area in the CCP's "stabilize Tibet" strategy.

Chen's itinerary—spanning police oversight, ethnic universities, religious sites, and local governance centers—underscored the CCP's fixation on countering "separatism" and "religious extremism." His [instruction](#) to "resolutely win the anti-separatism struggle" and prevent "violent terrorist incidents" reveals Beijing's narrative of Tibetan inhabited regions as a volatile frontier requiring stringent surveillance and ideological conformity. During his inspection trip, he attended a regional meeting "Anti-Division and Stability Maintenance in Some Provinces, Regions and Cities" in Xining, the capital of Qinghai, and made arrangements to "maintain the security and stability" of the China designated "Tibet Autonomous Region" and the 10 Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures in four provinces.

By emphasizing the "new era strategy for governing Tibet," Chen's directives to legally manage ethnic and religious affairs signal an escalation of sinicization, marginalizing Tibetan cultural and religious practices, under the guise of stability. The focus on strengthening "comprehensive governance centers" and enforcing judicial policies reflects a broader agenda to centralize control and suppress dissent through state mechanisms.

2. CCP membership growth reveal targeting of rural Tibetan demographic

The CCP Tibet Autonomous Region Committee's 2024 [Party Statistics](#) Bulletin reports a 2.42% increase in membership, reaching 470,400, with 11,100 new members added. While the CCP touts this as evidence of growing support, the data does not provide transparency over the recruitment process where state oversight is tight.

Since farmers and herders dominate the membership at 44.5% (209,300), the data suggests that the CCP is targeting the rural demographic, which forms the economically vulnerable group, to bolster their loyalty to the Party. The 79.85% "ethnic minority" representation

(375,600 members) appears inclusive on the surface, but that would also mean that the cultural autonomy of the Tibetan people is being diluted, and Tibetans are being driven in scale into the Party's ideological framework with a non-Tibetan party secretary at the top leadership in Tibet. No Tibetan has ever held the Party leadership at the top in the China designated "Tibet Autonomous Region". Female membership (150,000) accounting for 31.89% and 44.77% of the membership with higher education (210,600) suggest state driven quotas rather than voluntary participation.

The reported 23,900 grassroots organizations, with full coverage in urban streets, townships, and villages, also signal an extensive Party apparatus and surveillance in Tibet.

3. Rural Tibet target of Chinese bureaucracy

Buried in a lengthy propaganda piece detailing projects launched since the 18th Party Congress to implement the "Party's Strategy for Governing Tibet in the New Era," rural Tibet emerges as a clear target of the CCP's agenda. According to official Chinese statistics, "a total of 14 batches, comprising over [297,000 cadres](#), have been selected and dispatched from party and government organs at all levels, state-owned enterprises, and Chinese-directed institutions in Tibet to reside in villages." Framed as fostering "stable development at the grassroots level," this large-scale deployment of Chinese institutional bureaucracy seeks to assimilate Tibet and Tibetans into a Chinese identity under the guise of "national unity."

4. Xi's paternalistic letter to Tibetan villagers in Nyingtri

In a June 27 letter to the villagers of Kala Village in Nyingtri City, Tibet, Chinese President and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping in a paternalistic and strategic [messaging](#) ordered the villagers to "follow the Communist Party" for happiness and to "maintain national unity" for a "prosperous and stable frontier". Xi's words reveal a calculated propaganda effort to mask political control and border security priorities under the guise of benevolence. The letter's metaphor of the CCP as the "Big Dipper" guiding villagers to prosperity exemplifies the Party's propaganda playbook, casting itself as the sole path to a better life. Xi's emphasis on "national unity" and a "stable frontier" is a thinly veiled directive to prioritize border security in Nyingtri, a region critical to China's geopolitical strategy due to its proximity to India.

5. China's diplomatic push in Nepal on Tibet

The inaugural "China's Xizang Connections Cultural Week" was held at the Yak & Yeti Hotel in Kathmandu, Nepal, from June 21 to 23, under the theme of "70 years of diplomatic relations" between Nepal and China.

The event was hosted by the Chinese Embassy in Nepal, the China Foreign Literature Publishing and Distribution Bureau, and the China-Tibet Foreign Cultural Exchange Association, with Tibet Daily News Agency and Tibet Media Group as organizers. Marketed as a cultural exchange, the [event](#) featured video exhibitions, cultural salons, and performances showcasing "the beauty of China's Tibet." to project a sanitized narrative of Tibet while tightening influence over Nepal which shared historical borders with Tibet. Besides the visual elements, "the Chinese Tibetan Scholars Exchange Group", with Chinese voices from China Tibet Studies Research Center, the Foreign Cultural Exchange Association of the Tibet Autonomous Region, the Academy of Social Sciences of the Tibet Autonomous Region and the Institute of Human Rights of Southwest University of Political Science and Law held an "academic" event to spread China's narrative on Tibet in the "new era".

The [event's](#) unveiling of Nepal's "Window of China's Tibet" at the closing ceremony

symbolizes Beijing's intent to shape perceptions of Tibet as an inseparable, and a thriving frontier under Party control.

Nepal, home to over 20,000 Tibetan refugees, has faced increasing Chinese pressure to curb their activities, including restrictions on protests and cultural expression. The event's timing, following China's 2024 declaration of 2025 as "Visit Nepal Year" suggests a soft power push to bolster economic ties while reinforcing Nepal's compliance with Beijing's stance on Tibet.

6. Lhasa's foreign affairs limited power

Lhasa Party Secretary Xiao Youcai chaired the Municipal Foreign Affairs Committee meeting to review 2024 work and outline 2025 priorities, according to Chinese state media on June 9. The [meeting](#) emphasized implementing Xi Jinping's diplomatic thought, expanding Lhasa's international cooperation, and supporting socio-economic development.

Some of the key directives included that the power of foreign affairs rests with the Party Central Committee, hence, directions must come from the center and that the authority of the Party Central Committee must be ensured. Lhasa's foreign affairs must be aligned with China's national strategies like the Belt and Road Initiative. Lhasa foreign affairs bureau is instructed to leverage platforms like the Himalayan Forum and China International Import Expo to promote the Chinese international narrative.

RELIGION

7. China appointed Panchen Lama meetings with top CCP leaders

President Xi Jinping [met](#) the CCP installed 11th Panchen Lama, Chökyi Gyalpo, in Beijing on June 6, 2025, instructing him to be proactive in his work and role to build a "strong sense of community for the Chinese nation" and systematically promote the sinicization of religion in China. The Chinese Panchen pledged to implement Xi's instructions. CCP Standing Politburo members, Wang Huning and Cai Qi, as well as Li Ganjie, member of the Politburo and Minister of the Central United Front Work Department attended the meeting.

On June 30, Tibet Autonomous Region Party Secretary [Wang Junzheng](#) met with the Chinese Panchen Lama, who had arrived in Lhasa on June 27. The meeting, attended by regional CCP leaders Yan Jinhai and Liu Jiang, reveals the CCP's strategic use of the Panchen Lama to advance its political agenda in Tibet.

Wang's warm welcome of the Chinese Panchen Lama, coupled with praise for his "progress," frames the CCP's narrative of a harmonious Tibet under its leadership. He emphasized Xi Jinping's "new era" strategy for Tibet. Wang's focus on the "Sinicization" of Tibetan Buddhism—aligning religious practices with socialist values and CCP control—signals an ongoing effort to reshape the centuries-old Tibetan spiritual tradition to serve the party-state interests.

The meeting's timing, following Xi Jinping's June 6 meeting with the Chinese Panchen Lama, reinforces the CCP's intent to leverage his intended role in the future. Wang's directives for the Panchen Lama to lead monks in embracing CCP ideology, opposing "separatism," and advancing "three consciousnesses" education reveals CCP's clear expectation of him to prioritize political loyalty over spiritual role.

The Chinese Panchen Lama lacks the spiritual authority of Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, the Dalai Lama-recognized Panchen Lama who the CCP disappeared in 1995.

8. Seminar on Tibetan Buddhism pushing to sinicize Tibetan faith

The Seventh Tibetan Buddhism Doctrine Interpretation Seminar, hosted by the Tibet Buddhist Academy, gathered over 900 participants to advance the “Sinicization” of Tibetan Buddhism, according to CCP’s United Front on June 14. [State media](#) China Tibet Network reported that the scholars discussed how to systematically promote the “Sinicization of Tibetan Buddhism in the new era”. The event reveals the CCP’s strategic campaign to co-opt Tibetan Buddhism, subordinating its spiritual essence to state control. While labeled as “Tibetan Buddhism Doctrine Interpretation Seminar” purportedly to explain Tibetan Buddhism, the seminar was in essence a platform for ideological and theoretical manipulation to systematically sinicize Tibetan Buddhism in the CCP’s “new era”.

9. Tibet Buddhist Academy’s Trip to China’s East: A CCP Push for Ideological Control

From June 21 to 30, 40 students and faculty from the Tibet Buddhist Academy were led on a 10-day “Journey of Origin and Faith” to Zhejiang and Shanghai, to explore Chinese culture and history. Framed as an educational endeavor, the [trip](#)—visiting sites like Shanghai Museum, Lingyin Temple, and CCP revolutionary memorials—reveals the ongoing CCP activities to indoctrinate Tibetan monks with state ideology, promoting the “Sinicization” of Tibetan Buddhism and loyalty to Beijing’s vision of national unity.

The itinerary of the trip suggests the CCP’s agenda to tie Tibetan Buddhism to a Han-centric narrative. By emphasizing the “millennial friendship” between Han and Tibetan Buddhism, the trip seeks to erode the distinctiveness of Tibetan spiritual traditions, aligning them with state-approved practices. The focus on “red spirit” and “national rejuvenation” at revolutionary sites suggest a push to convert monks into ideological foot soldiers, tasked with “protecting the country” and promoting a unified Chinese identity.

10. Newly appointed monastery management committee cadres in Ngari receive training to control Tibetan monasteries

A [training program](#) for the newly appointed monastery management committee cadres in Ngari (Ali), Tibet Autonomous Region, was held, from June 23 to 27, to receive instructions on the Communist Party of China’s (CCP) ideological and administrative priorities. Hosted by the regional United Front Work Department, the five-day program trained 30 cadres in Xi Jinping’s thought on united front work, ethnic policy, and religious policy, emphasizing the “Sinicization” of Tibetan Buddhism. While presented as capacity-building, the training underscores the CCP’s relentless drive to tighten control over Tibetan religious institutions under the guise of governance and unity.

The program’s curriculum, centered on Xi Jinping Thought and policies like the “Regulations on the Management of Tibetan Buddhist Temples,” suggest a clear intent to mold cadres to be enforcers of state-directed religious oversight. Lectures by CCP officials, including sessions on “ethnic unity” and internet religious regulations, instructed legal compliance and ideological conformity over spiritual autonomy. The focus on “casting a strong sense of Chinese national community” aligns with Beijing’s broader campaign to assimilate Tibetan identity into a Han-centric identity.



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