



INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR TIBET

ICT'S TIBET ROUNDUP

FEBRUARY 1-28, 2026

ICT's Tibet Roundup is a compilation of curated news from various sources, including Chinese state media, official Chinese documents, briefings, information reported by Tibetans in Tibet and international commentary on Tibet. The presentation of information in the roundup should not be construed as amplifying Chinese political rhetoric but as a catalog of information from Chinese state media discourse for deeper research to uncover the truth. The roundup is organized in categories, including law, politics, culture, economics, climate, and commentary. The focus is on presenting news and reports with limited analysis and editorializing.

POLITICS

1. Party secretary orders united front to act as “combat team” while accelerating “Sinicization” in Tibet

As Tibet rolls into the “15th Five-Year Plan” starting in 2026, party secretary Wang Junzheng has instructed the united front system to act as a “combat team,” demanding absolute loyalty to Xi Jinping Thought and the “two safeguards” during the meeting of heads of United Front Work Department in “Tibet Autonomous Region” (TAR), according to a [report](#) published on the United Front website.

Central to this push is “forging a strong sense of community of the Chinese nation”. This initiative seeks to build a “common spiritual home” by prioritizing the popularization of the national common language (Chinese) and fostering the integration of all ethnic groups.

Furthermore, the “Sinicization of Tibetan Buddhism” is being institutionalized through “rule of law” governance. Monks and laypeople alike face regularized “three consciousnesses education” — focusing on national, civic and legal awareness — to ensure religion adapts to a socialist society.

Beyond religious control, the strategy aims to “draw the greatest concentric circles” by co-opting “private economic personnel, non-party intellectuals, people from new social classes, and overseas Tibetan compatriots”, into a “patriotic united front”. With a focus on grassroots surveillance and a strict responsibility system, these directives signal a decisive effort to replace a distinct Tibetan identity with a unified, state-led national consciousness.

2. 2026 government work report hints at a pivotal transition for the “Tibet Autonomous Region” as it enters the “15th Five-Year Plan”

Following a year defined by the 60th anniversary of the TAR’s founding and a visit from CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping, the [2026 TAR government work report](#) signals a hardening of political priorities -- absolute ideological loyalty and systemic cultural assimilation.

In its achievements in 2025, the report pointed out that the 2025 roadmap lies in its shift from “stability maintenance” to the active “Sinicization” of Tibetan life. Stability remains the “first priority,” governed by an intensified “anti-separatist” struggle and the “7+1” prevention model according to the government report. The report also emphasized having forged “a

strong sense of community of the Chinese nation” in 2025. This is underscored by a 94 percent proficiency rate in Chinese language among village leaders and the institutionalization of “three consciousnesses” education—national, civic, and rule of law—to ensure Tibetan Buddhism “adapts to a socialist society.”

Economically, TAR reports a seven percent GDP growth. Major landmark projects, such as the Yaxia Hydropower Project, represent more than energy; they are framed as “major political tasks” that tie the region’s resource potential to China’s national strategic security.

For the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030), the state demands a “combat team” mindset from cadres, who are instructed to be “executors, activists, and doers”. By combining “smart border defense” with aggressive “frontier-building,” the TAR government seeks to solidify Tibet as a “security barrier” for China. Ultimately, the report outlines a future where Tibetan identity is inextricably linked to the Communist Party’s “New Era” framework, replacing local autonomy with a unified Chinese national consciousness.

3. 12th TAR people’s congress adopts outline of the 15th Five-Year Plan

On February 3, 2026, the fourth session of the [12th People’s Congress](#) concluded with the formal adoption of the outline of the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) for Tibet, signaling a new phase of systemic assimilation.

Party Secretary Wang Junzheng described the session as a “clarion call” for Tibet’s future. A key outcome was the approval of the Regulations on Religious Affairs, reinforcing the mandate to adapt Tibetan Buddhism to a socialist society. The session reaffirmed the “Four Major Tasks” — stability, development, ecology and border strengthening—as the bedrock of TAR governance.

The Congress transitioned from celebrating the 60th anniversary of the TAR establishment in 2025 to institutionalizing ideological orthodoxy. Leaders invoked President Xi Jinping’s landmark inspection visit as the catalyst for the “two establishments” and “two safeguards,” demanding absolute consistency with the Party Central Committee. The Congress is now tasked with practicing “whole-process people’s democracy” through high-quality oversight and “small entry point” legislation to ensure the plan’s implementation.

Chairman of the TAR government, Yan Jinhai, instructed cadres to act as “servants, pioneers, and hard-working oxen” to deliver tangible results. This session cements a framework where TAR’s development is inextricably linked to China’s national security and the consolidation of a unified Chinese national identity.

4. Suppression of Tibetan Expression on Chinese social media Kuaishou

Exile media outlet [Tibet Times](#) on February 26, reported escalation in the monitoring and censorship of Tibetan digital content on the popular Chinese social media platform *Kuaishou*. Users inside Tibet face punitive measures, including account deletions and permanent bans, for sharing material related to Tibetan language, culture and religious identity.

Surveillance now extends to basic cultural expressions. Individuals wearing traditional attire or speaking Tibetan in live-streams have seen their broadcasts abruptly terminated or viewership restricted. Even static background elements, such as Tibetan script on wall hangings, triggers platform intervention. Notably, sensitive phrases like “Lhasa, the capital of Tibet” are filtered out unless users employ symbols to circumvent automated detection. The restrictions strictly prohibit the dissemination of religious teachings and images of spiritual

leaders, including His Holiness the Dalai Lama. Even the inadvertent appearance of such imagery during private video calls can trigger automated alerts.

RELIGION

5. Party cadres prohibited from holding religious faith and participating in rituals

The Communist Party of China (CCP) issued a stark ideological mandate defining the rigid boundaries between cultural tourism and prohibited religious activity for its members. A February 2026 directive published by [Beijing Daily](#) instructs that, while Party cadres may enter temples for sightseeing, they are “strictly prohibited” from holding religious faith or participating in rituals.

The guidelines cite Articles 62 and 63 of the Party’s Disciplinary Regulations, warning that “burning incense, worshipping Buddha or praying for blessings” constitutes an abandonment of Marxist beliefs. Such “feudal superstitious activities” are viewed as damaging to the Party’s “advanced nature and purity”. This directive is a cornerstone of the CCP’s ongoing ideological purity campaign. By mandating that members remain “staunch atheists,” the Party seeks to ensure total adherence to dialectical materialism, effectively barring any spiritual competition to Marxist-Leninist doctrine.

Citing an anonymous Lhasa resident, exile Tibetan media outlet [Tibet Times](#) reported that government employees are prohibited from participating in a deceased family member’s cremation, weekly prayer services and other last rites.

By permitting tourism but criminalizing worship, the CCP is attempting to co-opt cultural history while stripping it of its religious power. This strategy ensures that cadres function as purely secular agents of the state, preventing the erosion of Party discipline and maintaining a clear distinction between cultural appreciation and prohibited ideological deviation.

6. Tibetan new year welfare and ideology

At the Maochok monastery, traditional Tibetan holiday celebrations are being utilized as a platform for political education and state-led integration. On February 5, ahead of the Tibetan New Year, the Temple Management Committee held a mandatory [session](#) to consolidate “three consciousnesses”—national, civic and rule of law awareness—among its resident monks.

The officials emphasized a shared history where all ethnic groups “jointly opened up vast territories” and “created a splendid culture.” This narrative is central to the strategic push to “forge a strong sense of community of the Chinese nation.” Local authorities explicitly demanded that monks act as “defenders, practitioners and propagandists” of national unity, using their religious influence to guide the public toward the “five identities” and the belief that “national unity is a blessing, and division and turmoil are a disaster.”

Following the lectures, the officials distributed over 10,000 yuan in welfare goods, including rice and blankets. This “condolence” effort in effect attempts to manufacture loyalty to China.

7. CCP requires its installed Panchen Lama to maintain “a high degree of consistency” with the party central committee

In a high-level meeting underscoring the Chinese central government’s tightening grip on religious life in Tibet, Li Ganjie, member of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee and director of the United Front Work Department of the CCP Central Committee, met with

Gyaltzen Norbu, who was installed by the CCP as their Panchen Lama in 1995, on February 12, according to a United Front Work Department [report](#). The meeting, timed with Tibetan New Year, served as a formal venue to reiterate the CCP's expectations from Norbu acting as the Beijing-installed Panchen Lama.

Li Ganjie explicitly directed Norbu to maintain “a high degree of consistency” with the Party Central Committee and to conscientiously study Xi Jinping Thought. The mandate was clear: religious leaders must act as primary agents in “forging a strong sense of community of the Chinese nation” and systematically promoting the “Sinicization of religion in China” to ensure Tibetan Buddhism adapts to a socialist society.

In response, Norbu reaffirmed his “firm support” for the leadership of the CCP, pledging to safeguard “national unity” and contribute to the “stable development and progress of Tibet.” The meeting shows how the Chinese state views Norbu's role as an essential instrument for political and cultural assimilation.

8. Retrofitting historical events to align religious legitimacy with Chinese state sovereignty

Presenting a [Sinocentric narrative](#), Yin Haiyan of the Tibet Academy of Social Sciences, asserted that the reincarnation system of Tibetan Buddhism — particularly for the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama — has been under the authority of China's central governments since the Yuan Dynasty, with titles “granted” by imperial authorities and the golden urn as an unbroken mechanism for selection.

Contrary to claims that these titles were imperial grants, historical evidence shows that they emerged from internal Mongol and Tibetan dynamics. The title “Dalai Lama” was first bestowed in 1578 by the Mongol leader Altan Khan upon Sonam Gyatso; while later acknowledged by the Ming Dynasty, the conferral was not a direct imperial initiative. Similarly, the “Panchen” title originated within the Gelug tradition at Tashilhunpo Monastery and was recognized by Mongol leader Gūshi Khan in the mid-17th century.

Yin's Sinocentric portrayal is a modern interpretation that retrofits historical events to align religious legitimacy with Chinese state sovereignty.



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