Crisis of credibility: China’s leaders in Tibet selected for loyalty to CCP over welfare of Tibetan people

An analysis of developments relating to Tibetan officials working for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) system since our previous report in March 2024 reveals that China is facing an acute crisis of nurturing credible Tibetan officials who can command the respect of the Tibetan people while doing the CCP’s bidding.

Over the years, Xi Jinping has called for building of Tibetan leadership teams at all levels, including cadre teams and primary-level party organizations in order to improve the capacity to respond to “major struggles” and prevent “major risks”. A Chinese state media report of January 2020 focuses on a meeting of cadres in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) to study Xi’s thoughts saying that the officials in “Tibet will, in accordance with the Central Government’s requirements, work hard to consolidate and deepen the achievements, establish long-term systems, solve problems and promote the development of the cause; carry out targeted education on loyalty to the Party, patriotism and Marxist theory in ethnic border areas, consciously safeguard the unity of the motherland, strengthen national unity, and resolutely oppose secession; continue to consolidate the achievements of poverty alleviation, and work with the whole country to build a moderately prosperous society in an all-round way and realize socialist modernization simultaneously.”

In 2024, TAR issued the “Implementation Opinions of the Tibet Autonomous Region on Implementing the National Cadre Education and Training Plan (2023-2027)”, incorporating Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era to “strengthen political training” of Tibetan cadres and to make them capable of “stabilizing” Tibet.

When looking at the Tibetans who are currently being thrust into leading positions in all Tibetan areas, it is clear that China is doing so with the sole focus on loyalty to CCP rather than any consideration of their capability to deliver to the Tibetan people. This stands in stark contrast to earlier eras; while Tibetans may have disagreed with decisions made by Tibetans who worked with the CCP such as Baba Phuntsok Wangyal, Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, and the 10th Panchen Lama, each one showed their dedication to Tibet in different ways.

Outline of Chinese leadership in Tibet

China has divided Tibet into 17 prefectural-level and two county-level (under non-Tibetan prefectures) autonomous administrative divisions: the Tibet Autonomous Region (with seven prefectural level areas under it); under Sichuan Province, two prefectural-level and one county area; under Qinghai Province, six prefectural-level areas (Qinghai also has some sub-county level Tibetan areas without any “Tibetan autonomous governance” status); under Gansu Province, one prefectural and one county level area; and under Yunnan Province, one prefectural-level area.

This report lists Tibetan officials who currently head offices from the prefectural level upwards as well as the two separate counties. The most visible change is new heads of the TAR People’s Congress and government. Yan Jinhai (born March 1962) moved up the hierarchy to be the head of the TAR People’s Congress to replace Lobsang Gyaltsen who kept his national NPC Vice President position. Karma Tseten (born December 1967) replaced predecessor Yan as head of TAR government. Karma Tseten has spent 12 years in various positions in then Nagchu (Naqu) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (his only provincial experience) before being brought to TAR in Lhasa in 2012. His responsibilities in Nagchu included heading its Political and Legal Affairs Commission and Public Security Bureau. As the region was politically active and saw massive crackdown in the years during his stay there and subsequently, Karma Tseten would have been involved in the crackdown policy. Karma Tseten is from Jomda in traditional Derge region in the TAR while his two predecessors (Yan and Che Dralha(Qi Zhala)) were from Tibetan areas outside of TAR. Neither Yan Jinhai, Karma Tseten, nor any of the current batch of Tibetans who are in leadership positions have established any credibility among the Tibetan people. Their predecessor, the disgraced Che Dralha had established some standing with a segment of the Tibetan people. This is the credibility crisis confronting the Chinese Government as it continues to make futile efforts to win over the hearts and minds of the Tibetan people.

Phakpalha Gelek Namgyal (Pabala Gelie Langjie), despite being 85 years old, continues in his dual positions as vice chair of the national CPPCC and Chairman of the TAR CPPCC.

Outside of TAR, no Tibetan heads the government, the People’s Congress or the CPPCC of Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan, and Yunnan, which have the majority of the Tibetan population.

Sizable number of allegedly corrupt officials

One indication of this crisis is the sizable number of officials who have been subjected to investigation, trial or sentencing in the past year or so, many of whom are Tibetans. They include two of the four highest leaders at the autonomous region level, as well as provincial level officials, including a vice president of TAR higher people’s court, party secretary of Kardze (Ganzi), heads of governments of Lhasa, Ngari, Dechen, and Lhoka, along with heads of the United Front Work Department of Shigatse, Dechen and Lijiang.

Corruption appears to be endemic in the Tibetan areas. In a memorable statement in May 1980, the then General Secretary of CCP, Hu Yaobang, who went to Lhasa on a fact-finding trip was appalled by the condition of the Tibetans and demanded to know whether all the money Beijing had poured into it over the years had been thrown into the Yarlung Tsangpo (River). His implication was obvious.

Notwithstanding Hu’s admonition and any corrective measures taken thereafter, in November 2014, the People’s Daily came out with a report on a corruption inspection visit to TAR from Beijing that found “some problems”. More importantly, the 2014 inspection team found “the situation of the anti-secession struggle is still complex and severe, a few party members and cadres are not firm in their political stance” thus drawing a connection between anti-corruption campaign and political crackdown in TAR.

Going by the number of people reported by Chinese media as being under investigation for corruption in 2024, the issue is still a problem and is adding to decreasing credibility of the officials. Given China’s opaque governance system and absence of a fair judicial recourse system, some of these people could be political victims, too.

Below are partial lists of senior officials in the Tibetan areas who have been sentenced or are being prosecuted currently.

Provincial level officials investigated/sentenced

Prefectural Level Officials investigated/sentenced

County/City level officials investigated/sentenced

Atheist regime ironically relies on “theocratic feudal” lamas to control Tibetans

The second indication of China’s credibility crisis relating to Tibetan officials is the contradictory continued reliance on lamas and monks for governance. It is contradictory because China claims to have liberated the Tibetan people from “three feudal lords,” with the lamas being one of the three (the other two being officials of the then Tibetan government and the nobility). In fact, the latest Chinese White Paper on Tibet, released on March 28, 2025, calls them a “Theocratic feudal serfdom” who make the Tibetan people “to unconditionally obey their orders and satisfy their demands,” a politically-motivated reference to pre-Chinese occupation Tibet. Nevertheless, when it comes to serving its political agenda, the CCP in 2025 is relying on the very same ecclesiastical community to perform the same task for it. Quite a few lamas holding positions are those who have been brought up before the Chinese invasion of Tibet and fall under the “three feudal lords.” But the Chinese government realizes the continued strong influence of Buddhism in the Tibetan community despite its efforts at sinicization and so look to the lamas’ involvement to evoke positive response from the Tibetan people. Thus, despite 60 years of Communist rule that does not have space for religion, there are more than 20 Tibetan Buddhist reincarnates who are given leadership positions at the national, provincial and sub-provincial levels of administration.

More importantly, the CCP agenda for continued cultivation of a select group of lamas and monks would be to use them as tools in the search and recognition of Tibetan reincarnations. Comprehending the international disapproval of an atheist regime’s interference in Tibetan reincarnation process, as detailed in ICT’s report of May 2024, China is using such lamas as spiritual garb in the CCP-determined recognition process of reincarnations and their training. The CCP has introduced measures, regulations and initiatives to exercise control over the recognition of reincarnations, certainly in preparation for the Chinese government’s long-term strategy on the future reincarnation of the Dalai Lama. Almost all of the lamas listed below are given positions in the Buddhist Association of China (BAC), which is given the role to implement these measures. Therefore, these Tibetan lamas are among those who are being involved either directly or indirectly by the Chinese government on matters relating to Tibetan Buddhism, including in the search process for reincarnations at all levels.

Is the CCP-selected Panchen Lama out of favor?

Gyaltsen Norbu, the CCP-selected Panchen Lama, is among these lama officials but has not moved up the ladder contrary to expectations. Could it be because despite all the powers and resources of the CCP they have not been able to encourage the Tibetan public in Tibet to embrace him as a spiritual leader and so the Chinese authorities cannot get political mileage out of him? It could also be that China’s strategy for him is being pulled in separate ways, by those in the leadership who consider him an asset and those who are realizing that he might be a liability. There may also be questions about his reliability. In a speech in 2015 speech Gyaltsen Norbu mixed praise of the CCP with apparent criticisms of China’s religious policy and limitation on Tibetan Buddhism.

In the initial years of his adult life, Norbu was being thrust into the limelight by the Chinese authorities. In April 2006, the first of what is called the World Buddhist Forum organized by CCP was used to launch him on the international stage. In 2010, when barely 20 years old, he was made a vice president of the Buddhist Association of China. In 2013, he was made a member of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). Chinese state media said then “The elevation comes amid anticipation that the Panchen Lama, who turned 23 in February, will make greater political contributions through his religious influence.” State media also highlighted his presence at the annual Two Sessions in subsequent years.

However, he has not been seen making “greater political contributions” since then. From all indications from Tibet, the CCP-selected Panchen Lama has minimal religious influence is hardly there among the Tibetan people. Although he has been made to travel to Tibetan areas in the past several years, it is only through monetary incentives and political coercion that ordinary Tibetans are made to attend events with him.

Even in the World Buddhist Forum, five more meetings have been held since 2006, but Norbu’s role has steadily decreased from giving the “keynote” remarks in the 3rd Forum in 2012 to being a mere participant in the 6th Forum in 2024.

China still uses him to mouth political statements (the latest being on the occasion of the Tibetan new year in February this year) but at the same time issuing directives not to highlight him in state media reporting, as was revealed by China Digital Times in 2020. In December 2024 there were media reports from Nepal about China making efforts to have him visit Lumbini, the birthplace of the Buddha, but then when there was an opportunity to project him before the Tibetan public in the aftermath of the earthquake in western Tibet in January 2025 and they did not do so. He also did not have a public role during the Two Sessions in March this year although he still is a member of the CPPCC and has been put in the spotlight in the past by Chinese state media.

Chinese state media reporting on the meeting the United Front Work Department Minister Shi Taifeng with Gyaltsen Norbu in the past several years on the occasion of Tibetan New Year seem intended to have a political message to him of needing to have the same thinking as that of the CCP leadership.

During their 2023 meeting, Shi hoped that he “can firmly keep in mind the earnest expectations of General Secretary Xi Jinping, and maintain a high degree of unity with the CPC Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core ideologically, politically and in action.”

In their 2024 meeting, Shi asked Norbu to “conscientiously study Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, and maintain a high degree of unity with the CPC Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core ideologically, politically and in action.”

When they met in February this year, Shi wanted Norbu to “further enhance political literacy”, “solidify political conviction, and closely follow the CPC Central Committee in thinking, political stance, and action.”

This repeated message over the years could either be a strategy shift in order to gain him legitimacy from the Tibetan public by projecting him as an independent minded person who is not a CCP lackey or it could reflect serious concern within the CCP about him.

In a separate development and in what China observers are terming as unprecedented, Shi was on April 2, 2025 was moved from UFWD changing place with Li Ganjie of the Central Organization Department.

Tibetan Lama officials in national organizations

At the national level, the 6th Jamyang Shepa (Jiamuyang Luosang Jiumei Tudan Queji Nima) is the lama holding the highest political position. Born in 1948, he is from Labrang Tashikyil Monastery, an important Geluk monastery in Kanlho (Gannan) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Gansu Province. He is the only Tibetan in the current 159-member NPC Standing Committee. As was the tradition in Tibet, he had gone to Lhasa to study in Drepung Monastery. Although, as a prominent reincarnation of a Buddhist master his natural political abode would be the advisory body CPPCC, the Chinese authorities have opted to keep him in the NPC since 1998. He continues to have a range of religious and political positions. At the NPC he is also a member of its Ethnic Affairs Committee. Nationally, he also has the position of vice president of the Buddhist Association of China and dean of Tibetan Buddhism College of China. At the provincial level, he is a deputy director of the Standing Committee of the 14th Gansu Provincial People’s Congress, president of the Buddhist Association of Gansu Province and president of the Gansu Buddhist Academy.

Then there is the long-lasting Phakpalha Gelek Namgyal (Pabala Gelie Langjie, born in 1940) one of the 23 vice chairs of the CPPCC (In 1959, he became a Vice Chairman of the CPPCC even while holding a position in Lhasa, and continues at the same CPPCC position even to this day). He is a prominent Geluk lama, studied in Sera Monastery in Lhasa, and had the Hutuktu title in traditional Tibetan society.

In the current 299 members CPPCC Standing Committee, there are two Tibetan clergy: Drupkhang Thubten Khedrup (rendered in Chinese reports as Trukang Thupden Kheldo or Zhukang Tubdankezhub, born 1955), recognized as the lama of Shabten (Shodain) Geluk monastery in Nagchu in 1958, and the CCP-selected Panchen Lama Gyaltsen Norbu (born in 1990). They are both also members of the Ethnic and Religious Affairs Committee of the 14th CPPCC. Drupkhang Rinpoche was even honored by CPPCC in March 2025 for “clear positions and unwavering principles on fundamental issues” an obvious reference to his political support to CCP.

There are eight Tibetan clergy members on the 2,172 member current National Committee of CPPCC. They are:

• Drikung Chungtsang Lobsang Jampa (Zhikong Qiongcang). Born in 1942 in Lhokha (Shannan), the TAR, in the aristocratic Lhagyari family. In 1946, he was recognized as one of the two heads of the Drikung Kagyu lineage of Tibetan Buddhism. In 1959, he was imprisoned and was released only in 1982. He had traveled twice to India, in 1985 and 1992, including during the inauguration of the Jangchubling monastery constructed by the other head of the lineage, Drikung Kyabgon Chetsang, in Dehradun, northern India.
• Shodruk Kyabgon Jamyang Palden Dorjee (Xianggen Badeng Duoji). Born in 1949 in Lithang, he is the head of Jamchen Choekhorling Geluk monastery in Lithang. Popularly known as the Lithang Kyabgon, a title signifying a superior status, he has been involved with the BAC since the 1960s, first in Sichuan and then in Beijing. He is honorary president of the Sichuan Buddhist Association.
• Tsemonling Tenzin Thinley (Cemo Lin Danzeng Chilie). Born in 1950 in Lhasa, he was enthroned as reincarnation of the head of Tsemonling Geluk monastery in 1955. One of his previous incarnations had served as Gaden Tripa, head of the Geluk lineage, as well as the regent of Tibet.
• Sertri Choekyi Lodoe Gyatso (Saichi Queji Luozhi Jiacuo). He is also a member of the Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee of the 14th CPPCC. Born in 1968 in Taktsang under Hualong Hui Autonomous County in Qinghai, he is a lama of Lamo Dechen Choekhorling Geluk monastery in Chentsa (Jianzha) under Malho (Huangnan) prefecture. It is said that this monastery has historical connections to the Lamo Tsangpa Oracle, one of the oracles invoked by the Dalai Lama.
• Sharnor Trungpa (Dongbao Zhongba). Born in 1968 in Gyezur (Jiulong) in Kardze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, he was reportedly recognized by Tai Situ Rinpoche, a prominent lama in exile, as a reincarnation of a Kagyu master and has his Karma Namgyaling (Zhiyun) Kagyu monastery in Lijiang, Yunnan.
• Lobsang Tenzin Gyare (born 1953) (Lousan Danzeng Jiare). He is also a member of the Ethnic and Religious Affairs Committee of the 14th CPPCC. At the provincial level he appears to be the longest-serving Tibetan in the current TAR government having become a vice governor in 2003 and continues to serve as one even to this day. In addition to being a reincarnate he is also a member of Tibetan aristocracy, being the son of Tsewang Dorjee Lhalu, a member of the cabinet as well as governor of eastern Tibet in the initial period of Chinese invasion of Tibet.
• Tashi Gyaltsen (Zhaxi Jiancai). Born in 1962, he became a monk of Sera Monastery in Lhasa in 1983. He is not a reincarnate.
• The lone female incarnation Samdhing Dorjee Phagmo (Sangding Duoji Pamu, born 1942) is a member of the 14th National Committee of CPPCC, Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region People’s Congress, Vice Chairman of the All-China Women’s Federation.

There are several more Tibetan lamas given position at the provincial and sub-provincial levels, as detailed in our May 2024 report on the Buddhist Association of China.

Provincial and sub-provincial level lama officials

• Kuchar Yonten Gyatso (Gejiao Yundeng Jiacuo). Born in 1963, he is the fourth incarnation of Kuchar Rinpoche and heads the historically important Garthar (Huiyuan) monastery in Kardze Prefecture in Sichuan. He is a Vice Chairman of the Kardze Prefecture CPPCC.
• Mili Kyabgon Pema Rinchen (Xianggen Baima renqing), a lama from the Mili (Muli) Tibetan autonomous county in the Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture in Sichuan. He serves as the Deputy Director of the Standing Committee of the Liangshan Prefecture People’s Congress and the Deputy Director of the Mili County People’s Congress. He is also a member of the 14th National Committee of the CPPCC. Born in 1977, he is among the younger group of lama officials.

• Shakpa Jamyang Khedrup (Xiaba Jamuyang Kezhu), from Lithang is a member of the Kardze CPPCC, and Deputy Director of the Lithang County People’s Congress. Born in 1968, he is the lama of Jamchen Choekhorling in Lithang.
• Sershul Tripa Thupten Choekyi Gyaltsen (Shiqu Chì bā. Tú bù dān. Què jí jiān zàn) is the lama of Sershul monastery in Sershul (Shiqu) county of Kardze Prefecture. Born in 1966, he is the Vice Chairman of the Sershul County CPPCC, and Director of the Management Committee of Sershul Monastery.

Controlling Tibetans through Rule by Law

This year we also include information on the holder of the positions of People’s Court and People’s Procuratorate at the provincial and sub-provincial levels. Over the years, China has been claiming that it is a country with law-based governance. Particularly, the Chinese authorities claim that they uphold the law in Tibet. As recent as on April 22, 2025, Wang Junzheng, the TAR Party Secretary, told a meeting of the TAR CCP Leading Group for Maintaining Stability that the party cadres should “respect the law, learn the law, abide by the law and use the law, and create a good atmosphere in the whole society of consciously abiding by the law, doing things in accordance with the law, looking for the law when encountering problems, solving problems and using the law, and resolving contradictions by law.”

In reality, there is rule by law where the party state, which is not accountable to the people, controls the Tibetan people while using laws merely as means to justify their subjugation. The CCP is supreme and as Chinese state media assert: “The Party’s leadership, constitution, and a socialist legal system with Chinese characteristics are the three major pillars of Xi Jinping thought on rule of law.” As the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission outlines in its Report to Congress in 2023, “The CCP uses law as a tool to wield power, not constrain it. Rather than viewing courts as independent, neutral arbiters of disputes between equal parties, the Party-state leverages the judiciary as a tool to advance its policy and political goals through a rule by law system.”

We see that some of the judicial positions and several of the public procuratorate positions are held by Tibetans. This aspect of Chinese control of Tibetans has not received much attention. The presence of Tibetans in these positions do not reflect their empowerment. We have had instances of Tibetans being denied the right to a fair trial and legal defense and do not have information on the background of the officials who are responsible for the denial of such rights.

Given the Chinese political agenda in Tibet, Tibetan officials, particularly in the judiciary, are merely utilized in a colonial way to implement the CCP policies on the Tibetan people. The CCP Political and Legal Affairs Commission maintains effective control over the judiciary. Even the procuratorate have the power to supervise the judiciary. The mandate given to the Tibetan judges to be subservient to the CCP can be seen from the remarks made by the head of the Intermediate Court in Yulshul (Yushu) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Qinghai who instructed court officials in 2022 saying, “We must uphold the Party’s absolute leadership over the work of the courts, implement the Party’s leadership in all aspects and throughout the entire process of the work of the people’s courts, plan the work of the courts within the overall work of the Party and the government, strictly implement the system of reporting to the Party committee on major matters, and ensure that the work of the courts moves forward in the correct political direction.”

Interestingly, there are some Tibetans who are posted in Chinese provinces that are not part of any traditional Tibetan area or are predominantly non-Tibetan. This could be an indication that there are educated Tibetans trying to find broader avenues to work, if they at all have a choice in their career preference. For the first time a Tibetan Phurbu Dhondup (Pubu Dunzhu, born 1972), has become the head of a United Front Work Department in a predominantly non-Tibetan populated province. Similarly, a Tibetan from Dzitsa Degu in Ngaba Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Gaga (Keke), is Party Secretary and Director of Hubei Department of Culture and Tourism. A Tibetan woman, Cui Yuying, who was until January 2023 the head of the Fujian Province CPPCC has since March 2023 been serving as a Deputy Director of the Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee of the 14th CPPCC. Yangle (Yang Lei) currently serves as a member of the Jiansheng town party committee in Chongqing. Another Tibetan, Tsering Dorjee, is Deputy Mayor of Wuwei City in Anhui Province. Yet another Tibetan, Liu Yaning, is a member of the Party Committee of Wuhan Customs and Head of the Discipline Inspection Group of the Party Committee.

Tibetans in the national-level leadership

The current 20th Party Congress, the term of which ends in 2027, has only one Tibetan in the 205 member-strong Party Central Committee. This is one fewer Tibetan than in the 19th Party Congress.^[1] Yan Jinhai (born 1962, former Tibet Autonomous Region Chairman and current chair of the TAR People’s Congress) is the only Tibetan in the current Party Central Committee. No Tibetan has ever found a spot on the Politburo or its real power-wielding Standing Committee.

There have been some changes in the jobs of two of the three Tibetans who are in the 171 alternate members of the 20th Party Central Committee (an increase of one Tibetan from the 19th Party Congress when only two Tibetans were alternates). Karma Tseten (Chinese: Gama Cedain, born 1967), has been promoted in January 2025 as a deputy secretary of TAR CCP and chairman of the TAR Government while Phurbu Dhondup (Pubu Dunzhu, born 1972), now heads the Sichuan United Front Work Department. The position of the third Tibetan, Tsering Thar (Ceringtar, born 1969), remains the same as a member of the Standing Committee of the Qinghai Provincial CCP and a vice governor of Qinghai Government.

In the current 14th National People’s Congress, which is China’s parliament (term began in March 2023), one Tibetan, Lobsang Gyaltsen (Luosang Jiangcun, born 1957) is among the 14 vice chairs. Gyaltsen was until January 2025 also the chair of the TAR People’s Congress. He had replaced Pema Thinley (Baima Chillin) in March 2023 as the sole Tibetan as an NPC Vice Chair. He could be considered the Tibetan holding the highest position under the Chinese system currently.

In the 159-member NPC Standing Committee, there is only one Tibetan, Jamyang Shepa, who is from Labrang Tashikyil Monastery in Kanlho (Gannan).

In the current 14th Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, the highest advisory body in China, only one Tibetan finds a place at the vice president level, the long-lasting Phakpalha Gelek Namgyal. He was re-appointed one of the 23 vice chairs of the CPPCC in March 2023.

As of March 2025, there are four other Tibetans on the CPPCC Standing Committee, which has a total of 299 members. They are Tashi Dawa (Zhaxi Dawa, born 1959) from Bathang in Kardze (Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Sichuan, a writer; Dorjee Rapten (Douji Redan, born 1956), deputy director of the Ethnic and Religious Affairs Committee of the CPPCC; Drupkhang Thubten Khedrup, vice chairman of the TAR CPPCC; and the CCP-selected Panchen Lama. This is the highest position that has been assigned to Gyaltsen Norbu (born 1990), whom the CCP selected in November 1995 to be its Panchen Lama after disappearing Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, the Panchen Lama recognized by the Dalai Lama. The fifth Tibetan who was a member of the CPPCC Standing Committee, Che Dralha (Qi Zhala, born 1958), has been removed from the CPPCC membership in March 2025 after he was subjected to disciplinary review and supervision investigation.

Although not on the CPPCC Standing Committee, Penpa Tashi (Bianba Zhaxi, born 1964) is a deputy director of the CPPCC Ethnic and Religious Affairs Committee. He also has a government position (see below).

No Tibetan finds a place in the minister level or higher in the current government. Dorje Tsering (Duoji Cairang) from Kanlho (Gannan) is the only Tibetan to have served at the level of a minister in Beijing. He served two terms as Minister of Civil Affairs from March 1993 to March 2003. Currently, Penpa Tashi (born 1964) is a member of the Party Leadership Group and Deputy Director of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission as well as Deputy Director of the Ethnic and Religious Affairs Committee of the 14th National Committee of the CPPCC.

No Tibetan finds a place in the committees of the NPC. In the CPPCC, there are currently two Tibetan deputy directors: Penpa Tashi and Dorjee Rapten in the Ethnic and Religious Affairs Committee. Che Dralha, until his expulsion, used to be on the Agriculture and Rural Areas Committee.

Tibetans in the United Front Work Department

The Communist Party organ the United Front Work Department (UFWD) plays a pivotal role in Chinese policies on Tibet.

However, since its establishment in 1948, to date the only Tibetan to be in a senior UFWD leadership position was Sithar (Sita), who was a vice minister in the Central United Front from 2006 to 2016. Sithar has since retired from the United Front but appears to still be involved in Tibet-related work.

Interestingly, in January 2025, a Tibetan has been appointed as head of the Sichuan provincial United Front Work Department. Phurbu Thondup, who is from Gyantse in Tibet, has been appointed as Minister of the provincial United Front Work Department making him the first Tibetan to hold such a position in Sichuan.

Although not technically from UFWD, Damdul (Zheng Dui), who is the head of the Beijing-based China Tibetology Research Center, is a member of the 14th CPPCC (and its Committee on Ethnic and Religious Affairs), but more importantly the deputy director of China’s secretive Office of the Central Tibet Affairs Coordination Group, which is the key body advising the Politburo on Tibet policy. Damdul has an academic background but was also involved in the Chinese delegation (serving as an interpreter) in the 2002-2010 dialogue process between envoys of H.H. the Dalai Lama and the Chinese Government. However, since he is past 60 years old, he may not rise any further in the hierarchy.

Non-Tibetans continue to dominate leadership

Non-Tibetans continue to hold the majority of party leadership positions, which are undoubtedly endowed with powers, at the provincial and prefectural level of administration in Tibet. No Tibetan holds the Party Secretary position in any of the five provincial level administration, nor has any Tibetan every held such a title.

At the prefectural level, of the 17 Tibetan prefectural-level and two county-level administrations, only four—Lhasa, Shigatse and Ngari in the TAR and Tsojang (Haibei) in Qinghai—have Tibetans as party secretaries. This is one more than in 2024, with the position in Ngari being the addition this time.

Tibetan representation at the head of prefectural-level governments, 13 of the 17 prefectural positions and one of the two counties are held by Tibetans. In Pari (Tianzhu) Tibetan Autonomous County in Gansu, no Tibetan holds any leadership position in this period. In our previous report, the head of the county was a Tibetan. According to Article 17 of the Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy, all of these positions ought to be held by Tibetans. It categorically says, “The chairman of an autonomous region, the prefect of an autonomous prefecture or the head of an autonomous county shall be a citizen of the nationality exercising regional autonomy in the area concerned. Other posts in the people’s government of an autonomous region, an autonomous prefecture or an autonomous county should, as far as possible, be assumed by people of the nationality exercising regional autonomy and of other minority nationalities in the area concerned.” (Emphasis added). China clearly is not following its own law in Tibet.

In both the People’s Congress, and the Political Consultative Conference the number of Tibetans heading them at the prefectural level has decreased since our 2024 report.

If we look at the security entities in Tibetan areas, we can see that almost all are non-Tibetans, both at the provincial as well as the prefectural levels. Similarly, among the judges only four out of the 17 prefectural level intermediate courts are headed by Tibetans.

In addition to its involvement in restricting religious activities, the PSB also seems to be the one that is responsible for the racially discriminatory denial of passports to Tibetans even though all citizens of the People’s Republic of China are entitled to one.

If we look at the PSB in Tibet, no Tibetan heads it at the provincial level. Only five prefectural-level heads out of 17 are Tibetans. This could be interpreted to imply that the CCP does not trust Tibetans enough to be leading these offices.

Up and coming Tibetan officials

There have been a few Tibetan officials who have risen quickly in the hierarchy since our last report in 2024. If the trend continues these people might be next in line to replace Yan Jinhai and Karma Tseten in the TAR leadership structure.

Tenpa, currently a member of the Standing Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region Party Committee, Deputy Secretary of the Party Leadership Group and Executive Vice Chairman of TAR Government. He was promoted to this position in February 2025. He has worked in the provincial UFWD at different levels for over 15 years and served in the sensitive Nagchu city government, too. His being made the executive vice chair of the TAR government could be an indication that he might be the one to replace Karma Tseten in the coming years. He was born in 1969 and has several years of service left before retirement.

Sonam Nyima, who was appointed head of the TAR United Front Work Department in 2024, was made one of the vice chairmen of the TAR PCC in 2022. In 2022, he also became the Party Secretary of of Shigatse prefectural-level city, being one of the few Tibetans to assume such a party position.

He is from Nangchen in Eastern Tibet (presently incorporated in Qinghai Province) and was born in February 1966. He has served a long time in Tibet, starting his work in Chamdo. In 2011, he became Deputy Secretary-General of the TAR government and subsequently served as Executive Deputy Mayor of Lhasa. In January this year, he became one of the vice chairmen of the 12th Tibet Autonomous Region CPPCC Committee.

Lists of leaders

Below are lists of leadership positions at the provincial and sub-provincial levels in Tibetan areas.

Footnotes:
[1] Xi Jinping cements grip on power at Party Congress: new leaders revealed and their influence on Tibet policy, International Campaign for Tibet, November 1, 2017, https://savetibet.org/xi-jinping-cements-grip-on-power-at-party-congress-new-leaders-revealed-and-their-influence-on-tibet-policy/