INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR TIBET

ICT'S TIBET ROUNDUP

October 1-31, 2026

ICT's Tibet Roundup is a monthly compilation of curated news from various sources, including Chinese state media, official Chinese documents, briefings, information reported by Tibetans in Tibet and international commentary on Tibet. The presentation of information in the Roundup should not be construed as amplifying Chinese political rhetoric but as a catalog of information from Chinese state media discourse for deeper research to uncover the truth. The Roundup is organized into categories, including law, politics, culture, economics, climate and commentary. The focus is on presenting news and reports with limited analysis and editorializing.

Politics

1. Tibetan primary school students on a "red-themed" study tour

On October 22, 2026, primary school students from Nagchu City's Sernyed (Seni) District and Lhasa's Niu (Liuwu) New District were taken on a "red-themed" study tour of the Tibet Chairman Mao Badge Museum in Lhasa. Organized to mark the 90th anniversary of the Red Army's Long March victory, the event, titled "Continuing the legacy of the Long March and cultivating patriotic feelings", embeds CCP historical narratives into primary education in Tibet.

The children were guided through exhibits of Mao badges, assembled before a large statue of Chairman Mao, and required to listen to accounts of CCP revolutionary history intended to instil the "spirit of the Long March." Chinese state media presents such visits as "vivid education in patriotism and revolutionary tradition."

This event illustrates how local education authorities translate central directives on national cohesion into practice. By instructing Tibetan children to "inherit the red gene" and frame their own academic efforts as their generation's "Long March," the authorities seek to instill CCP ideological concepts — red consciousness, a shared Chinese national identity, and patriotic thought — from the earliest years of schooling.

2. Sinicizing Tibetan children from Tibet's western frontier

On October 14, 2026, fifty primary school students from Dingri (Tingri) County in Shigatse, Tibet, were taken to the Chinese imperial landmark and the National Museum in Beijing as part of the third phase of the state-sponsored "United in Heart, Building Dreams for China" indoctrination tour. Although framed as an educational excursion, the program represents a structured effort to immerse Tibetan children from Tibet's western frontier in state-sanctioned historical narratives.

3. Han representation in Lhasa city's 13th People's Congress

The Standing Committee of the 12th People's Congress of Lhasa announced the list of 250 deputies elected to the 13th People's Congress of Lhasa on October 16. The composition of the new congress shows a clear increase in Han representation compared with the early years of the local people's congress system. Although Tibetans remain the majority,

Han representation, especially in the urban Chengguan District and the PLA/Armed Police delegation, is markedly higher than in the system's founding period, when Tibetan representation was typically well above 80–90%.

In the Chinese political system, real power rests with the CCP, which is already dominated by Han cadres. Even within the people's congress system, which remains subordinate to the Party, Han representation has been gradually increasing, while Tibetans retain only a formal majority for now.

ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF DEPUTIES OF LHASA'S 13TH PEOPLE'S CONGRESS

Ethnicity	Number	Percentage
Tibetan	159	63.6%
Han	86	34.4%
Hui	3	1.2%
Mongolian	1	0.4%
Bai	1	0.4%
Total	250	100%

BREAKDOWN OF DEPUTIES BY COUNTY/DISTRICT

Delegation	Total Seats	Tibetan	Han	Other Non-Tibetan
Chengguan District	85	52	7	2 (Hui)
Toelung Dechen (Doilungdêqên)	26	19	7	0
Taktse (Dagzê) District	19	11	6	2 (1 Hui + 1 Bai)
Lhundrup (Lhünzhub) County	26	19	7	0
Meldrogongkar (Maizhokunggar)	24	16	8	0
Chushul (Qüxü) County	19	13	5	1 (Mongolian)
Nyemo (Nyêmo) County	18	10	8	0
Damshung (Damxung) County	22	17	5	0
PLA & PAP	11	2	9	0
Total	250	159	86	5

4. Authorities punish alleged "rumor-mongers" after Nagchu earthquake

Chinese public security organs have announced administrative penalties against five internet users for circulating what they as allege to be false information about the recent magnitude-7 earthquake that struck Drachen County in Nagchu, Tibet, on October 22, 2026. The cases form part of the ongoing "Clean Internet 2026" campaign targeting online content that authorities allege fabricates disaster details, exaggerates casualties, or creates panic.

The swift, highly publicized crackdown highlights a familiar pattern in disaster communication under tight information controls. In Tibet, where independent media access is severely restricted and official casualty figures are released slowly or selectively, unofficial posts often serve as the only available channels for independent, real-time accounts. By labeling unconfirmed local reports as "rumors" that "disrupt social order," authorities effectively deter Tibetans from sharing firsthand observations that diverge from the official state narrative.

While deliberate fabrication that genuinely impedes rescue work is a legitimate concern, the absence of transparent, detailed official data creates the very information vacuum that fuels such reports. Punishing individuals for circulating higher casualty estimates or warnings of secondaryhazard risks discourage legitimate inquiry and public oversight precisely when accurate, multi-sourced information is most needed. In the absence of such transparency, an information monopoly prevails in the form of an exclusive state narrative as seen during the limited information available from Tibet during the catastrophic August 2026 Nepal-Tibet flood.

The full names of the five penalized individuals were not disclosed. Of the five, one is from Lhasa, two are from Nagchu, one from Chamdo, and the fifth from Shenzhen, Guangdong.

5. Qinghai's "warm home" as an instrument to control Tibetan diaspora

On October 30, Qinghai Province formally unveiled a renovated and expanded version of the so-called Tibetan Reception Center in Xining City for exiled Tibetans, presenting the upgrade as a compassionate "warm home" and a bridge to the motherland. Officials highlighted the renovated facilities and enhanced services for policy consultation, family visits, investment, and resettlement. Staff emphasized Party leadership, patriotic outreach, and the goal of letting returning Tibetans "see the real situation" of Qinghai's development. Such reception centers operate under the guidance, oversight, and control of the United Front Work Department.

The language of hospitality sits uneasily beside longstanding patterns of political management. The center is framed as a platform for establishing close contact, building consensus, and promoting official narratives, implemented within the broader framework of the United Front Work efforts to cultivate the loyalties of Tibetan exile communities.

6. Wang Huning inspects Tibetan areas in Sichuan

During an October 13–16 inspection tour across Chengdu, Deyang, and Kardze (Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Politburo Standing Committee member and CPPCC Chairman Wang Huning outlined directives aimed at accelerating state-led assimilation. Framed around the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Party Central Committee and

preparations for the 15th Five-Year Plan, the high-level visit illustrates a concerted effort to align regional governance with central political directives.

A key focus of the inspection was Wang's October 14 visit to Serta (Seda) County Middle School in Kardze, where officials emphasized embedding a "strong sense of community for the Chinese nation" directly into local educational programs. This policy framework requires reinforcing the "five recognitions" across schools, urban communities, and cultural heritage sites. Parallel directives called for the systematic advancement of the Sinicization of religion, together with tighter legal supervision over religious affairs, explicitly invoking the Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress as a statutory instrument to enforce compliance.

7. Hu Changsheng's western Tibet borderland inspection

During an inspection tour of Ngari Prefecture from October 14 to 16, recently appointed Party Secretary of the "Tibet Autonomous Region" (TAR), Hu Changsheng, linked regional development and environmental policy to centralized political control. Accompanied by regional leaders Gong Huicai, Xu Zhitao, and Zhu Shouke, Hu's visits across Purang, Tsamda, and Gar counties highlighted how political and administrative authority is exercised along Tibet's western borderlands.

The official itinerary frames border security as an ideological imperative. Mandating strict adherence to central leadership through the "two establishments" and "two safeguards," Hu instructed local officials to intensify "anti-separatism" efforts and strictly regulate religious affairs in accordance with the Chinese law.

At the same time, the inspection underscored the political function of socio-economic planning. Industrial projects in border villages, tourism development, and poverty-prevention mechanisms serve a dual purpose: driving local growth while anchoring populations in strategically sensitive border territories.

By combining support for cadres stationed in extreme-altitude posts with targeted interventions to bolster weak Party organizations, the regional leadership continues to treat grassroots Party building as the primary vehicle for border security.

8. Centralized grid governance and security restructuring in Lhasa

On October 8, TAR Party Secretary Hu Changsheng conducted an inspection of Lhasa's grassroots comprehensive governance centers, signaling a consolidated drive to integrate digital surveillance with institutional political control. The visit coincided with a major leadership restructuring within the regional security apparatus, as He Luchun was officially appointed to replace Liu Jiang as Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission.

Inspecting the Chengguan District Comprehensive Governance Center, Hu evaluated grid-based management systems and the "three-way linkage" connecting litigation, police, and petition mediation. The inspection suggests that regional authorities are accelerating the rollout of a comprehensive governance information platform designed to enhance predictive risk assessment and tech-driven policing capabilities across urban grid networks.

This administrative overhaul is reinforced by targeted ideological campaigns. Officials emphasized deepening education on "national consciousness, civic consciousness, and rule of law consciousness" alongside anti-crime initiatives.

9. Institutional discipline and security mobilization in frontier governance

A meeting of the Standing Committee of the TAR Party Committee, chaired by Party Secretary Hu Changsheng on September 29, outlined a comprehensive governance strategy integrating ideological control, administrative discipline, and holiday security. Held ahead of China's National Day holiday and the Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th CCP Central Committee, the proceedings underscored the regional leadership's focus on enforcing political loyalty and maintaining social stability across Tibet.

The committee emphasized aligning local cadres with central directives through strict Party governance and the "three no-corruption" framework. Official instructions mandated targeted efforts to reform weak grassroots Party organizations. Security protocols featured prominently, with references to Fujian's "Zhangzhou 110" policing model and the "Fengqiao Experience" as models for strengthening public safety networks. On the ideological front, leadership demanded strict control over media positions, aligning public opinion management and children's cultural initiativeswith China's national integration goals.

Religion

10. Requiring Chinese language for the monastic community

On October 9, the TAR Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) convened a special conference titled "Deepening the popularization of the common language among monks and nuns and promoting the construction of a community with a shared future."

Official directives framed the learning of standard Mandarin as an integral component of "spiritual practice for monks and nuns in the new era." By weaving state language acquisition directly into the daily life of monasteries, the United Front administration seeks to embed Chinese national identity into the core routines of Tibetan Buddhist practice.

11. Party oversight of Tibetan monasteries under the banner of "Sinicization"

On October 17, 2026, Dawa Tsering, a Standing Committee member of the TAR Party Committee and Party Secretary of Lhasa, conducted an inspection of Tsurphu Monastery and Nenang Monastery. During the visits, he instructed the monastics, management cadres and public security personnel to "firmly safeguard national unity and ethnic solidarity, clearly oppose separatism," study and publicize the Law on the Promotion of Ethnic Unity and Progress together with the TAR's regulations on religious affairs. The monastics were told to deepen their "love for the Party, the country, and socialism" and to "unswervingly listen to the Party and follow the Party."

Dawa repeatedly stressed adherence to Xi Jinping's discourses on religious work and called for advancing the "Sinicization of religion," strengthening ideological and political guidance under the main line of "forging a strong sense of the Chinese national community". Monastery management committees were ordered to enhance the cohesion and combat effectiveness of their Party organizations to "consolidate the grassroots foundation of religious work."

Foreign Affairs

12. Bhutanese delegation visits Lhasa

On October 26, 2026, the Tibet Academy of Social Sciences hosted its first Bhutanese delegation, marking an expansion of regional diplomacy. Coordinated primarily through the academy's South Asia Research Institute, the visit brought together delegates from religious, academic, and legislative backgrounds for exchanges within official research institutions. The arrangement suggests that institutional leaders are actively building a platform for long-term policy research and regional alignment across the Himalayan region.

Chaired by academy President Li Xiaoning, the formal discussions established a framework for future institutional cooperation. Beyond diplomatic pleasantries, the visit functioned as a dual-track exercise in knowledge exchange and narrative management.

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