China released its first-ever White Paper on national security on May 12, 2025, in which it outlined Xi Jinping thought on national security unhesitatingly asserting that the survival of “the leadership and ruling status of the Communist Party of China” is the “fundamental” framework of national security. In essence, the white paper emphasizes preserving the continuity and dominance of the CCP over the country as the bedrock of China’s national security.

At the time of this report, the full text of the White Paper is available only in Chinese with a sanitized “abstract” in English and some other languages. This version does not make the above assertion while presenting the White Paper as an explanation of Xi Jinping’s “holistic approach” to national security. This could be an indication that the White Paper is more meant for domestic consumption than for the world at large.

The cover of China’s White Paper on National Security

For the international audience, the abstract makes the benign and acceptable case that “China’s national security in the new era is one that takes the people’s security as its ultimate goal, political security as the fundamental task, and national interests as the guiding principle.”

However, if we look at the full text then the White Paper is a message to the people in the People’s Republic of China about how they should be looking at the CCP and its governance policy. The text categorically equates the continuation of CCP rule to China’s “political security”. The report text in Chinese under the section “Safeguarding the Party’s leadership and the socialist system,” maintains that “China’s national security hinges on the Party. China places political security as its top priority, always planning and advancing security in other areas from the perspective of political security…”

Also, under the section, “Upholding political security as the top priority” the White Paper says, “This is the lifeline of China’s national security in the new era. The core of political security is the security of the regime and the security of the system, and the most fundamental aspect is to safeguard the leadership and ruling position of the Communist Party of China and the socialist system with Chinese characteristics. If political security is not guaranteed, China will inevitably fall into a state of disunity and chaos, and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation will be impossible to achieve. The fundamental and long-term interests of the people will not be safeguarded.”

The White Paper conveys to the Chinese people that CCP will accordingly “place greater emphasis on maintaining social stability” and “on resolving conflicts and disputes at the grassroots level, and building harmony and stability at the grassroots level.” This would mean that China will continue to use local people and institutions as the vanguard in its sinicization of Tibet.

While the abstract does not mention Tibet, the full text has three references projecting the Tibetan issue (as well as that of the Uyghurs) as merely tools for interference by “Western anti-China forces” (and by implication a threat to China’s national security). The White Paper, while maintaining that “Western anti-China forces are doing everything they can to contain, suppress and contain China” says under the same section, “We must fully implement the Party’s strategies for governing Tibet and Xinjiang in the new era, crack down on secessionist and sabotage activities in accordance with the law, effectively curb infiltration, and significantly improve the public security situation.” Interestingly, the White Paper says, “Overseas separatist forces such as “Tibetan independence” and “East Turkestan” are frequently active.” The relevant portion on Tibet fundamentally aligns with China’s long-standing narrative of “the century of humiliation” to shift the blame on “foreign devils” to deflect its failings in Tibet. This blame-shifting serves a dual purpose: it deflects scrutiny from the CCP’s governance failures in Tibet, and it galvanizes Chinese nationalism by positioning the CCP as the steadfast defender of China’s sovereignty and dignity against perceived Western hostility.

The White Paper also includes “separatism, religious extremism” as being part of “non-traditional security challenges” that are increasing.

Human rights are mentioned thrice in the White Paper, including cited as being one of the four “red lines” that the United States cannot challenge China on. The White Paper calls the concept of human rights as well as democracy and freedom being “universal values” as instrument of “overseas anti-China forces” that needs to be prevented.

The White Paper makes reference to border security and claims that “China has negotiated and resolved land border issues with 12 of its 14 land-based neighboring countries”. As for the two remaining border countries, India and Bhutan, negotiations are ongoing. People’s Republic of China current land borders are with 14 countries: Afghanistan, Bhutan, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Myanmar, Mongolia, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Vietnam. It is interesting that the White Paper includes Nepal among those countries with whom border issues have been resolved even though reports in Nepal’s media talk about disputes at a few regions that are yet to be resolved.

Overall, the White Paper appears to be a message predominantly directed to the people in the PRC that China is confident in the midst of international turmoil and that it can withstand any challenges under the leadership of the CCP.