Chinese President Xi Jinping has issued new instructions on overseas Chinese affairs, urging greater efforts to “rally the hearts and strength” of the estimated 60 million Chinese diaspora across 200 countries globally and mobilize their support for China’s national rejuvenation, modernization drive, and reunification goals. The directives were conveyed at the National Conference on Overseas Chinese Affairs Work, held in Beijing from July 27 to 28, 2026.

According to a Xinhua report, Xi praised the contributions of overseas Chinese, returned overseas Chinese, and their relatives since the 18th Party Congress in 2012. He credited them with aiding China’s economic and social development, preserving Chinese culture, and advancing international exchanges. Looking ahead, Xi instructed officials to guide this community to “uphold fine traditions, cultivate patriotism and family-country sentiment,” leverage their “unique advantages,” and “actively serve the great cause of national reunification.” The ultimate aim, he said, is to pool a “mighty force” for building a strong country and achieving national rejuvenation through Chinese-style modernization.

Speaking at the same conference, Wang Huning, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, described overseas Chinese affairs as a “long-term strategic task” and called for high-quality development of the work. Wang emphasized uniting the diaspora around the “Chinese Dream,” coordinating domestic and overseas efforts, and encouraging greater roles in modernization, cultural promotion, national reunification, and international exchanges.

In concluding remarks, Li Ganjie, head of the United Front Work Department, stressed upholding the Party’s overall leadership, particularly the centralized and unified leadership of the Central Committee, as well as protecting the rights and interests of overseas Chinese and consolidating the foundation for “united struggle.”

On July 22, the United Front Work Department of Ngari (Ali) Prefecture in the Tibet Autonomous Region held an indoctrination session on China’s new so-called Ethnic Unity and Progress Law, which codifies China’s forced assimilation policies in Tibet and came into effect July 1.

The session led by a prefectural United Front official, who also holds a position in the local Buddhist Association, aimed to deepen implementation of CCP’s ethnic policies and strengthen the “sense of community for the Chinese nation.” Local Tibetans were instructed on the law’s requirements for building a “shared spiritual homeland”, expanding inter-ethnic exchanges, and advancing “common prosperity.” Officials framed ethnic unity as essential to social stability and high-quality development in the remote region, instructing cadres to integrate patriotic and ethnic-unity messaging into daily work.

While presented as routine legal education, the session reflects Beijing’s broader strategy of tightening ideological and administrative control in Tibetan areas through the United Front system. Such campaigns prioritize forced assimilation and the dilution of distinct Tibetan cultural and religious identity under the banner of “ethnic unity” and “Chinese national community consciousness.”

Beijing has formally abandoned its founding commitment to securing national unity through limited recognition of ethnic differences. The new Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress legally entrenches China’s coercive assimilation policies hollowing out constitutional promises of territorial autonomy, argue scholars James Leibold and Tenzin Dorjee in Foreign Affairs.

Under Xi Jinping’s signature goal of “forging a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation,” the state seeks not merely loyalty but the remolding of minority consciousness itself, erasing distinct languages, religious institutions, and historical memories that could sustain claims to collective self-rule. The scholars argue that unlike immigrant groups seeking inclusion, Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Mongols are colonized national minorities whose demands center on preserving ancestral territory, language, and institutions across generations. The law tolerates only a curated spectacle of minority costumes, food, and music packaged for Han consumption while suppressing anything that implies separate identity or meaningful self-government.

By closing the political middle ground once occupied by advocates of genuine autonomy such as the Dalai Lama, Wang Lixiong, and Ilham Tohti, Beijing locks itself into a zero-sum confrontation as policies of forced homogenization harden rather than dissolve resistance, write Leibold and Dorjee.

The International Campaign for Tibet reported that Chinese authorities had, on July 13, started a new round of demolition targeting at least 1060 monastic residences at Serthar Buddhist Academy, or Larung Gar, in eastern Tibet. Following ICT’s report, exile media outlet Tibet Times confirmed on July 27 that authorities have ordered the monks and nuns whose residences have already been demolished to return to their homes or to monasteries in their native places, and barred them from continuing to stay at Serthar Larung Gar.

Citing reliable sources, Tibet Times reported that the Chinese government had earlier planned to demolish the area of Gyutrul Temple at the academy. However, authorities decided instead to demolish monastic residences after petitions were received against the demolition of Gyutrul Temple, which is located on a ridge overlooking Larung Gar, citing risks of cascading damage to the adjacent surroundings. Monks and nuns are being forcibly sent back to their places of residence, the report said, with even those from Sertar county being ordered to return to their own villages or local monasteries.

On July 21, the Third Seminar on “Advancing the Sinicization of Urban Tibetan Buddhist Temples” was held at Puning Temple in Chengde, Hebei. Organized by the China Tibetology Research Center’s Institute of Religious Studies, the seminar focused on upholding “patriotic and religion-loving traditions” and strengthening “the sense of community for the Chinese nation.”

The venue was carefully chosen. Built by the Qianlong Emperor in 1755 as a Han-Tibetan hybrid temple after military campaigns in the west, Puning Temple was visited by Xi Jinping in 2021. Organizers repeatedly cited Xi’s instructions on guiding religions to adapt to socialist society and uphold the Sinicization of religion; promoting Chinese patriotism; and managing religious affairs according to law.

More than 30 religious representatives, scholars, and officials discussed how urban Tibetan Buddhist temples can serve as pilots for the Sinicization of religion. The resulting consensus emphasized political orientation, rooting Tibetan Buddhism in Chinese culture, and stricter legal management.

A July 15 meeting convened by the Ngari (Ali) Prefecture United Front Work Department highlights the Chinese Communist Party’s systematic use of Tibetan religious figures to advance control over Tibetan society. The United Front Work Department, in its report, claimed that the four newly appointed religious representatives, elevated as CPPCC vice-chairmen, pledged to “listen to the Party, thank the Party, and follow the Party,” while committing to forge a strong sense of Chinese national community and support socialist modernization.

The local minister of the United Front Work Department instructed them to deepen the “Sinicization of Tibetan Buddhism,” maintain a firm political stance, and serve the Party’s goals of “long-term stability and high-quality development.”  By placing these individuals in formal political roles and extracting public loyalty declarations, the CCP strategically creates a layer of Tibetan intermediaries to endorse Party policies on religion, ethnicity, and governance and to pressure or isolate Tibetans who retain traditional allegiances or resist Sinicization campaigns.

On Tuesday, July 28, two earthquakes with magnitudes of 5.7 and 5.8 struck Drakkar (Xinghai) County in Hainan (Tsolho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai Province. The first quake, a 5.7-magnitude tremor, occurred at 11:16 a.m. local time at a depth of 10 kilometers, according to the China Earthquake Networks Center (CENC). Eighteen minutes later, a 5.8-magnitude quake struck the same area at a comparable depth.

The earthquakes triggered landslides, with state media footage showing substantial dust plumes rising from mountain slopes. Tremors were felt in Xining, the provincial capital of Qinghai, and in Lanzhou, the capital of neighboring Gansu Province. Chinese state media reported varying degrees of damage to houses, roads, and infrastructure across all seven townships in the county with no fatalities reported. 

This event follows a similar moderate earthquake earlier this year. On January 26, a magnitude 5.5 quake struck Tewo County in Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Gansu Province, at a depth of 10 kilometers. The quake damaged several villages, prompted the evacuation of approximately 20,000 residents, and resulted in no reported fatalities.

Chinese state outlet China Today reported the opening of the fifth Trans-Himalaya International Cooperation Forum in Nyingtri (Nyingchi or Linzhi), Tibet, from July 16–18 2026. The event, themed “Promoting Green Development and Building a Beautiful Home,” drew over 350 participants from more than 30 countries and featured roundtables on climate, tourism, sports and health. Outcomes included a satellite data MoU with Kyrgyzstan, renewal of agricultural cooperation with ICIMOD, promotion of China’s MAZU early-warning system, and symbolic friendship ties with Argentine, Korean and Maldivian entities.

State media coverage portrayed Tibet solely as an ecological and developmental success under Chinese rule and China’s leadership of the “Asian Water Tower.” With the glaring absence of independent voices, this Chinese soft power promotion deployed typical formulaic language of consensus and vitality around China through state media. Critical issues like the India-China Himalayan border tensions,  militarization, longstanding concerns over religious freedoms, surveillance and demographic policies in Tibet were ignored. 

Environmental trade-offs from hydropower, mining and infrastructure development on the fragile Tibetan plateau received no scrutiny, despite the forum’s emphasis on “promoting green development.” While technical deals on disaster monitoring and high-altitude agriculture hold some value, the forum’s core purpose was narrative control by normalizing Chinese governance of Tibet and projecting Beijing as the region’s responsible steward.

The Indian Ministry of External Affairs’ (MEA) response to Beijing’s July 23 readout of the Jaishankar-Wang Yi meeting in Manila signals New Delhi’s reluctance to endorse Beijing’s characterization of India’s position on Tibet and China’s sovereignty claims.

The Chinese readout claimed that “India’s position on such issues as Taiwan and Xizang remains unchanged. India respects China’s sovereignty and has always pursued a positive and cooperative bilateral relationship with a forward-looking approach.” In effect, China implied that External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar had reaffirmed India’s position on Tibet and respect for Chinese sovereignty during the Manila meeting. However, Indian MEA spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal, during the bi-weekly media briefing on July 24, neither endorsed the Chinese claim nor issued a categorical denial of it.

Crucially, Jaiswal did not confirm that Jaishankar had stated that India’s position on “Xizang” remains unchanged or that “India respects China’s sovereignty.” Instead, he reframed the sovereignty discussion towards India’s own territorial concerns, asserting that it is India that raises such issues, citing China’s illegal occupation of Indian territories in Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh since 1963. Jaiswal did not explicitly recognize Chinese claims over Tibet, nor was Tibet (or Xizang) mentioned in the spokesperson’s remarks.

Commercial satellite imagery has revealed that China deployed at least 11 J-20 “Mighty Dragon” fifth-generation stealth fighters at two airbases along the Indian border in late June and early July 2026, according to NDTV on July 27. 

On July 9, seven J-20s were spotted on the tarmac at Hotan airbase in Xinjiang, approximately 389 km northeast of Leh and just 245 km from the Indian Air Force’s Daulat Beg Oldie airfield in Ladakh. Separately, four J-20s were observed at Damshung (Damxung) airbase in Tibet, about 344 km northwest of Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh. This marks the largest visible concentration of J-20s at any Chinese base opposite India to date.

Defense experts note the significance of these stealth platforms, which feature advanced low-observable technology giving them an edge in contested airspace over India’s current non-stealth fleet, including Rafale jets. Former fighter pilot Sameer Joshi said the deployments confirm that fifth-generation operations from high-altitude bases are now routine for the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), rather than mere signaling. According to NDTV, the first sighting of J-20s in Tibet was in 2016 in Dapba (Daocheng) County, Kardze Tibetan Prefecture, Sichuan.  At least seven J-20s were spotted at the Shigatse airfield  on May 27, 2024.